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l)Agent-Based Simulation of Financial Markets
A Modular, Continuous-Time Approach
The dynamics of financial markets is subject of much debate among researchers and
financial experts trying to understand and explain how financial markets work and traders
behave. Diversified explanations result from the complexity of markets, and the hardly
observable aspects of price formation mechanisms and of participants’ motivation behind
trading decisions. In an attempt to provide a better understanding of market dynamics,
studies in the realm of agent-based computational economics represent markets from
bottom-up. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of market
dynamics by extending the agent-based computational approach. In order to achieve our
goal we propose a modular, continuous-time, agent-based trading environment, with
individual, autonomous representation of market participants. In order to be able to
develop such an environment we first analyze and compare real and artificial stock
markets (ASMs). Based on this analysis we propose a conceptual framework to describe
real markets. By enriching the framework with design and implementation issues we get a
multi-dimensional taxonomy of artificial stock markets. ABSTRACTE, the proposed
modular environment is an operational form of these frameworks. ABSTRACTE is aimed to
embed the common aspects of real markets that exhibit big variations and are rarely
represented in artificial stock markets. This environment provides the user with a flexible
mechanism to implement many of the varying and hardly observable aspects of stock
markets and traders’ behavior. In this way it can contribute to the understanding of
market dynamics as it can be used both as a test bed to replicate and evaluate existing
market models, and to compare dynamics of multiple ASMs, as well as a tool to conduct
experiments with new models and traders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The dynamics of financial markets is subject of much debate among researchers and finan-
cial experts trying to understand and explain how financial markets work and traders behave.
Diversified explanations result from the complex dynamics of markets and its various hardly
observable aspects, such as decisions behind price formation mechanisms, or investors’ mo-
tivation behind trading actions. All this causes researchers to base their studies on diverging
assumptions.
There are two main, contradictory views regarding market mechanisms. On the one hand,
theoretical studies idealistically describe market dynamics. They suggest that markets are
efficient and assume rational, homogeneous behavior of traders. As the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) states, efficient markets are markets in which all available information
is immediately reflected in the prices, and thus, it is not possible for anyone to consistently
outperform the market, other than by chance. Further, rational traders are defined as traders
who take the optimal trading decision based on all the information they posses.
In contrast to the theoretical models, empirical and experimental studies suggest that
several assumptions made by theories (such as homogeneity, rationality, or the absence of
transaction costs) do not correspond to reality. They claim that traders are heterogeneous and
”boundedly rational”. Bounded rationality arises not only from cognitive boundaries, but ra-
tionality is mostly limited by the complexity of the environments. This approach suggests
that the standard finance models based on rational behavior and profit maximization, can be
true within specific boundaries. They are, however, incomplete, since they do not capture the
details of behavior (Reilly and Brown, 2003). Traders’ behavior, the way humans interpret
and act on information is the central topic studied within the area of behavioral finance.
Within behavioral finance alternative paradigms, such as the prospect theory and the het-
erogeneous market hypothesis (HMH), are proposed to explain empirical patterns (referred
to as market anomalies by EMH believers) that are not supported by theoretical explana-
tions. Although behavioral factors play an important role in the decision-making process
of individual investors, it is not clear how this phenomena influences the market as a whole
(Brabazon, 2000).
1
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There is, thus, much controversy about the market mechanisms that lead to price devel-
opments of the assets that can be observed in practice. There are two main aspects that cause
discussion: the rationality of traders, and the efficiency of markets. In relation to this dis-
crepancy, opinions regarding the properties of the time series on a market are not univocal
as well. Some people argue that prices follow a random walk, and that this property sug-
gests that markets are efficient. Several analysts, however, seem to find patterns, or so-called
”stylized facts”, in time series and benefit from them. The question is whether these patterns
occur by chance or whether there is some predictability in the prices. There are obviously a
multitude of factors that might influence in multiple ways the way prices develop, but there
is no general consensus regarding which aspects effectively play a role in the formation of
market prices and in the possible predictability of future returns.
In recent years, the agent-based approach to economic and financial analysis has grown
into an important research field for developing and understanding the complex patterns
and phenomena that are observed in economic systems. The agent-based computational
economics (ACE) (Tesfatsion, 2001; LeBaron et al., 1999), and, alternatively, the micro-
simulation (Levy et al., 2000) approaches have been proposed, emphasizing the need to
represent traders as individuals and to study the way macro features emerge from individual
interactions. These approaches attempt to model financial markets as evolving systems of
competing, autonomous interacting agents and emphasize their learning dynamics (Tesfat-
sion, 2001, 2002; LeBaron, 2000). Agent-based models offer the possibility to transparently
model behavioral issues and to study in this way the effect of agents’ behavior on the market
prices. Further, in agent-based models prices can be endogenously formed by the system
itself as the result of interaction of market participants. By using agents for studying market
dynamics, heterogeneous, boundedly rational, and adaptive behavior of market participants
can be represented and its impact on market dynamics can be assessed.
Both the benefits and the drawback of agent-based artificial stock markets, as LeBaron
(2001) notices, lie in the ”large number of parameters for which our priors are extremely
diffuse”. Two important features of agent-based artificial stock markets in relation to other
market models and real stock markets are emphasized here: diffuse priors, and the ability to
handle large number of parameters. Diffuse priors refer to the fact that the identity and value
of the parameters that describe real markets are uncertain or not known, and therefore market
modelers make different assumptions regarding them. Taking into account a large number
of parameters, on the one hand, generates market models that contain more representative
elements of the de facto microstructure of stock markets. This strengthens their validity, in
the sense that the probability that they have any connection to the real world increases. On
the other hand, the changing and large variety of market organizations and the occurrence of
several ”hardly observable” features, such as details behind price formation mechanisms and
traders’ decision, imply broadly diffuse prior assumptions. Consequently, the dilemma that
one has to deal with when representing markets is, which parameters and values to choose
for, and how to assess the validity of one’s assumptions and the way the choices influence
the dynamics.
Given the complexity of real stock markets, agent-based market models need to contain
as well assumptions and choices related to the market organization and to the traders’ behav-
ior. We observe several common choices made in these models. For instance, most of the
early agent-based artificial markets represent call markets. Further, often only investors are
2
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modeled. From implementation point of view the investors are centrally coordinated, and a
predefined set of trading strategies is considered.
In artificial stock markets (ASMs) in the literature a common choice is to study call
markets. Further, in these models, in relation to call markets, equilibrium type of price
formation mechanisms are typically studied. Although, continuous trading sessions are
much more common in real markets (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000; Harris, 2003), these
have been rarely focused on in early ASMs, and have gained attention only recently.
With respect to the behavior of market participants, in ASMs attention is rarely paid to
the representation of financial traders involved in setting prices, such as market makers
or brokers. Usually, the only market participants considered are investors, who are more-
over modeled as being centrally selected and making trading decisions simultaneously. In
contrast to this representation, in reality investors take decisions autonomously and asyn-
chronously.
The modeled strategies across the different AMS’s vary on a wide scale, given the fact
that investment strategies are hardly observable, and the fact that arbitrary many possibilities
exist to forecast future values. However, by far the most ASMs are one shot models with a
predefined set of trading alternatives. This means, that if we want to study other strategies, or
slightly other type of models, we need to build a new model from scratch. It is not possible
to easily plug in new alternatives in existing models.
In an attempt to provide a better understanding of market dynamics, in this thesis we
propose a trading environment that addresses the above mentioned shortcomings. We aim
to represent markets from bottom-up, and to continuously follow the trading behavior of
market participants, including financial traders, portrayed as individual, autonomous agents.
In order to accomplish this goal we apply the ACE methodology. We strive for a modular
representation of markets and trading behaviors, in the sense that we try to support multiple
market structures and arbitrarily many trading strategies in a flexible way. We primarily
focus on studying dynamics in relation with continuous trading sessions by using continuous
time simulation.
Based on the considerations above, we start with formulating our research objective and
research questions followed by a discussion of the applied research methodology.
1.2 Research objective and research questions
Research objective:
Contribute to the study and understanding of market dynamics by providing a
computational agent-based continuous-time simulation approach that supports a
flexible representation of stock market organizations and traders’ variable behavior.
Several approaches exist to study and understand market dynamics. Theoretical stud-
ies try to find explanations through analytically tractable models. Empirical research ana-
lyzes historical data and tries to find correspondence between various factors. Experimental
studies focus on analyzing the trading behavior and its consequences on the dynamics of
well-observed players in a usually stylized environment of simplified market models, play-
ers being either humans or computer programs. Experimental studies are closely related to
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the behavioral finance literature.
The common feature of the approaches used to study market dynamics is, that a model of
the market is created. In order to create somewhat realistic models, however, one should look
at how markets are in fact organized. Therefore, in order to provide an improved approach
for studying market dynamics, first, we should examine and summarize what is known about
market organizations and market dynamics. Further, we should pinpoint and analyze the
aspects that make market dynamics difficult to understand or can cause controversial expla-
nations. For instance, an important aspect that leads to controversial explanations of market
dynamics is the assumption regarding the characteristics of market participants. Are they
rational, boundedly-rational, heterogeneous, or homogeneous?
Accordingly, the first question that arises in relation to our objective is:
Research Question 1.
Which are the relevant common and variable aspects of stock markets that should be
taken into account when studying them?
After having gained insight into the workings of real markets we should survey how
artificial stock markets from literature compare to them. Therefore, we need to study several
ASMs, compare these and analyze what kind of common and variable aspects are taken into
account by them. Accordingly, the second main research question that we aim to answer is:
Research Question 2.
To what degree do ASMs from literature reflect the workings of real markets and how do
they deal with the common and variable aspects of real stock markets?
Our final objective is to improve the understanding of market dynamics. We aim to do
this with the help of an environment that supports the representation of common and variable
aspects of markets found when answering Research Question 1, irrespective of whether they
are considered or not by the ASMs studied. The question is:
Research Question 3.
How can we design and develop a modular, flexible agent-based environment using which
one can study both the common and the varying, hardly observable features of stock markets,
as well as their aspects that have been rarely or not represented in existing ASMs?
Our aim is at the one hand to provide a design methodology for flexible, modular repre-
sentation of stock markets. On the other hand, we aim to build such an environment. Once
we know how to build this environment, and we build it, we need to evaluate it.
In order to evaluate the environment we need to conduct case studies, i.e. implement
specific ASMs on top of the environment. The case studies serve to evaluate whether the
environment possesses the suggested properties, particularly the ability to embed varying
aspects in a flexible way. Further, they are used to prove the correct functioning of the
environment. Further, case studies can help us to answer questions related to the added
value of the proposed environment:
Research Question 4.
What is the added value of the proposed environment as compared to existing ASMs, and
how can it improve the understanding of market dynamics?
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1.3 Research methodology
As we remarked in the previous subsection, the first step to take in our research is to study
the relevant aspects of real stock markets. To be able to answer Research Question 1, we
study first, the literature on market microstructure and we analyze the organization of sev-
eral markets. In order to be able to describe the generic behavior of traders and to determine
the varying aspects that differentiate individual participants we discuss the various trading
possibilities by tracing orders on the various routes they can follow, from the moment they
are placed till they are executed and confirmed back. Based on the literature survey and
analysis conducted in this way, we compose a conceptual framework that consists of a struc-
tured classification of the common and varying aspects of markets with the help of which
market organizations and traders’ behavior can be described and differentiated. This frame-
work forms a guideline for the rest of the thesis. So far, the research approach that we apply
can be characterized as qualitative and inductive: we start with detailed observations of part
of reality, namely the structure and the workings of stock markets, and move towards a more
abstract, general representation of the observed features (theory building).
After having gained insight into the workings of real markets we conduct a literature
survey on artificial stock markets. In order to answer Research Question 2 we give a struc-
tured overview of several ASMs from the literature in terms of the conceptual framework
that we build in answering Research Question 1. First, we analyze which aspects of the tax-
onomy are modeled in the ASMs, and which aspects are omitted. Then, we also investigate
implementation issues, i.e. we investigate how the represented aspects are modeled. This
comparative study on ASMs leads to a new taxonomy of ASMs that enriches the conceptual
framework for describing real stock markets with modeling details.
The frameworks and the results on the analysis of stock markets and ASMs enables us to
take a generic approach for modeling stock markets, leading to an environment that should be
flexible and modular in order to support the representation of multiple market structures and
trading strategies. The question that arises at this stage is, how to combine all these aspects
into one environment. The next step of our research is thus, to answer Research Question 3.
As reflected by the research objective, there are already some decisions we have made in
advance related to the design of this environment. These decisions refer to the continuous-
time simulation and the agent-based computational approach. By applying the agent-based
computational economic approach we can achieve constructive development of market mod-
els, and we can study dynamics as arising from the interaction of individual agents. Contin-
uous-time simulation and asynchronous, autonomous trader representation will be achieved
with the help of the JADE environment, that supports non-preemptive scheduling of agents’
tasks, that are part of agents’ behavior. We choose for software agent-based simulation ex-
periments, since it gives us the freedom to manage various parameters, and the possibility to
observe traders’ behavior. This in turn helps us to study the influence of traders’ decision on
the dynamics.
After designing and developing the proposed framework, it should be evaluated and its
added value should be assessed. There are several aspects to evaluate in relation to a frame-
work. First of all it should be tested whether it serves its purpose, and additionally its correct-
ness needs to be investigated. In order to evaluate the agent-based framework that we build,
we try to replicate already tested models. In one of the case studies, we go further than
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replicating experiments and conduct additional experiments by taking advantage of specific
features (such as continuous-time simulation and autonomous representation of traders) of
the trading environment that we propose. The case studies help us to evaluate the environ-
ment and to illustrate the added value of it, thus answering Research Question 4. Further, the
case studies also serve to investigate whether and in which measure the choices made with
respect to the aspects of the real markets we choose to model, and the way these aspects are
modeled influences the dynamics of the model.
Our research objective goes further than building a market model. By introducing this
environment we aim to provide a methodological advancement, that, as stated in our research
objective, can aid the study and understanding of market dynamics. We provide a framework
that can be used to model many types of markets and trading strategies and as such, can help
to investigate market dynamics using these models.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The structure of the thesis is directed by the research questions stated above. To start with,
in Chapter 2 we present a synthesis on market organizations and the behavior of market
participants. We analyze the structure of market organizations and abstract out factors that
we think are important to consider when modeling markets. Further, we study the trading
behavior of market participants with different roles, such as investors, brokers and market
makers and identify the common and varying aspects of individuals within each group. This
analysis is aimed to answer Research Question 1, and results in a conceptual framework, a
taxonomy of real markets and market participants.
In the second part of Chapter 2 we present an overview of approaches used to describe
and understand market dynamics. We briefly discuss ideas behind analytical, empirical and
experimental research conducted in this direction and compare them. We elaborate on how
they try to provide means for understanding market dynamics, briefly mention the findings
they lead to, and discuss the advantages and shortcomings of each. Further, we motivate why
we choose to apply the agent-based computational approach.
Based on the conceptual framework for a taxonomy of stock markets, in Chapter 3 we
study several artificial stock markets from the literature. We investigate the aspects that
these ASMs represent, and the aspects they omit or rarely represent. Further, we study
how the represented aspects are modeled within these ASMs. The analysis conducted in
this way helps us to answer Research Question 2 and results in a taxonomy of artificial
stock markets. This taxonomy extends in fact (with modeling aspects) the taxonomy of real
markets proposed in Chapter 2.
The results obtained so far, i.e. the structured description and classification of stock
markets and ASMs are mapped to an agent-based framework in Chapter 4. In this chapter
we propose an approach, i.e. the ABSTRACTE modular trading environment, that aids the
understanding of market dynamics. During the design phase of the trading environment we
strive to take into account both the common features and the varying aspects of real markets.
We also want to incorporate features that are rarely focused on in the ASMs studied. Through
the presentation of this environment we aim to answer Research Question 3.
In order to evaluate the environment and to answer Research Question 4 we try to repli-
cate and extend ASMs from the literature. As a first stage we choose to replicate two simple
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models. The first case study (the Roll model) is analytically tractable, and represents contin-
uous quote-driven markets. The second case study models a simple call auction with prices
set at equilibrium. Our primary aim with these ASMs is to illustrate the modularity of AB-
STRACTE and to prove its correct functioning. A success in replicating an existing model
can be seen as a positive evaluation of the environment.
At the second stage of evaluation, we illustrate how microstructure models can be repre-
sented and studied within the proposed framework. In Chapter 5 we consider the extended
Glosten and Milgrom model presented by Das (2005), and try to replicate its findings. Our
research goal goes beyond replicating these experiments however. We primarily aim to im-
prove the understanding of market dynamics. Therefore, taking advantage of the properties
of our proposed environment, we extend and improve the replicated model, and analyze the
market dynamics within it. The main focus of the analysis is whether and how continuous-
time simulation influences the outcomes and what its added value is in comparison to dis-
crete time simulation. Through the various experiments conducted we aim to answer Re-
search Question 4.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we evaluate our research objective, and analyze to what degree we
managed to answer the research questions. We finish the thesis with suggestions for future
research.
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Dynamics of Stock Markets
One of the few characteristics that advocates of the various research approaches agree on is
that stock markets are complex systems and that models are needed to study their dynamics.
In order to find out how to design such models insight in the structure and workings of real
stock markets is required.
In this chapter we aim to give insight into the organization and workings of stock mar-
kets. We start with introducing some concepts from the market microstructure literature.
Market microstructure literature studies the institutional structure behind price formation in
markets, analyzing the process by which investors’ demands are translated into transactions
and prices. Inspired by this area we propose a conceptual framework to differentiate stock
markets. The framework provides a taxonomy for market structures and trading aspects.
These proposed aspects will then serve as a guideline for comparing ASMs from the litera-
ture and for an overview of the structural and behavioral representation possibilities. Further,
they provide the main design line one should consider when building new market models.
The way a market is represented and organized influences the quality of a market. High
quality, good functioning markets are what all traders ultimately strive for. In the second
part of this chapter we discuss how quality of a market is defined, and how it can possibly
be measured. We round off with a brief overview of the approaches used to study market
dynamics, and the findings thereof. A preliminary version of this chapter has been reported
in (Boer et al., 2005b).
2.1 Market microstructure
The central topic in studies on market dynamics is price dynamics, that is the process by
which prices change as a reaction to changes in the state of the market. Market prices are
directly determined by the price formation mechanism that applies on a specific market.
Prices are formed basically as a result of executing orders. As a consequence, prices are
indirectly influenced by several other factors that trigger orders, such as economy, news,
financial situation of equity issuers, personal opinions (Figure 2.1).
The importance and influence of the market structure on price formation is ignored in
many studies. The primary aim in market microstructure literature, however, is to study
9
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Order Matching
Traders
Market PriceTrading Decision Orders
Figure 2.1: Price formation at high level
this relationship (O’Hara, 2002). The institutional structure behind price formation might be
ignored for some purposes, like when longer investment horizons are involved. However, for
many purposes (measurement of execution costs, market liquidity, comparison of alternative
market making mechanism, etc.) market microstructure should be a central issue (Campbell
et al., 1997).
It is not difficult to observe the trading actions that participants take. What is more prob-
lematic is to define what governs these actions, such as when, how and why participants
take these actions, how they determine the parameters of the orders. How traders solve these
problems depends on their role in the market, on the market structure, and on individual
characteristics. The difficulty of understanding market dynamics arises from the presence of
such hardly observable aspects. Generally speaking there are two main hardly observable as-
pects on stock markets: the price formation mechanism and the decision-making mechanism
of the traders. We denote these as cloudy areas in Figure 2.2. The former hardly observable
aspect is related to the organization of the market, the latter to the behavior of market partici-
pants. They are however, strongly related to each other, given that market participants might
be involved both in placing orders and executing them.
The literature on market microstructure investigates trading and the organization (struc-
ture) of markets. The structure of a market is defined by trading rules and trading systems
and determines who can trade, what, when and how can be traded, and further what traders
can know and do in a market (Harris, 2003). The structure provides the framework within
which the market functions, i.e. trading takes place. Microstructure literature focuses on
research related to:
• price formation and price discovery,
• market structure and design issues,
• information and its disclosure.
Markets are often referred to as black boxes because of the hardly observable aspect of these
issues. Market microstructure literature is concerned in a natural way with ”black box”
related problems, such as (Madhavan, 2000):
• looking inside the ”black box” in order to analyze how latent demands are translated
into the prices and volumes realized,
• analyzing how different rules and structures affect the ”black box”, and
• studying how revealing the workings of the ”black box” affects the behavior of traders
and their strategies.
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Figure 2.2: Processes that determine market dynamics at high level
Being interested in understanding the dynamics of stock markets we are inevitably con-
cerned with these black box related problems. In order to be able to study market dynamics,
first we take a closer look at the (static) structure of real markets. Then, we try to watch
markets in action and look inside the black boxes.
2.2 The organization of stock markets
In order to understand how stock markets work, first we focus on their static, visible side. In
this section we aim to identify the main organizational factors that characterize real markets
and influence market dynamics, and, as such, should be taken into account when designing
artificial stock markets. In order to achieve our aim we analyze various market organiza-
tions. Based on the aspects discussed by Harris (2003) and Madhavan (2000) we identify
the following main factors that describe a market structure: traded instruments, order forms,
market participants, trading sessions, execution systems, and market rules. We elaborate on
each of them in the remainder of this section.
2.2.1 Traded instruments
Instruments are the objects traded in a market. At every market it is well-defined which
instruments can be traded. Instruments include several types of assets and contracts. Real
assets represent physical commodities. Financial assets are instruments that represent own-
ership of real assets and the cash flows that they produce. Stocks are financial assets that
represent ownership of corporate assets (Harris, 2003). A given stock can be traded on a
market only if it qualifies for listing, which is the case if it, and the corporation that issued
it, satisfies certain financial and governance criteria stated by market rules. On the NYSE
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instruments of approximately 3600 companies were listed in January 2007 according to the
official site of NYSE Group, Inc. (http://www.nyse.com). Certain stocks can be traded on
more than one market.
Stocks traded on a given market are priced according to the rules that are established on
that specific market. Price, however, does not necessarily reflect the real value of a stock.
The value of a stock depends on the valuation of corporate assets, liabilities and income
of the corporation that they represent, and further it depends on the traders’ expectation
regarding how well they expect corporate managers will use corporate assets in the future
(Harris, 2003). In this sense, stocks are not an integral part of a market where they are traded,
but, they exist ”outside” the market. That is: they represent the issuer company, dividends
are payed on them, and their value depends on the issuer’s performance and future plans.
2.2.2 Orders and quotes
Trading intentions are expressed by means of trade instructions called orders or by means of
willingness to trade in the form of quotes (Harris, 2003). Orders specify which instrument
to trade, how much to trade (size of an order), whether to buy or sell (side of an order). All
this information is contained in the most simple orders, called market orders. Orders might
also specify additional conditions that the trade must satisfy. Conditions might refer to the
ultimate price (limit price) that the trader accepts for an order, in case of limit orders, and
they might further indicate for how long the order is valid (expressed in time or related to
change in the market price), whether the order can be partially executed, etc. If price is not
included in the order, the order will be executed at the market price that is valid when the
order is received on the market.
Buy and sell orders that can not be executed for the moment are entered in a so-called
order book. There is a separate order book for every stock. Order books that contain limit
orders are limit order books. Whether, and in which measure the content of an order book
is available to the market participants, and other restrictions regarding order placement are
determined by the trading rules that hold in a market. Availability of such information has
impact on the grade of transparency of the market.
Generally, on markets traders are operating having a specific role, for instance they need
to execute orders, motivate trading, or ensure an orderly market (see Section 2.2.3). Traders
with a specific role on a market do not issue trading instructions, but they arrange their own
trades. In order to indicate that they are willing to buy or sell they quote prices and quantities.
Willingness to buy is referred to as a bid quote, while willingness to sell is referred to as an
ask quote or offer. Quotes include information about the name of the instrument, the trading
side, the quantity and price that the traders will accept. The difference between the best (i.e.
lowest) offer price and the best (i.e. highest) bid price on a market is the bid-ask spread.
Traders offer liquidity when they make bids or offers, and they take liquidity when they
accept bids or offers (for a definition of liquidity see Section 2.4).
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2.2.3 Market participants
In every market it is well-defined what kind of traders can operate, their number, role, oblig-
ations and restrictions. Depending on their tasks and role in the market we classify market
participants (traders) in two main groups:
• investors and
• financial traders.
We refer to traders who are not part of the market organization itself as investors. They can
be individuals, mutual funds, money managers or corporate pension funds (Harris, 2003).
Financial traders (or financial agents) are traders endowed with special role in financial
markets. They act as intermediaries, i.e. third parties in trading (Schwartz and Francioni,
2004).
Financial agents need to conduct special tasks. They need to execute orders on behalf
of the clients, or need to execute orders for own account in order to give other traders the
opportunity to trade (i.e. to provide liquidity). Accordingly, we differentiate two types of
financial traders:
• brokers and
• market makers.
Brokers are primarily required to handle orders for customers. They might be allowed at
some markets to trade for their own account as well. Financial traders responsible for a
good, orderly market are called market makers. Market makers allow other traders to trade
when they want to trade, and make money by buying low and selling high. Market makers
often are known by other names. Market makers who have the obligation to commit capital
to a trade in order to contribute to a liquid, orderly market are defined as dealers. Further, the
expression market maker can be used for the ”Specialist” from the NYSE, for the ”Hoekman”
from the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, for the ”Kursmakler” from the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG,
and for the dealers from the NASDAQ.
To each stock one (e.g NYSE) or more market-makers can be assigned. They are re-
sponsible for the liquidity of the assigned stock. In most markets, market makers have to
provide bid and ask quotes for the stocks they are responsible for. If more market-makers
are assigned to a certain stock (e.g. dealers on NASDAQ), they are competing with each
other by trying to provide the best bid-ask quotes.
Figure 2.3 depicts the relations that are possible between the different types of market
participants. Market makers function only on the market itself. Brokers, however, can work
both on the market and independently, trading through member brokers from the market
organization or directly with market makers. Investors typically contact a specific broker or
brokerage firm if they want to sell or invest, and ask their advise and help to place orders.
However, it is also possible that investors trade directly with a market maker, for example,
if they are member firms, or they trade via electronic trading systems. A common scenario
is that brokers are contacted by investors to execute an order, and they then try to trade
with other brokers or market makers, like the specialist on NYSE, and the dealer with the
most attractive quote on NASDAQ. Market-makers have the obligation to execute orders that
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arrive from outside the market-place, and need to overtake unexecuted orders from brokers.
It is not always possible to execute an order immediately. The time of execution depends on
market requirements, and on the market makers’ strategy and belief. Orders that cannot be
immediately executed are stored in the limit order book of the market maker.
Marketplace
Investors
Brokers
Brokers
Market Makers
Figure 2.3: Relation between traders
Financial traders are, in fact, not always needed. Their tasks can be performed by auto-
mated order execution mechanisms as well, that do not require human intervention.
2.2.4 Trading sessions
Trading at stock markets takes place in trading sessions (Harris, 2003). There are basically
two types of trading sessions, based on the degree of continuity (Madhavan, 2000):
• call market sessions and
• continuous sessions.
On call-markets trading occurs at well-specified times. During a call all trading requests
placed for a stock are aggregated and a single price is set, usually such that the trading
volume is maximized. On continuous markets, trading can occur at any time the market is
open. The advantage of call markets is that traders interested in a given instrument at the
same time and place can easily find each other. The advantage of continuous trading is that
it allows traders to arrange their trades whenever they want.
Although there are several types of stock markets, there is a tendency to converge towards
similar organizations, often towards a structure with call markets used to open and close the
trading day, and with continuous trading session in between (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000).
Continuous trading markets are very common. In the past few years many national equity
markets switched from call market sessions to continuous trading with opening calls, but
none has changed from continuous trading to exclusive call trading (Harris, 2003).
2.2.5 Execution systems
The procedures used for matching buyers and sellers defines the execution system of a mar-
ket. The execution system is the kernel of a market. There are two primary market structures
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distinguished based on the execution system applied (Harris, 2003; Schwartz and Francioni,
2004):
• quote-driven markets, and
• order-driven markets.
Often two or more execution systems are applied on a market. Such kind of markets are
referred to as hybrid markets. Both limit and market orders can be placed on any of these
markets.
On quote-driven markets market makers must participate in every trade. This means
that investors and brokers cannot trade with each other, they need to involve the market maker
in every trade. Market makers trade for their own inventory by placing quotes at which they
are willing to buy and sell. In pure quote-driven markets all liquidity is supplied by market
makers. Quote-driven markets in which more market makers supply the liquidity for a given
stock are also called dealer markets.
On order-driven markets the orders of buyers and sellers can be brought together and
cleared directly without the intermediation of market makers or dealers. Buyers and sellers
have to arrange their trades based on the trading rules (see Section 2.2.6) applied on the
market. Trading requests are submitted to a central location, where they are matched (Reilly
and Brown, 2003; Madhavan, 2000). There are many forms of order-driven markets, most
of them being auction type of markets.
• Oral auctions.
In an oral auction traders offer and take liquidity by calling out and accepting bids
and offers. Traders must publicly express their bids, offers and acceptance. In this
way all traders can participate fairly in the market. One of the best known forms of
oral auction is the ”persistent shout double auction” applied on the NYSE. During
double auction on NYSE the current bids and offers persist. Any new bid or offer
must improve on the existing one. Call outs that are improved become invalid.
• Rule-based order matching systems.
On markets that apply rule-based order matching systems traders negotiate with each
other by submitting and canceling orders. If the market is organized around call ses-
sions, then orders will be collected before a call and there is one attempt made to
arrange all trades at the end of a call. In continuous trading markets the system at-
tempts to arrange trades whenever new orders arrive. Based on the rule applied to de-
termine prices of trading arrangements, three main types of markets are distinguished:
single price auctions, continuous two-sided auctions and crossing networks.
– Single price auctions.
In a single price auction, all trades take place simultaneously at the same market
clearing price. If the buy and sell order in a feasible trade have different prices
(i.e. the price of the buy order is higher than the price of the sell order), the
orders can be filled at any of these prices, or at any price between them. The
final price in this case will be determined by trading rules. Single price auctions
are applied in call sessions.
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In (Schwartz and Francioni, 2004) single price auctions are further classified as
price scan auctions, sealed bid auctions or open limit order books. During a
price scan auction the market maker indicates a market clearing price. Traders
respond to the indicated price with orders. These processes are repeated until
an acceptable balance can be found. During a sealed bid auction orders are not
revealed to other participants. If a single price auction is characterized as open
limit order book, orders are made public, and, at each instant a clearing price is
indicated that would be set if the call were to be held at that instant. The final
market price is set when the call is conducted.
– Continuous two-sided auctions.
In a continuous two-sided auction, orders that cannot be filled are stored in an
order book. Incoming sell orders are compared with the best bid and incoming
buy orders are compared with the best offer from the order book. If a match is
possible trade is conducted at the price of the order from the order book. If the
trade does not completely fill the new order, the system matches the remainder
of the order from the next highest ranking order from the order book on the
corresponding side.
– Crossing networks.
In crossing networks all trades take place at prices determined elsewhere. Cross-
ing networks are the only order-driven markets that are not auction markets.
They are all call markets: traders submit orders to them before the call. The
system matches buy order to sell orders based on some precedence rules. All
possible trades are arranged at a so called crossing price. The crossing price, can
be for example the closing price of some market, or at a price of a trade chosen
randomly from trades immediately following a call.
Order-driven markets are very common. On call markets typically single-price auctions
are conducted. These type of call-sessions are referred to as call-auctions. On many con-
tinuous markets it is possible to arrange trades via electronic continuous two-sided auctions
(Harris, 2003).
Both quote-driven and order-driven markets can be further characterized as brokered
markets if brokers actively search to match buyers and sellers. Brokers are either asked by
investors (their clients) to fill their orders or initiate orders themselves by suggesting trades to
their clients. Brokers are, for example, often needed on order-driven markets for an effective
creation of liquidity.
Most of the markets cannot be characterized as pure quote-driven or pure order-driven,
but are hybrid markets. Hybrid markets do not apply a single execution system, but they
combine them. In such a case, the dominating system defines the market type. The NASDAQ
Stock Market is, for example, a quote-driven market, but sometimes traders can directly
trade together. Many continuous markets are basically order-driven markets but if there is
not enough activity intermediaries need to intervene as dealers (Reilly and Brown, 2003).
This is the case if there is order imbalance (there are no orders on one of the trading sides),
or if the bid-ask spread becomes too wide (Schwartz and Francioni, 2004).In the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, the most liquid stocks, those belonging to the AEX and AMX indexes, are
traded in a continuous order-driven market with automatic matching. For medium and less
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liquid stocks, execution is not automatic but controlled by the Hoekman who enters quotes
manually (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000). The NYSE is essentially an order-driven market
as well, but has elements of quote-driven market, since market makers (called Specialists)
are required to commit capital in order to offer liquidity when no one else will do so.
2.2.6 Market rules
On every market rules specify how buyers and sellers can arrange their trades. The set of
rules adopted on a market is called the protocol. Rules can vary not only from market to
market but from stock to stock within a market as well. Rules regulate the organization of
trades, the trade prices, and determine the quantity and quality of information provided to
market participants.
Rules specify, for example, the time of the call-auctions on call and hybrid markets, and
the conditions that imply trading suspensions. They also impose restrictions on the orders
and quotes that traders can place (Madhavan, 2000). On the Amsterdam Stock Exchange,
for example, there is a minimum threshold of shares determined for which quotes can be
placed (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000). Rules restrict the allowed minimum and maximum
difference between the bid and ask prices of a dealer’s quote, called as bid-ask spread, the
minimum and maximum difference between two consecutive bid quotes and ask quotes, the
unit by which traders can vary their quotes (e.g. decimals) called tick-size. The order in
which orders can be filled also depends on regulations: earlier placed orders, or orders at
better prices might have priority.
The quantity and quality of information provided to the market participants during the
trading process (Madhavan, 2000), the extent of dissemination and speed of dissemination
(Demarchi and Foucault, 2000) are all regulated by market rules. Information is classified
as pre-trade or post-trade based on the timing of its availability. Pre-trade information refers
to information a-priori available for traders, such as: quotes, the content of the limit order
book, degree of anonymity. Post-trade information refers to the transactions made, to the
publication of prices, etc. An example of post-trade information is transaction data. On
many markets there must be some delay before transaction data is published (especially if it
represents a large transaction). The way information is disseminated on a market influences
the degree of transparency of that market.
The organizational factors described above state how trades can be conducted and thus,
how prices can be formed on a market. Accordingly, the type of execution system by which
the final price is determined on a specific market is known. However, the detailed process
behind the actual price formation is in general not public but hardly observable. This problem
is strongly related to the hardly observable aspect of price formation discussed in Section 2.1.
The other hardly observable aspect we mention in that subsection refers to the participants’
behavior. The presence and behavior of traders is constrained by the way a specific market
is organized. Their actual behavior is, however, individual and is influenced by the de facto
functioning of a market. In the next section we discuss the generic trading behavior of
market participants based on their role and the market organization where they interact, and
we speculate on the actual behavior of the participants within the constraints indicated in this
subsection.
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2.3 Price formation and behavioral aspects
Now that the static, visible side of stock markets has been described we can let them operate
and make an attempt to observe their dynamics. We need thus, to discover somehow hardly
observable aspects or speculate on their content. In this section we aim to describe processes
and to identify behavioral aspects that influence market dynamics. Fort this reason, we
zoom in on the tasks and responsibilities of market participants. By behavioral aspects we
mean factors related to the trading behavior of market participants, such as the way market
participants decide which stocks to trade, the way they determine the parameters of their
orders and quotes, their timing regarding when to place orders, when and how to determine
the parameters of a transaction, if that is not unequivocally defined by the trading rules, and
so on. The method that we apply for deriving the behavioral factors is to watch markets in
action. That is, we elaborate on possible ways of price formation through the behavior of
market participants by tracking step by step how orders might be formed and how they might
trigger market prices. In order to succeed we build mainly on observations of these processes
as described in the literature (e.g. (New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 2000; Demarchi and
Foucault, 2000; Reilly and Brown, 2003)).
2.3.1 Order initiation and the behavior of investors
Orders can be initiated by investors or by financial agents trading for their own account,
trying to keep or reallocate a certain level of inventory, or trying to ensure liquidity. The
instruments that a trader holds constitute the portfolio of the trader. Traders aim to keep the
composition of their portfolio appropriate. They do this by means of portfolio management.
Portfolio management often involves that the composition of a portfolio needs to be changed.
The main question is how traders determine the desired content of a new portfolio. The
way investors manage their portfolio is in fact a hardly observable process as discussed in
Section 2.1.
In general, as described by Reilly and Brown (2003), the portfolio management process
involves four main, highly interrelated tasks:
• construction of a policy statement,
• determination of the investment strategy to meet the policy statement guidelines,
• construction and maintenance of the portfolio, and
• continual monitoring of the needs and conditions.
These tasks provide a guideline to the remainder of this section. By taking a closer look on
how these tasks can be possibly conducted we try to identify generic and varying aspects of
traders’ behavior when placing orders.
2.3.1.1 Policy statement
The policy statement is a road map that specifies the investment goals, constraints and risks
investors are willing to take. It depends on the expectations and experience of the investors
and it is determined taking into account the investors’ short-term and long-term needs. The
18
33
2.3 - Price formation and behavioral aspects
policy should be updated from time to time given that needs change over time. Three main
factors drive the policy statement: the investment goals, investment constraints and risk.
Investors can have a variety of objectives changing over time. Objectives are stated for
different time-horizons and are of varying importance. Objectives vary from near-term high
priority goals (such as, accumulating funds to make a house down payment or pay college
expenses) and long-term high-priority goals (like the ability to retire at a certain age) to
lower-priority goals (like to take a luxurious vacation every year).
There are several constraints that influence investment objectives, including: liquidity
needs, time-horizon, tax concerns, legal and regulatory factors, unique needs and prefer-
ences. A close relationship exists between the investors’ time-horizon and liquidity needs:
near-term goals might require quick conversion to cash and thus more liquidity.
In order to achieve their objectives, investors need to take risk. People are willing to
take different grades of risk. That is, they have different attitudes to risk. An investor’s
attitude to risk is influenced by personality, financial constraints, and personal preferences.
In addition, the priority and the time-horizon of an objective might exert a big influence
on the attitude to risk: long-term investment horizons can usually tolerate more risk, while
investors with short-term time horizons favor less risk.
2.3.1.2 Investment strategy
In order to achieve the investment objectives stated in the policy statement, traders can de-
velop a variety of investment strategies. The development of a strategy includes the study
of financial, economic, political and social conditions and aims to forecast future prices
at a certain time-horizon. Many indicators (measures) exist that traders use for analysis in
this sense. Many studies are devoted to analyze how and whether various indicators can be
used to describe and forecast financial time series. A thorough overview of measures and
(possible) relationships between these is given by Haugen (2001). Indicators are character-
ized as either technical or fundamental. Fundamental indicators are related to the basic
intrinsic value, also referred to as fundamental value of a stock, and as such, depend mainly
on the underlying economic factors (Reilly and Brown, 2003), like the performance of the
issuer. Technical indicators refer to assumed statistical features of the historical data. Arbi-
trary many ways exist to consider and combine diverse indicators in order to have a possible
projection into the future. Based on the type of data that is used by traders for forecasting,
two main types of investors are differentiated: fundamentalists and technical analysts (or
chartists). In the literature they are also referred to as informed traders and noise traders,
respectively .
2.3.1.3 Portfolio maintenance
Based on the policy and forecast, traders or their advisors implement the investment strategy
by determining how to allocate available funds across different markets, asset classes, and
assets depending on the investor’s attitude to risk. Trading instruments of different types
are categorized in asset classes, such as real assets, risk-free assets paying constant interest
rate, and stocks paying varying dividends. Regardless of the investment strategy used, the
portfolio construction results in asset allocation, that is, the determination of the required
asset classes and weights for each class, and the specific assets and weights of them within
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each asset class. The difference between the current portfolio and the required portfolio
determine the parameters of the orders that traders will place: the identity of the traded
assets, the size and side of the orders.
When placing an order traders should have in mind an ultimate price at which they are
willing to buy/sell the selected stocks. The price depends heavily on the expectations given
by the investment strategy. At markets where limit orders can be placed, traders can quote
a price (limit price) at which they are willing to trade in the worst case. Traders might also
decide to place market orders, and then, the price that they are not willing to exceed can be
determined by the right timing of the placement of the order.
2.3.1.4 Monitoring
Monitoring is, in fact, conducted in combination with all the other processes of portfolio
management. Monitoring implies periodic reconsideration of the various phases. Investors
monitor their needs and the market conditions, and evaluate the portfolio performance from
time to time, compare it to expectations, and modify the policy statement and/or the invest-
ment strategy if they think it is necessary. Monitoring includes thus, performance analysis,
and assimilation of new information. Modified statements and strategies reflect the adap-
tive behavior of the traders.
2.3.1.5 Time
During the various stages of the portfolio management process a variety of time factors,
related to different decision problems, play an important role. The time factor in this sense
has multiple aspects. It can refer to the time-horizon of the investment objectives, to the
forecast horizon of the investment strategies, to the time interval traders look back in past
for relevant historical data in order to forecast, to the time at which they decide to place
an order for a certain stock, their waiting patience for the execution of a limit order, to the
time they monitor changes and decide to reconsider their strategies and objectives, and so
on. Decisions related to timing can be influenced by current market conditions but also by
individual factors, such as goal, belief and portfolio composition. The timing with respect
to the placement of an order is, for example, determined by the preferences of a trader, the
signals/information perceived and by the market regulations. Alternatively, brokers might
advise their clients (investors) when they think it is advantageous to place an order for a
certain asset.
We have analyzed, so far, the order placing behavior of investors, in view of the portfolio
management process. Based on the market organization where they interact, brokers and
market makers might deal with similar decision problems. Order-placing behavior in their
case is mainly related to, and can be entailed by the order execution behavior required by
their role. In the next subsections we continue to trace the orders on the various routes they
can follow, based on the organization of the market where they are placed and executed, and
on the role and behavior of financial traders who overtake and execute them. First, we focus
on markets in which brokers can interact and the way orders might be processed by brokers.
Then, we spend a few words on automated execution mechanisms and finally, we elaborate
on the tasks of market makers.
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2.3.2 Order execution and the role of brokers
According to their role, brokers are committed to clear orders on behalf of the investors.
Their main task is thus to receive and execute orders placed by investors. In addition,
they might also place orders for their own account if allowed. In relation to their role in the
market, brokers are faced with two main decision problems:
• which received order(s) to select for execution; and
• how to execute the received orders.
Like investors, brokers continually monitor and analyze the market conditions which in-
fluences them in making decisions. The way brokers decide to select and execute orders
depends on the execution system(s) applied on the market where they interact.
2.3.2.1 The order selection strategy
Brokers might try to execute orders one by one or in an accumulated way. Orders that are not
immediately executed are stored in an order book, and selected from there later, for further
execution. The selection choice can be based on the order of arrival, price (orders with higher
probability for execution might be chosen first) or several orders can be aggregated into a
new order that contains and represents them. It is not clear how brokers solve this problem in
reality. Arbitrary many possibilities exist, which depend on several individual and financial
features. Further, the way selection is made is influenced by the execution system that is
applied on a market.
2.3.2.2 The order execution mechanism
For an easier overview assume Broker A receives and executes orders one by one. Suppose
he receives Order X from Investor X and thus needs to execute it. The broker needs to
decide through which available execution mechanism to execute the received order. There
are basically three main possibilities he can choose from (Figure 2.4) depending on the
rules and the execution system that apply on that market (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2001; Schwartz and Francioni, 2004):
1. cross the trades: execute the order or part of it internally (represented by Order XI ),
for example with an earlier received order from another trader;
2. try to negotiate: find other traders that are willing to take the other side of the order
preferably at an improved price (Broker A can take the Order XN form of the re-
ceived order and try to negotiate with Broker B and with Broker C who try to fill
Order Y N and Order C respectively);
3. submit the order, or part of it for further execution to a central execution system
(Order XC). Central execution might be either automated or supervised by a market
maker.
The first two choices can be made for example on order-driven markets, where partici-
pants can directly trade with each other. The central execution system where orders can be
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sent to and cleared can be, for instance, automated central matching system on call-auctions,
or might represent and be driven by market makers, who quote bids and asks and maintain
a limit order book on quote-driven markets. Usually, all trades must be reported to, and
approved by the market maker (or the central system).
Figure 2.4: Tracking orders
Depending on the decision of the brokers, an order might be transformed into more orders
before final execution. Transformation might be applied to volume and/or price. It is often
possible to improve the execution price of an order. It might also happen that in first instance
only part of an order can be executed. The rest will be then filled later, most probably at a
slightly different price. Finally, it can also occur that parts of an order are executed through
different execution mechanisms.
Depending on the execution mechanism selected, brokers are faced with additional deci-
sion problems.
1. If a broker is allowed to, and chooses to execute the order internally, he needs to de-
cide whether to match the order with orders sent by other traders (that could not have
been executed previously) or to execute it for his own account. Taking the other side
of an order might lead to surplus or deficit in the inventory of a broker. Brokers who
are required to keep a certain level of inventory are faced with a portfolio manage-
ment problem similarly to the investors. Order execution might thus trigger additional
orders.
2. If the market organization allows and the trader chooses to find other financial agents
to trade with, he can either accept an offer of the others or try to negotiate. If traders
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choose negotiation they further need to set up some kind of negotiation strategy, that
involves decisions regarding:
• timing related to the length of negotiation: for how long to try to negotiate an
item?
• the negotiation steps: how to define the negotiation prices?
• timing related to negotiation patience: how long to wait before making the next
bid/offer?
• negotiation limit: when to accept an offer and when to stop with negotiating?
3. If the broker routes the order for execution to a central order execution mechanism he
can still send it with an improved price quote. In this case it is up to the execution
system how it clears the order. How this can be done is discussed in the next section.
Basically there are two main decision-problems brokers are faced with in this case.
They need to decide the degree of price improvement. Further, they need an appropri-
ate timing for forwarding the order: they need to decide for how long to keep an order
before sending it to a central matching mechanism. In most of the cases the latter is in
fact not a difficult problem since often rules specify for how long brokers at the trading
floor are allowed to keep an unexecuted order.
Regardless of the choice made, brokers have to determine the transaction price at which
to execute the orders in case of actual execution, or a price limit in a way similar to investors,
in case of routing the order. The price depends on the price quote that the requesting investors
set, in case of a limit order, but also on the current market conditions and regulations.
Similar to the variety of investment strategies that can be applied by investors, arbitrary
many realizations of the order selection and the execution strategy of the brokers exist. Sev-
eral possible variants (of e.g. negotiation strategies) are described in the literature, however,
except for the constraints defined by market organizations, details of the applied strategies
are not revealed by the brokers themselves. This hardly observable feature again is a reason
why market dynamics are difficult to understand.
2.3.3 Order execution and the role of market makers
While placing an order always involves traders, the execution of orders does not necessarily
require a trader, but can be automated. Central order execution at call sessions, for instance,
might be conducted by a special financial trader, e.g. a market maker but often an automated
system is used to match orders and find an equilibrium point. Similarly, a mechanism on
continuous markets where limit orders are stored if they cannot be executed and new orders
are matched against the best quotes, can be solved by an automated order matching systems,
like a continuous electronic system operating 24 hours a day. In this section we elaborate
on the role and behavior of market makers when executing orders. We can state without
loss of generality that the descriptions below also cover price formation mechanisms and
decision problems within automated execution systems. The reason is that we can think of
an automated system as an execution system carried out by a trader, the decision of which is
determined only by a computer program and it is not influenced by other behavioral factors.
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2.3.3.1 The role of market makers
The role of market makers as summarized in (Madhavan, 2000; Reilly and Brown, 2003)
and (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000) consists primarily of the following tasks:
• supply immediacy in order to permit continuous trading by overcoming the asynchro-
nous timing of investor orders;
• monitor the market through quoting bid and ask prices at which they buy and sell
stocks, so that traders do not need to spend resources to do that;
• set prices: adjust the bid-ask spread to the changing market conditions;
• provide liquidity: provide additional liquidity for less liquid stocks;
• in some cases (must) complement the supply of liquidity at the time of call-auctions:
this can lead to equilibrium and liquidity;
Summarizing the tasks above, market makers are responsible for a good functioning of the
markets. For this reason, they need to place additional orders and to execute received orders
as soon as possible. Further, they need to maintain bid and ask quotes on continuous markets
that on the one hand reflects market conditions, and on the other hand encourages trading.
2.3.3.2 Execution of orders on call markets
During call market sessions where, as described in Section 2.2, trading takes place at well
defined times when all interested traders need to send their orders during a given time in-
terval to a central execution system. In case of call auctions orders are accumulated and
matched at a single price at some equilibrium. The equilibrium point can be defined in dif-
ferent ways but in most of the cases the aim is to maximize trading volume, or to minimize
excess demand. The key factor distinguishing the mechanisms of call-auctions, and the main
decision problem to be solved by market makers or by automated execution systems on these
type of markets is thus, how to determine the equilibrium price.
2.3.3.3 Execution of orders on continuous markets
During continuous trading sessions market makers need to determine bid and ask quotes.
When market makers receive an order they check whether it matches the quoted bid (in case
of a sell order) or ask (in case of a buy order). If it matches they clear the order at the quoted
price and charge the actual transaction costs, otherwise they enter the new order into the
limit order book. Besides new order arrivals, inactivity on the market, competitive behavior,
belief, or the arrival of some information can cause the market maker to update the bid and
ask quotes.
The main decisions that market makers face on continuous markets is thus related to:
• determination of the new quotes: what should be the values of the new quotes so as
to reflect the content of the limit order book, the position of the market makers and to
ensure a liquid and fair market?
24
39
2.3 - Price formation and behavioral aspects
• timing of the new quotes: that is when to change the quote. How to decide that there
is not enough liquidity? How to be competitive without loosing in case of competitive
markets?
• management of the limit order book, that is how and when to execute orders entered
in the limit order book? This problem is related to the way new quotes are determined,
since market makers can take the other side of an order before they make new quotes,
or after some quotes are executed, in order to ”recover” their position.
The most simple solution for defining a quote is to take the highest bid and lowest ask
orders from the order book, as quotes. However, most likely, real bid-ask setting strategies
of market makers are more complicated, as they depend, among others, on the content of
the limit order book and on the position of the market maker. How each market maker
determines the quote can vary a lot, and again it is not revealed.
2.3.4 Summary
In this section we have discussed the details of price formation. It is important to make a
clear distinction between the originally quoted price of an order and the final price that an
order triggers. We refer to a limit price that investors (or other participants initiating orders)
define as a price quote or quoted price, and to a price that is a result of a transaction as the
market price. We discussed the details of placing orders and quoting prices in the first part
of this section. In the second part we elaborated on the possible forms of execution of an
order and the market prices that the original order could trigger.
Price formation is strongly related to the behavior of traders. The decisions behind
traders’ behaviors are by definition hardly observable. Given this property it is not obvi-
ous how prices are actually determined by the participants. The organization of markets
imposes constraints on how prices can be set but does not provide all the details behind
the price formation mechanism. Based on the organization and the actual conditions on the
market a final market price might be set:
• by brokers within their own account;
• by brokers through negotiation;
• by market makers at quote;
• by market makers at equilibrium;
• by automated electronic systems based on submitted quotes;
• by automated matching mechanisms at equilibrium.
The difficulty to understand market dynamics is caused by the fact that the details behind
these alternatives are hidden.
By tracing the path an order takes till it is executed we could observe that a multitude of
factors might influence the value of the resulting market price. The final market price does
not only depend on the originally quoted price of an order placed by an investor but might
go through slight changes based on the market structure, financial agents’ role and behavior.
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So far we have identified several organizational and behavioral factors that are often
hardly observable, and often vary, underlying the differences between various markets and
traders’ behavior respectively. The hardly observable aspects of the market mechanisms,
and their complexity, are reasons behind the difficulty to understand market dynamics. This
is why representations of markets have to be designed incorporating assumptions regarding
hardly observable aspects.
2.4 Market quality
The organization of markets influences their quality. Therefore, organizational aspects are
adapted from time to time to improve market quality. Various people perceive the quality of
a market differently depending on their priorities. In this section we describe the attributes
which are considered relevant in deciding how well markets function. Further, we discuss
how, and through which organizational aspects these attributes can be manipulated to im-
prove market quality.
2.4.1 Characteristics of a good market
The most important characteristics of a good market, according to Reilly and Brown (2003)
are timely and accurate information, liquidity, low transaction costs and informational effi-
ciency. In this subsection we explain these notions and introduce related ones.
• Transparency. Traders expect timely and accurate information on the prices and
volume of past transactions, and on the current outstanding bids and offers in order to
be able to determine an appropriate price.
• Liquidity. Liquidity refers to the ability to buy and sell an instrument quickly at a
fairly certain price, that does not differ substantially from previous transaction prices
assuming no new substantial information is revealed. The likelihood of an asset of
being sold quickly is referred to as marketability, while the fact that prices do not
change much from one transaction to the next is referred to as price continuity. Con-
tinuity of prices can be achieved if there is enough depth, that is if there are buyers and
sellers who want to trade at prices above, and respectively, below, the current market
price.
• Low transaction costs (internal efficiency). Traders prefer markets with lower trans-
action costs to markets with higher transaction costs. Investors do not want to pay
much in addition for their orders being executed. They will normally not trade if
the costs of the trade are higher than the difference in value between what they give
up and what they receive. Markets where minimal transaction costs are charged are
characterized as internally efficient.
• Informational efficiency (external efficiency). Finally, traders expect to be treated
honestly and not to be misled, that is they want to trade at a price that fully reflects
all the information available regarding the asset. A market in which prices reflect all
available information is characterized as being informationally efficient.
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2.4.2 Manipulating market quality through the organizational aspects
The first three measures of a good market, namely transparency, liquidity and low transac-
tions costs, can be more ore less directly manipulated through the organizational aspects of
the market, such as trading rules, execution systems and trading sessions.
The degree of transparency of a market depends on the trading rules applied. This is
entailed by the fact that the part of the information on prices, volume, bids and offers, and
the timing of the information that is revealed is constrained by trading rules. Information
that is withhold can be made available for extra cost. Prices with respect to information as
well as transaction costs are again formulated in form of trading rules.
The liquidity of the assets is influenced by the rules applied on a market, and can be
enhanced by employing specific financial traders, since these traders are required to trade for
own account if necessary, initiate orders, and update quotes if there is not enough activity.
The relationship between liquidity and organization of markets is in fact bidirectional. The
liquidity of certain assets often determines the type of trading sessions and execution systems
applied on a market to trade them: liquid stocks are mainly traded on continuous order-driven
markets, while less liquid stocks are traded on call markets (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000).
While there is a direct, univocal relationship between organizational aspects, and the first
three attributes mentioned above, it is not evident how external efficiency can be improved
through altering aspects of a market organization. The main reason behind this problem
is that it is not well-understood how information is reflected into prices. This problem is
strongly related to the hardly observable aspect of the price formation process and has led to
many conflicting and controversial discussions around market efficiency.
All the aspects of market quality are strongly related to information. Therefore, in the
next subsection, we define what the term information might cover. Then, we would like to
elaborate on the efficiency of the markets, one of the most discussed topics in the literature
on financial markets.
2.4.3 Information in markets
We can state without any doubt that one of the main, if not the main, driving forces of market
dynamics is information. The main questions all market participants face are all related
to information, i.e. is some specific information available or can it be acquired for extra
cost, is the available information accurate, is someone in the possession of some valuable
information, and can he make advantage of it.
Information on markets is classified along two dimensions: its source and its grade of
dissemination.
Based on their source, two categories of information are differentiated, namely:
• market information, and
• fundamental information.
Market information, also known as trading information, refers to currently available in-
formation generated by the market and historical values. It includes knowledge of the current
quotes, last transaction data, contents of the limit order book.
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Fundamental information pertains to the determinants of future share value. It includes
information concerning current earnings, forecasts, strategic business and economic condi-
tion (Schwartz and Francioni, 2004).
Information can be also differentiated based on its availability. Three categories of infor-
mation are defined accordingly, based on the extent to which information is disseminated:
• public information;
• private information; and
• inside information.
Public information refers to information that is widely disseminated and is readily avail-
able to everyone (freely or for cost). It includes market information, and fundamental in-
formation such as earnings and dividend announcements, price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios,
dividend-yield (D/P) ratios, price-book value ratios (P/BV), stock splits, news about the
economy, political news. Private information is fundamental information possessed individ-
ually based on own analysis. Finally, inside information is only known by people in a special
position.
2.4.4 Market efficiency
The efficiency of financial markets is a central question in economic studies. An efficient
market is defined as a market in which prices always ”fully reflect” all available information
(see (Fama, 1970)). This definition is known as the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).
Depending on the type of information, that is to be reflected into prices, three variants of
efficiency have been proposed by Fama (1970) in the form of hypotheses:
• The weak-form EMH is concerned with the full reflection of all past market infor-
mation.
• The semistrong-form EMH is concerned with the full reflection of all public infor-
mation.
• The strong-form EMH is concerned with the full reflection of all information from
public and private (including inside) sources.
The problem with this definition of efficiency is that, because the term ”fully reflects” is
not operational, there is no common agreement on what it means. This problem gave rise to
many different interpretations and controversial discussions on what an efficient market is.
We enumerate the most common interpretations:
1. In an efficient market prices adjust rapidly to the release of new information (e.g.
in (Reilly and Brown, 2003)).
2. In an efficient market prices reflect all information so that no one can predict future
price changes(e.g. in (Harris, 2003)).
3. In an efficient market investors cannot realize excess returns.
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4. In an efficient market investors are not able to consistently derive above-average risk-
adjusted profits.
5. In a (perfectly) efficient market prices follow a random walk.
Notice that three types of EMH are distinguished based on the type of information re-
flected in the prices. Similarly, all interpretations of the EMH given above, except for the
last one, can have three forms, each form being parameterized with the type of information
investors base their decision on, i.e. past, public and all information.
The various interpretations of the EMH illustrate that, as (Lo and MacKinlay, 1999,
pg.6-7) state ”the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, by itself, is not a well-defined and empiri-
cally refutable hypothesis.” On the other hand, interpretations of the EMH, such as ”adjust
rapidly”, ”excess returns”, ”above-average”, are not well-defined either. Therefore, in order
to make the EMH operational, ”one must specify additional structure, e.g., investor prefer-
ences, information structure, business conditions, etc.” However, the additional structure im-
plies additional difficulties, since: ”then a test of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis becomes
a test of several auxiliary hypotheses as well, and a rejection of such a joint hypothesis tells
us little about which aspect of the joint hypothesis is inconsistent with the data. Are stock
prices too volatile because markets are inefficient, or is it due to risk aversion, or dividend
smoothing? All three inferences are consistent with the data. Moreover, new statistical tests
designed to distinguish among them will no doubt require auxiliary hypotheses of their own
which, in turn, may be questioned.”
Based on the reasoning above, we do not discuss here the first interpretation because it
is as vague as the original. Interpretations 2 to 4 can be treated as being equivalent. Most of
the studies on testing EMH are based on one of these three interpretations combined with the
last interpretation. These studies are mainly concerned with analyzing the predictive power
of traders relying on some specific information. Accordingly, the grade of efficiency of a
market is often determined by examining whether some traders can realize excess returns
by trading on a given set of information, i.e. if there are any traders who can to realize
above-average profits by using trading rules based on past price movements (in relation to
the weak-form EMH), public information (in relation to the semi-strong EMH), and private
information (in relation to the strong-form EMH).
In the literature, in general the weak-form EMH is tested. For a description and dis-
cussion on various tests of different forms of efficiency we direct the reader to Campbell
et al. (1997). Studies that are aimed to test the weak-form efficiency try to find successful
strategies that are based on past data. In relation to this approach two possibilities are dif-
ferentiated with respect to the properties of the time series: price series are either random,
or contain some pattern, i.e. there is some linear or non-linear relation between the various
past data values. Accordingly, in order to find successful strategies based on past data, it is
analyzed whether price changes are random or some sort of ”pattern” can be observed in the
past data. If someone cannot make above normal profits by exploiting a certain regularity,
that regularity, indeed, is not enough proof to reject the hypotheses that a given market is
efficient. It does not mean however, that no other patterns might exist, which have not been
discovered. If someone is able to make above normal profits by exploiting these regularities,
it has to be further analyzed whether this successful strategy is persistent or it is there only
by chance. There are contradictory views whether this is indeed the case.
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Tests on the successful behavior of traders are thus, strongly related to the 5th interpreta-
tion of market efficiency, according to which in an efficient market price changes are random.
This is in fact the only mathematical formulation that can be operationalized. Many people
claim that in a perfectly efficient market prices follow a ”random walk”. However, critical
remarks on this claim have been voiced. Alexander et al. (2001) emphasize for instance,
that ”stock prices do not need to follow a random walk in order for them to fully reflect
information and for markets to be efficient.”
Schwartz and Francioni (2004)[pg.33] comment on the relation between efficiency and
randomness with the following argumentation: ”Information is the input that drives invest-
ment decisions and therefore also trading. Security prices are a result (output) of the process.
In efficient markets, information should be reflected in prices with an accuracy that leaves no
investor an incentive to search for additional information or to trade. If information is per-
fectly reflected in prices and if trading is frictionless (seamless and costless) process, then
security prices will follow a random walk (i.e., a stock’s price will change randomly over
time). However, when the realities of actual markets are taken into account, it is clear that
trading is not frictionless and that share prices do not follow random walks.”
Our conclusion is that random walks and efficiency are not equivalent properties. While
the proof for randomness might be enough to accept efficiency, efficiency does not neces-
sarily generate only random time series. If price changes prove to be random, and thus, no
pattern can be found, probably no successful strategy can be found either. It can also happen
however, that price changes are not random, but no successful strategy can be found based
on the patterns found. If no such a strategy can be found the weak-form EMH cannot be
rejected. However, if one couldn’t find a successful strategy, it does not mean that a strategy
that leads to above-average risk adjusted profit does not exist. If a strategy exist that is based
only on past information can persistently outperform the buy-and-hold strategy, the market
is probably not weak-form efficient.
2.4.5 Summary
By definition in a high quality market we expect timely and accurate information; liquidity;
low transaction costs and informational efficiency. While there is a desire to achieve all these
requirements of a good market, sometimes a trade-off between them is inevitable. There are
certain policies, like restrictions on insider trading, which may make prices less informative
while increasing market liquidity. Further, if information is expensive, or the market is not
liquid, prices will not be able to fully and rapidly reflect information. As Harris (2003,
pg.243) states: ”How informative prices are depends on the costs of acquiring information,
and on how much liquidity is available to informed traders. If information is expensive, or
the market is not liquid, prices will not be very informative.”
Well-functioning markets produce prices that accurately reflect the fundamental values of
the instruments they trade (Harris, 2003). Achieving a highly efficient structure for markets
is, however, a challenge (Schwartz and Francioni, 2004). In order to improve efficiency in
particular, and market quality in general, sources of efficiency should be brought to light and
the workings of financial markets should be better understood.
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2.5 Schools of thought and approaches for studying market
dynamics
In order to understand and explain the dynamics of financial markets price dynamics are
analyzed. Several methods have been proposed that try to describe the properties of price
(or rather return) series. Approaches include analytical models, empirical testing, experi-
ments and computer simulations. Approaches base their theories on assumptions that are
needed given the hardly observable properties of market organizations and traders’ behavior.
In this section we present a brief summary of the views formed on market dynamics, the
approaches used to study it and the ensuing controversial findings. Given that the literature
on various aspects of market dynamics is very broad, and given that many detailed overviews
of the surveys, findings, and descriptions of the historical development of the specific areas
exist (such as (Campbell et al., 1997), (Alexander, 2001), (Haugen, 2001), (Hommes, 2006),
among others) our aim is not to give a full description, but just to provide some insight into
the views and central ideas.
2.5.1 Theories of modern finance
The very first models proposed to explain market dynamics use mathematics as a tool to
describe traders’ behavior and financial time series. These models of financial markets have
been mainly introduced in the modern era of economics, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and form
the pillars of financial economic theory. The most popular paradigms developed include
the portfolio optimization theory by Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952), the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964), the option pricing model (OPM), the expected utility theory
(EUT) and the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970).
When we investigate how these paradigms deal with the hardly observable aspects of
financial markets we find that they simply ignore the many options behind them and take the
most ideal variant. Accordingly, in the models that are concerned with trading behavior it is
assumed that all traders are rational. Rational traders always make the most optimal choice
in a given situation.
As far as order execution mechanisms and price formation is concerned, in theoretical
market models equilibrium is central, and the mechanics of trading is ignored. Equilibrium
is most often defined at the price at which demand equals offer. This is the price at which
orders are executed, i.e. the market is cleared. Implicit in this approach is the assumption
that the trading mechanism does not affect the resulting equilibrium: that is, whatever trading
mechanism is employed, the same equilibrium would arise (O’Hara, 2002).
With respect to the quality of markets, in modern theoretical studies it is often claimed
that markets are efficient. Efficiency is commonly used in relation with external efficiency.
Proponents of efficiency claim that in financial markets it is not possible to earn abnormal
profits (other than by chance) by exploring some set of information. In these studies market
efficiency is often interpreted as being equivalent to random price changes or to the impos-
sibility to earn above average risk-adjusted profits.
According to the theoretical models, one might assume about the operation of markets
that participants are rational, prices are formed at equilibrium, and markets are efficient.
Many people question however, whether these models are right about the assumptions they
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make with respect to the hardly observable aspects, and whether trading on real markets
takes place as assumed and claimed by them. A number of approaches have been proposed
to test whether markets operate as described by modern finance theory. Approaches in-
clude empirical studies, experimental economics, and the market microstructure approach.
Empirical studies primarily focus on market quality, in particular on efficiency. Traders’
behavior is central in experimental economics. Finally, market structures and the effect of
trading mechanisms on the price dynamics are closely analyzed and described in the market
microstructure literature.
2.5.2 Market anomalies and empirical studies
In order to determine how efficient various markets are numerous empirical studies have been
and are conducted. Empirical studies test whether theoretical models correspond to reality
by taking real (i.e. empirical) data and trying to fit them to the model tested. In contrast to
the theoretical approach empirical studies do not assume and ideal world but investigate the
real one. This approach aims to describe and analyze properties of market data.
In general, early empirical tests supported the theoretical models. However, in the late
1970’s unfavorable evidence began to appear against the modern financial paradigms because
empirical regularities have been uncovered in the pricing of stocks, these being not predicted
by traditional models. Accordingly, they are referred to as anomalies (Alexander et al.,
2001).
One of the most widely known anomalies is the January effect. It has been observed that
in general stocks have higher returns during the month of January than during other months.
Another interesting seasonal anomaly is the Monday effect: in general returns on Monday
turn to be lower than on other days of the week.
Empirical studies test the random walk property of price changes. Randomness implies
that successive price changes should be statistically independent and identically distributed
(IID). Consequently, most efficiency tests are concerned with statistical tests of indepen-
dence between rates of return. Autocorrelation tests or runs test are used for this reason. If
the autocorrelation of rates of returns is not significant, return series are statistically random,
supporting weak-form efficiency. Similarly, the number of runs (one ore more consecutive
increases or decrease) being similar to what one expects in random series, supports the hy-
pothesis that the series is random.
Statistical properties that reveal non-random features of historical data are referred to
as stylized facts. A wealth of interesting stylized facts have been discovered which seem
to be common to a wide variety of markets, instruments and periods. Examples are excess
volatility, heavy tails, no autocorrelation, volatility clusters and volume-volatility correlation
(Cont, 2006).
When conducting empirical analysis on historical data, it turns out also, that the returns
in many financial markets are not well-modeled by an IID process. Very high frequency
returns often show signs of autocorrelation, meaning that they are not independent. And
although, low-frequency data is in generally not autocorrelated at first order, there is, often
a strong autocorrelation in squared returns. Autocorrelation in squared returns indicates
that return series are not independent, but that ”volatility comes in clusters where tranquil
periods of small returns are interspersed with volatile periods of large return” (Alexander,
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2001). Volatility clusters (or autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, i.e. ARCH) have
been reported already in the sixties by Mandelbrot (1963, pg. 418), who noted that ”large
changes tend to be followed by large changes -of either sign- and small changes tend to be
followed by small changes.” Various versions of GARCH (generalized ARCH) models have
been proposed that manage to reproduce volatility clusters which are observed in empirical
data.
Volatility clusters are an example of stylized facts. Another stylized fact often reported
is the presence of heavy tails, meaning that the distribution of returns displays fat tails with
positive excess kurtosis. It has been also observed that trading volume is positively correlated
to market volatility.
For a thorough overview of surveys, approaches and (contradictory) findings on testing
paradigms of modern finance theory we recommend the reader (Campbell et al., 1997). A
thorough overview of approaches applied to test the various forms of efficiency is presented
in (Alexander, 2001) and (Campbell et al., 1997).
Findings of empirical research are contradictory and the significance of anomalies is con-
troversial. While the existence of anomalies is well-accepted, the question whether they are
persistent, and whether investors can exploit them to earn excess return in the future is sub-
ject to debate. On the one hand, proponents of it claim and believe that anomalies contradict
accepted theoretical predictions (e.g. (Haugen, 2001)). On the other hand, advocates of
theoretical finance, sustain that anomalies are ”not of a sufficient magnitude to suggest that
richer are to be made by exploiting them. Indeed, transaction costs would devor most if not
all of any profits that might be made” (Alexander et al., 2001).
Despite this controversy, empirical findings rarely support theoretical models, and they
suggest that there is predictability in the prices. The question is whether this proves that
markets are not efficient, or predictability is the consequence of other properties, such as
market structure, frictions, or changing conditions (Campbell et al., 1997).
2.5.3 Behavioral finance and experimental economics
Empirical findings suggest that markets do not necessarily behave according to the theo-
retical models suggested. A possible reason behind this phenomenon might lie in the sim-
plifying assumptions behind these models. Behavioral finance and experimental economics
investigate whether the assumptions on homogeneous rational decision-making, utility maxi-
mization and a priori knowledge of utility functions and alternatives are valid (Simon, 1997).
In order to test these assumptions, experiments have been conducted. The aim of exper-
iments is to evaluate a theoretical model by examining investors’ behavior in a laboratory
(Levy et al., 2000). Experimental studies try to describe human behavior and reasoning
behind decision-making. During experiments artificial market conditions are set up in a
laboratory. Description of behaviors is based on observations and surveys.
The main advantages of experimental studies are the possibility to replicate them and to
control them (Davis and Holt, 1992):
• Replicability refers to the possibility that other researchers can reproduce the experi-
ment, and thereby verify the findings independently;
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• Control is the capacity to manipulate laboratory conditions so that observed behavior
can be used to evaluate alternative theories and policies. In laboratory, relations and
effects of certain settings can be isolated, and thus analyzed without the interference
of other variables.
Experiments and surveys form the basis of behavioral finance, the area of economics
that is concerned with the effects of market decisions, and with the empirical validity of
the neoclassical assumptions about human behavior (Simon, 1997). Behavioral finance is
largely influenced by psychological research, in particular by ”cognitive models of decision-
making under risk and uncertainty”, and by ”the prospect theory” of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979).
Behavioral finance not only investigates assumed or contradictory behavior, but it also
analyzes the implications of departures of actual behavior from assumptions. It tries to
discover ”the empirical laws that describe behavior correctly and as accurately as possible”.
It aims to better understand economic decisions and the way they affect market dynamics.
While recent behavioral approaches are all concerned with theory testing, it is interesting
to know that many of their ideas date back from before the introduction of the rational ex-
pectations and efficient market hypothesis (Hommes, 2006) 1. Some of the key elements of
this approach ”are related to Keynes’ view that ’expectations matter’, to Simon’s view that
economic man is boundedly rational, and to the view of Kahneman and Tversky in psychol-
ogy that individual behavior under uncertainty can best be described by simple heuristics
and biases” (Hommes, 2006).
Findings of experiments suggest heterogeneity and bounded rationality of traders. Re-
sults are, however, often questionable because of biased features included in the experimental
process, which can influence the subjects’ behavior even if only subconsciously. For exam-
ple, as argued by Phelan and Reynolds (1996): ”The mere observation of people may lead
them to modify their behavior and if information about behavior is to be published this may
also have an effect.” Other possible biases are discussed in (Roth, 1994). Another question
that arises with respect to experiments is whether and how findings can be calibrated to real
data.
2.5.4 Market microstructure
While experimental economics try to reveal the hardly observable aspects of traders’ behav-
ior, market microstructure literature is concerned with the hardly observable price formation
mechanisms. Traditional theoretical models assume that prices are formed at equilibrium
and markets are cleared at this price. In these models it is not of interest how this market
clearing was achieved, i.e. what it is in the economy that coordinates the desires of deman-
ders and suppliers so that a price emerges and trade occurs.
In contrast to the traditional equilibrium models, that ignore the mechanics of trading,
market microstructure literature analyzes how specific trading mechanisms affect the price
formation process (O’Hara, 2002). According to the market microstructure theories, prices
need not equal full-information expectations because of a variety of frictions. A central
question of this approach is concerned with how various frictions and departures from sym-
metric information (i.e. the fact that participants do not possess the same information) affect
1see also http://www.behaviouralfinance.net/
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the trading process (Madhavan, 2000). The best known theoretical microstructure models
are the Kyle model (Kyle, 1985) and the Glosten and Milgrom model (Glosten and Mil-
grom, 1985), which study the process by which prices come to impound new information.
Findings point out that market structure and information asymmetry influence the grade of
efficiency of a market.
2.5.5 The constructive approaches
Recent promising approaches propose a bottom-up understanding of financial markets. In
contrast to other approaches they pay attention to individual interactions and study the emer-
gent properties generated as the results of these interactions. The main observation behind
the constructive approaches is that economies are recognized as complex dynamic systems.
This feature is underpinned by Tesfatsion (2006) as follows: ”Large numbers of micro agents
engage repeatedly in local interactions, giving rise to global regularities such as employment
and growth rates, income distributions, market institutions, and social conventions. These
global regularities in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions. The result is
an intricate system of interdependent feedback loops connecting micro behaviors, interaction
patterns, and global regularities.”
As part of the constructive approach, recently the evolutionary approach has gained at-
tention, according to which economy is viewed as a complex evolving system (see (Hommes,
2006) for a thorough overview). What is evolving is mainly the set of applied trading strate-
gies, and because of the ”feedback loops” in fact a co-evolution of strategies and markets
can be observed.
Proponents of the constructive approach argue that although classic models can repro-
duce basic macroscopic features, they fail to reproduce emergent features of markets that
cannot be directly deduced from the microscopic interaction producing them (Muchnik et al.,
2005). There are three main approaches that we classify as being constructive: the nonlin-
ear economic dynamics approach, microscopic simulation and agent-based computational
economics (ACE). The area of nonlinear economic dynamics assumes nonlinear price for-
mation and boundedly rational traders, whose belief about efficiency co-evolves with price.
In microscopic simulation and ACE, the focus is on individual interactions. The latter two
approaches have emerged from different areas, namely econophysics and agent-based sim-
ulation, but are based in fact on similar ideas and apply the same method to study market
dynamics.
2.5.5.1 The nonlinear economic dynamics approach
The complex evolutionary view on economics motivated researchers to apply nonlinear dy-
namics, chaos theory and complex systems to economic theory. Proponents of this approach
attack traditional models on the fact that they assume simple (linear) economics. Hommes
points out that in those simple environments it is not surprising to have rational traders: ”In
a simple (linear) stable economy with a unique steady state path, it seems natural that agents
can learn to have rational expectations, at least in the long run. A representative, perfectly
rational agent model nicely fits into a linear view of a globally stable and predictable econ-
omy.” (Hommes, 2006)
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In contrast to the linear view on economics, a central question of the nonlinear approach
is: ”how could agents have rational expectations or perfect foresight in a complex, nonlin-
ear world, with prices and quantities moving irregularly on a strange attractor?” Hommes
argues that ”A boundedly rational world view with agents using simple forecasting strate-
gies, perhaps not perfect but at least approximately right, seems more appropriate within a
complex, nonlinear world.” Models within the nonlinear approach are referred to as dynamic
heterogeneous agent models.
Summarizing, within this approach price formation is based on nonlinear rules rather
than linear equations. Further, traders are assumed to be boundedly rational. Moreover,
traders’ strategies co-evolve with markets. Studies for describing and analyzing market dy-
namics within this area, typically apply a mixture of analytic and computational tools. A
number of dynamic heterogeneous agent models is described in (Hommes, 2006). One of
these, the ABS model, will be subjected to a deeper analysis in the next chapter.
2.5.5.2 Microscopic simulation
Microscopic simulation emerged from physics and is part of the so-called econophysics
research. The idea behind microscopic simulation is to model the system in question as a set
of microscopic elements and define microscopic interactions between them. This approach
then investigates how observed macroscopic features emerge from the interaction of these
microscopic elements. Being frequently and successfully exploited in physics, this method
is now being applied in social sciences as well. In the specific context of the stock market, a
variety of simplified microscopic models have been introduced over the last decade. (Levy
et al., 2000; Muchnik et al., 2005).
2.5.5.3 Agent-based computational economics
Another approach to constructive understanding of economic theory, is the rapidly expand-
ing area of agent-based computational economics (ACE). ACE is defined by Tesfatsion as
”the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting
agents” (Tesfatsion, 2001, 2002, 2006). Agent-based market models attempt to explain the
origins of observed properties of market prices in terms of simple, stylized behavioral rules
of market participants.
In recent years, studying stock markets using multi-agent based models has become a
promising research area due to the fact that this methodology reflects the nature of the stock
market where heterogeneous investors with various expectations and different levels of ra-
tionality interact with each other through the market (Chen and Liao, 2005).
Microscopic simulation and agent-based computational economics ultimately apply the
same paradigm: constructive understanding, the importance of individuals and their interac-
tions; they just emerged from different areas of science.
In contrast to laboratory experiments with humans, in pure computational experiments,
the simulated behavior of represented traders is completely observable. The reasoning be-
hind decision making, the relation between cause and effect is more trustable in this sense.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of approaches proposed to study market dynamics
2.5.5.4 Overview
In Table 2.1 an overview is given on how various approaches handle the hardly observable
aspects, and what they conclude about the efficiency of markets.
Theoretical models assume that prices are formed at equilibrium, traders are rational and
that markets are efficient. Within empirical studies price formation mechanisms and traders’
behavior are not of interest, but the statistical properties of historical data are studied instead.
Analysis of data results in interesting patterns in time series, suggesting that prices are not
random, and thus might be exploited to earn excessive returns. Further, the possibility to
earn excessive profits might indicate that markets are not efficient.
Other approaches try to find out what kind of behavior and/or market organization can
lead to the stylized facts observed by empirical studies, and in which circumstances markets
are efficient as suggested by theoretical models. While the area of behavioral finance focuses
on revealing the behavior of traders, market microstructure literature is mainly concerned
with the hardly observable aspects of the price formation details.
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Based on the observed behavior of market participants, experimental studies in the area
of behavioral finance conclude that traders are not homogeneous and rational as presumed
by theoretical models, but rather ”boundedly rational”. They attribute to this property the
discrepancy between theoretical predictions and empirical findings with respect to market
efficiency.
The market microstructure literature studies the structure of various real markets analyz-
ing the effects of differences in the various market organizations on the quality of markets.
Several types of price formation mechanisms are studied and it is analyzed how information
is reflected into prices. Efficiency is characterized by whether market prices converge to a
well-defined fundamental value.
Finally, the constructive approaches represent the details both behind price formation and
behind individual traders’ behavior. A variety of price formation mechanisms and behaviors
are represented and analyzed. Stylized facts are often reproduced, but it is also found that
efficiency of markets can emerge from individual interactions within these market models.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we gave insight into the dynamics of stock markets. It is well-known that
findings with respect to market dynamics are not univocal. Further, there is a lot of discussion
going on with respect to market quality in general, and market efficiency in particular. The
reason behind these discussions and contradictory findings is caused by the complexity of
the markets and particularly the hardly observable aspects that drive market dynamics. By
hardly observable factors we mean values and processes that are not revealed directly to
the outside world. We have pointed to two important hardly observable aspects that make
market dynamics difficult to be understood. One represents the actual price formation and
the decisions behind it, the other represents the behavior of traders.
In order to be able to determine the aspects that drive the dynamics we have applied a
microstructure based approach. We elaborated on the possible route of orders in different
market organizations. In the first part of this chapter we proposed a list of aspects that are
important to consider when studying market dynamics. We differentiated organizational
factors from aspects related to price formation and traders’ behavior. The former are mainly
static and describe the structure of a market, the latter are mainly dynamic.We concluded the
first part with a discussion on the quality of markets, and its relation to the market aspects
we distinguished.
In the second part of this chapter we briefly presented approaches and theories about
market dynamics and we discussed how they deal with problems related to the hardly ob-
servable aspects, and what they say about market quality. In order to study and understand
market dynamics, assumptions regarding the content of the hardly observable aspects are in-
evitable. The various approaches make different assumptions and consider diverging levels
of detail when representing or describing market organizations. These differences are at the
root of the contradictory, and often controversial findings.
Analytical models form the pillars of economic theory. They have been criticized how-
ever, on the simplifying assumptions made (such as investors’ homogeneous rational behav-
ior, price formation at equilibrium). The advantage of these assumptions is that they lead to
analytical tractability. Furthermore, advocates of classical theoretical models claim that it is
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not important whether these assumptions are realistic, it is more important how predictive
the models are. Indeed, these studies form the basis of modern finance, and in fact, they led
to the appearance of new finance and alternative theories.
Alternative theories reveal a number of ”anomalies”. However, there is no agreement
on whether these are strong enough to reject the EMH. The reason is that it is questionable
whether investors can earn consistently above average risk-adjusted profits based on these
anomalies, and whether these anomalies will persist at all in the future.
Concluding we can say that, the ”large range of empirical financial puzzles (...) remain
difficult to explain using traditional asset pricing models” (LeBaron, 2006). This fact mo-
tivates more and more researchers with different views on markets, from different areas of
science (such as econometrics, psychology, physics, computer science) to continue to study
and understand market dynamics. In the next chapter we describe and analyze some of the
studies that use constructive approaches. As we aim to study how market structure and
traders’ behavior influences market dynamics, in the remainder of this thesis we focus espe-
cially agent-based approaches and, in relation to it, on agent-based artificial stock markets.
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In general market dynamics are studied through market models. A market model is, like any
other model, an external and explicit representation of part of reality (in this case of finan-
cial markets) as seen by the people who wish to use that model to understand, to change,
to manage and to control that part of reality (Pidd, 2003). An overview of the approaches
used to study stock markets has been given in the previous chapter. The approaches include
theoretical analytical models, empirical studies, experiments, market microstructure, nonlin-
ear economic dynamics, microsimulation and agent-based computational economics. Many
market models within these approaches are referred to as artificial stock markets (ASMs),
moreover recently the term agent-based ASM (ABASM) has became popular. There is how-
ever no commonly accepted definition of these terms.
In this chapter first we discuss what the term ASM might cover. Then, we elaborate on
what agents are, and give definitions from different areas; Further the agent-based aspect of
ASMs is brought to light. In the second part of this chapter we study a number of ASMs
and place them in a taxonomy based on the conceptual framework derived from the organi-
zational and behavioral aspects listed in Chapter 2. A preliminary version of this chapter has
been reported in (Boer et al., 2005b).
3.1 Agent-based artificial stock markets
3.1.1 Artificial stock markets
Artificial stock markets are models of financial markets used to study and understand market
dynamics. They are more advanced than traditional market models however. They are ”mar-
kets”, and as a consequence, they incorporate a well-defined price formation mechanism and
a representation of market participants. The key property is that in ASM environments prices
should emerge internally as a result of trading interactions of the market participants repre-
sented.
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Chen and Yeh (2002) make a more strict distinction between ASMs and conventional
models pointing out that ASMs are composed of many heterogeneous interacting adaptive
traders. They further remark that ASMs are ”a promising way to study the stock market as a
complex adaptive system”, because they are rich in dynamics, and they are rich in emergent
properties.
There are several keywords here to be elaborated upon:
• many traders: more than one market participant or behavior or strategy thereof is thus
represented in ASMs;
• heterogeneous traders: in contrast to classical theoretical models which assume ho-
mogeneous behavior, in ASMs heterogeneity is taken into account;
• interacting traders: traders are interacting in order to achieve their objectives, in the
sense that they communicate and trade with each other;
• adaptive traders: they can perceive the changes in their environment and act upon it
(Kaymak and Boer, 2001);
• rich in dynamics: a variety of dynamics can emerge as a result of interaction between
traders;
• rich emergent properties: prices emerge as a result of interaction among market par-
ticipants. Various studies manage to explain emergent properties of ASMs from the
interaction between heterogeneous traders. For an overview see for example LeBaron
(2000).
The definition above indicates that modeling using ASMs falls within the constructive
approaches applied for studying stock markets. As introduced in Section 2.5.5 the construc-
tive approach aims to study how emergent properties arise from the interaction of market
participants who are represented either in mass, or as molecules, or as agents.
Nowadays most market models are characterized as agent-based artificial stock mar-
kets (ABASMs). However, there is not a definition of this notion that is commonly agreed
upon. People associate various meaning to the terms ”agent-based” and ”agent-based artifi-
cial stock markets”. Therefore, before we describe some ASMs we elaborate on a number
of definitions concerning these terms.
3.1.2 Agents
Agent-based modeling is characterized by the existence of many agents who interact with
each other with little or no central direction (Axelrod, 2003).
Nowadays we meet agents more often than not as far as human agents are concerned.
If we do not contact them ourselves, they call us during dinner time and want to arrange
our pension or life annuity, they want us to borrow money and want to arrange that for us,
they want to look for a new house on our behalf and negotiate on the price. If you do not
want to apply for their service, but you are frequently using the Internet, and searching for
something, then you still have to do with them, or, better said, with their artificial version.
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Internet agents compare prices for us, they look for houses and jobs for us, and notify us
whenever new offers appear in which we are interested in.
While the ”trendy” term agent-based is widely used in many areas to characterize models
and systems, there is no commonly accepted definition of what an agent is. It has a different
meaning for different people even in the same area. In this section we discuss some widely
used definitions.
The origins. The term agent has its roots in the Latin ”agere” which means ”to do”. In
everyday life we think of an agent as a mediator that arranges something for us.
The economic view. Agents have been originally used in the context of economics. The
classical definition of an agent is as follows: an agent is ”an individual or firm authorized to
act on behalf of another (called the principal), such as by executing a transaction or selling
and servicing an insurance policy.” 1 We refer to an agent that corresponds to this description
as a financial agent.
The ”broad” view. Russell and Norvig (2003) define an agent very broadly as anything
that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting upon that en-
vironment through effectors. In (Wooldridge, 1999) a mathematical formalization of agents
is given. For the time being, assume that the agent’s environment can be characterized as a
set of environment states S = {s1, s2, . . .} that the agent can influence only partially. The
influence of the agent is effected through a set A = {a1, a2, . . .} of actions that the agent
can perform. The agent can then be viewed as a function
action : S → A
that maps environment states to actions (Wooldridge, 1999). The (non-deterministic) behav-
ior of the environment can also be modeled as a function:
env : S ×A→ P(S)
which maps the current environment state and the action of the agent into a set of environ-
ment states. The range of the env function is always a singleton in case the environment is
deterministic. Note that this definition of an agent completely parallels the definition of a
decision maker in a decision environment. Hence, one could argue that this is a decision-
theoretic approach to agents.
Typically, the agents observe the environment states only partially. (This is one of the
aspects that hinders them from being perfectly rational.) Therefore, the agent’s actions will
depend only on a set P of percepts, which consists of a subset of the environment states and
quantities that can be derived from the environment states. It is part of the agent’s design
to determine which percepts it can derive from the available states. In the formalism of this
section, this mapping can be represented as a function:
see : S −→ P.
1http://www.investorwords.com/154/agent.html
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The agent’s decision-making mechanism now maps (sequences of) percepts to the actions of
the agent. Let f denote this mapping. Then we have:
f(P,Θ) : P −→ A
where Θ denotes a set of parameters with which the mapping f can be parameterized.
An agent’s function can now be specified by defining its set P of percepts, set A of
actions and the mapping f(P,Θ) from the percepts to the actions as shown in Figure 3.1.
It is assumed for simplicity that the specification of P also implies the specification of the
function see.
Agent
P f(P, )Q AS
Figure 3.1: An agent maps its percepts to its actions.
The software engineering view. In software engineering agents are specific computer pro-
grams. Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) define an agent as ”a computer system that is situ-
ated in an environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment in order
to meet its design objectives.”
In this definition the notion of environment mentioned in the broad view of Russell and
Norvig comes back. New in this context is the autonomy and the fact that agents have
their own objective. Although there is no agreement on what autonomy precisely means for
agent-based systems, people agree that autonomy should be central to the notion of agency.
Tesfatsion (2006) tries to associate agents’ autonomy to humans’ autonomy. She claims
that ”autonomy, for humans, means a capacity for self-governance”. According to Franklin
and Graesser (1996) ”an autonomous agent is a system situated within and part of an envi-
ronment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda
and so as to effect what it senses in the future.” This definition is not sufficiently strict how-
ever. As Tesfatsion (2006) argues: ”the standard neoclassical budget-constrained consumer
who selects a sequence of purchases to maximize her expected lifetime utility could be said
to satisfy this definition in some sense”.
The most widely accepted definition of autonomy is probably the one given by Jennings
(2000), according to which the property autonomy means that agents have control both over
their internal state and over their own behavior. The question is how and to what degree
this property of agents is realized in models. What does ”having control” mean? Does it
mean that they can not be controlled by another computer system? On the other hand, the
way autonomy is implemented does not seem to be an important detail. According to Tes-
fatsion (2006) ”the important issue is not whether agent-based tools permit the modeling of
agents with autonomy, perse, but rather the degree to which they usefully facilitate the mod-
eling of agents exhibiting substantially more autonomy than permitted by standard modeling
approaches.”
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The fact that there is no general agreement on the terms ”agent” and ”autonomous agent”
is illustrated by the discussion in (Franklin and Graesser, 1996) on the many ways these terms
are used. The authors give an overview of many definitions, and, based on these definitions,
they propose a taxonomy of autonomous agents.
The ”intelligent agent” view. In the area of computer science, many people, among which
Russell and Norvig, associate agents to artificial intelligence (AI). Russell and Norvig (2003)
are of the opinion that AI cannot exist without agents, defining AI as ”the study of agents
that receive percepts from the environment and perform actions.” They differentiate several
types of agents based on their qualities. Examples include rational agents, adaptive agents,
and so on.
In (Poggio et al., 2001) we see a more restricted view. Here AI-related agents are explic-
itly referred to as intelligent-agents, and they are defined as ”computer programs that contain
certain heuristics and computational learning algorithms, with the intention of capturing par-
ticular aspects of human behavior.” The authors compare the agent-based approach to study
financial markets with the experimental one, and emphasize the added value of software
agents above humans, claiming that ”their preferences and learning algorithms are trans-
parent and, unlike experimental subjects, can be carefully controlled and modified. Using
AI-agents, we can conduct a far broader set of experiments involving more complexities than
with human agents.”
While Russell and Norvig associate agents to the area of artificial intelligence, and they
define them as adaptive agents that use artificial intelligence techniques (such as genetic
algorithms, neural networks) to learn and adapt, according to Jennings and Wooldridge it
doesn’t need to be necessarily so. So, they introduce the notion ”intelligent agent” and they
define this as ”a computer system that is capable of flexible autonomous action in order to
meet it’s design objectives” (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995).
What differentiates an intelligent agent from a simple agent is its flexibility. According
to Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) a flexible agent has the following properties:
• responsive: agents should perceive their environment and should be able to respond in
a timely fashion to changes that occur in their environment;
• proactive: they should be able to exhibit opportunistic, goal-directed behavior and
take the initiative where appropriate; and
• social: they should be able to interact with other agents in order to achieve their goals.
The question is whether AI techniques are necessary for achieving these properties. A
Genetic Algorithm, for example, is viewed as a key component in many agent-based financial
markets for modeling responsive behavior, i.e. learning and adaptation. Besides AI tools
however, more traditional approaches exist as well, such as Bayesian learning and adaptive
linear models (LeBaron, 2006).
The agent-based computational economics view. In the agent-based computational eco-
nomics (ACE) literature ”agent” refers broadly to a bundle of data and behavioral methods
representing an entity constituting part of a computationally constructed world. Examples
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of possible agents include individuals (e.g., consumers, producers), social groupings (e.g.,
families, firms, communities, government agencies), institutions (e.g., markets, regulatory
systems), biological entities (e.g., crops, livestock, forests), and physical entities (e.g., in-
frastructure, weather, and geographical regions). Thus, agents can range from active data-
gathering decision makers with sophisticated learning capabilities to passive world features
with no cognitive function. Moreover, agents can be composed of other agents, permitting
hierarchical constructions (Tesfatsion, 2006).
3.1.3 Agent-based environments
Regardless of the agent-definition that one is willing to accept, we certainly all agree, that
”agents are situated and interact in an environment”. Let us know focus on the possible
properties of an environment where agents might interact. Russell and Norvig (2003, pg. 41)
list six dimensions along which an environments can be categorized. In the list below the
explanation of properties is based on the interpretation and examples given by Wooldridge
(2005).
• fully observable vs. partially observable:
An environment is fully observable if the complete state of the environment is ob-
servable. That is: complete, accurate, up to date information can be obtained about
the environment’s state. An environment is partially observable if the observer can-
not get complete insight into the environment either because he is hindered given the
properties of the environment or because of his own capabilities. Partially observable
environments have some degree of uncertainty.
• deterministic vs. stochastic:
In a deterministic environment any action has a single guaranteed effect. In a sto-
chastic environment a variety of effects can occur each with some probability. The
probability that a certain effect will take place might be known, but even so, it can
lead to actions failing to have the desired result. Thereof stochastic environments
entail uncertainty as well.
• episodic vs. sequential:
In an episodic environment decisions must be taken periodically, in episodes. The state
of the current episode does not depend on actions in the previous episodes. An episodic
environment can be viewed as an environment with isolated decision problems, that
could be solved in any order in fact because they do not affect each other. In sequential
environments the current decision generally affects the state of the environment, and as
such, all future decisions. The order of decision problems in sequential environments
can thus not be varied, because when the order would be varied that would change the
characteristics and outcomes.
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• static vs. dynamic:
The state of a static environment is guaranteed to stay the same while decisions are
being made. In a dynamic environment there are many processes that operate con-
currently to modify the environment in ways that are beyond our control. A dynamic
environment might thus change while decisions are being made, entailing uncertainty.
A dynamic agent-based environment, for example, has the following consequence on
the agents’ decisions and actions: ”if an agent performs no external action between
times t0 and t1, then it cannot assume the environment at t1 will be the same as it was
at time t0. Thus if an agent checks that the environment has some property φ and then
starts executing some action α on the basis of this information, it cannot in general
guarantee that the environment will continue to have property φ while it is executing
α” (Wooldridge, 2005). As a consequence, participants in a dynamic environment
will need to synchronize or coordinate their actions with those of other processes in
the environment.
• discrete vs. continuous:
”Discrete ideas or things are separate and distinct from each other”. (Sinclair, 2001,
pg. 435) ”A continuous process or event continues for a period of time without stop-
ping.” ”A continuous line or surface has no gaps or holes in it.” (Sinclair, 2001, pg.
327) ”The discrete/continuous distinction can be applied to the state of the environ-
ment, to the way time is handled, and to the percepts and actions of the agent. For
example, a discrete-state environment such as a chess game has a finite number of
distinct states. Chess also has a discrete set of percepts and actions. Taxi driving is a
continuous-state and continuous-time problem: the speed and location of the taxi and
of the other vehicles sweep through a range of continuous values and do so smoothly
over time. Taxi-driving actions are also continuous.” (Russell and Norvig, 2003).
• single agent vs. multiagent:
Based on the number of agents, an agent-based environment can be classified as single
agent or multiagent. Most problems require or involve multiple agents which will
need to interact with one another, either to achieve their individual objectives or to
manage the dependencies that ensue from being situated in a common environment.
Interactions can vary from simple information interchanges, to requests for particular
actions to be performed and on to cooperation, coordination and negotiation in order
to arrange interdependent activities (Jennings, 2000).
A most complex environment is one that is partially observable, stochastic, sequential,
dynamic, continuous, with many participants or decision makers. One can easily agree that
financial markets are such kind of environments. On the one hand, conventional financial
models, being constrained by mathematical feasibility, are not capable of modeling all these
features (Chen and Yeh, 2002). On the other hand, computational agent-based techniques
proved to be able to model these sort of environments. We point the reader again to (Russell
and Norvig, 2003) and (Wooldridge, 2005) for a detailed description and reasoning on this
potential of agent-based modeling.
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3.1.4 Agent-based modeling of financial markets
The goal of agent-based modeling is to enrich our understanding of fundamental processes
that may appear in a variety of applications. The emergent properties of an agent-based
model are the result of ”bottom-up” processes, rather than a ”top-down” direction. (Axelrod,
2003). While the topics being investigated by the agent-based approach may be complicated,
the assumptions underlying the agent-based model should be simple. The complexity of
agent-based modeling should be in the simulated results, not in the assumptions of the model
(Axelrod, 2003). The promising property of agent-based approaches to model and study
complex systems is at the basis of the area of agent-based computational economics.
3.1.4.1 Agent-based computational economics
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is the computational study of economic pro-
cesses modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. (Tesfatsion, 2006).
Tesfatsion (2006) elaborates on a number of advantages of ACE modeling above standard
modeling approaches.
• In ACE events are driven solely by agent interactions once initial conditions have been
specified. ACE does not aim to focus on the equilibrium states of a system. The idea
behind it is rather ”to watch and see if some form of equilibrium develops over time.”
Thus, it is possible to study in what case equilibrium will establish, and if so, how
such an equilibrium is realized. Further, ”modeling can proceed even if equilibria are
computationally intractable or non-existent.”
• Agent-based tools facilitate flexible social communication. ”Agents can communicate
with other agents at event-driven times using messages that they, themselves, have
adaptively scripted.”
• Agent-based tools facilitate the design of agents with relatively more autonomy than
standard modeling approaches. in the sense that agent-based tools facilitate the mod-
eling of cognitive agents with more realistic social and learning capabilities than stan-
dard models. These capabilities include:
– social communication skills;
– the ability to learn about ones environment from various sources (such as gath-
ered information, past experiences, social mimicry, and deliberate experimenta-
tion with new ideas);
– the ability to form and maintain social interaction patterns (e.g., trade networks);
– the ability to develop shared perceptions (e.g., commonly accepted market pro-
tocols);
– the ability to alter beliefs and preferences as an outcome of learning; and
– the ability to exert at least some local control over the timing and type of actions
taken within the world in an attempt to satisfy built in (or evolved) needs, drives,
and goals.
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As Tesfatsion (2006) observes: ”A potentially important aspect of all of these modeled
capabilities is that they can be based in part on the private internal methods of an agent,
i.e., internal processes that are hidden from the view of all other entities residing in the
agents world. This effectively renders an agent both unpredictable and uncontrollable
relative to its world.”
3.1.4.2 Agent-based computational finance
Agent-based computational finance is a subfield of agent-based computational economics,
which focuses on agent-based modeling of stock markets. Models in the realm of agent-
based computational finance view financial markets as interacting groups of learning, bound-
edly rational agents. In agent-based financial markets, dynamic heterogeneity is critical.
This heterogeneity is represented by a distribution of agents, or wealth, across either a fixed
or changing set of strategies. Bounded rationality is driven by the complexity of the state
space more than the perceived limitations of individual agents (LeBaron, 2006).
According to LeBaron (2006): ”Financial markets are particularly appealing applications
for agent-based methods for several reasons.
• First, the key debates in finance about market efficiency and rationality are still unre-
solved.
• Second, financial time series contain many curious puzzles that are not well under-
stood.
• Third, financial markets provide a wealth of pricing and volume data that can be ana-
lyzed.
• Fourth, when considering evolution, financial markets provide a good approximation
to a crude fitness measure through wealth or return performance.
• Finally, there are strong connections to relevant experimental results that in some cases
operate at the same time scales as actual financial markets.”
Agent-based computational finance allows us to explore new areas of economic theory,
especially in dynamic markets with asymmetric information, learning, and uncertainty - a
combination that poses many insurmountable technical challenges from a theoretical per-
spective (Poggio et al., 2001).
3.1.4.3 Is agent-based modeling the perfect approach?
Based on the above properties agent-based modeling seems almost perfect. Although it is the
most promising approach so far to model complex dynamic systems, unfortunately, agent-
based models are not perfect either, they also entail problems. The most commonly criticized
aspects include:
• validation / calibration: how do models and data relate to reality and real data?
• too many parameters, the impact of which is not well understood;
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• the stability of the results with respect to the addition of new trading strategies. The
question as LeBaron (2006, pg223) states is: ”Specifically, are there strategies that
would smoke out obvious patterns in the data and change the dynamics?”
• a small number of assets, which is a simplification that may eliminate many interesting
features;
• a small number of agents. The question is what happens when the number of agents is
increased? Can the dynamics change dramatically as the number of agents becomes
large?
• timing (of learning, decisions, information and trade). To which degree do the results
depend on arbitrary timing decisions?
The reason for all these drawbacks, as Poggio et al. (2001) argue, is that agent-based
models contain ”new and untested algorithms, parameters that must be calibrated, and other
ad hoc assumptions that are likely to be controversial”. This ”ad hoc assumption” problem
is in fact the same problem that occurs in other approaches used to study stock markets,
and is entailed by the hardly observable aspects of financial markets. One way to address
these concerns, as proposed by (Poggio et al., 2001) is to use data from human experimental
markets to validate and calibrate the agent-based models.
3.1.5 Are all ASMs agent-based? - a discussion
In the literature on studying market dynamics, most authors prefer to refer to their market
model as an ASM and to characterize it as agent-based. Most notably, the three constructive
approaches i.e. the nonlinear dynamic approach, microscopic simulation, and ACE often
talk in terms of agent-based methods, agent-based artificial stock markets. The approach that
explicitly mentions agents in the naming is the ACE approach (agent-based computational
economics), all three approaches refer however to the market participants they represent as
agents. The idea behind these methods is also very similar: they represent individual market
participants or groups of market participants and aim to study the emergent properties that
are the results of their interactions. The difference is that they root in different areas: the first
one in chaos theory, the second one in physics, and the last one in the literature on agents.
The question that we aim to answer in this subsection is whether the models in the realm
of these approaches are artificial stock markets and whether they are agent-based. Given
that there is no commonly accepted definition of these two terms (agent and ASM) more
answers might be possible to this question. Our answer is based on two definitions, namely
the definition of ACE (or strictly speaking agent-based computational finance) by (LeBaron,
2006), and the strict definition of ASMs by (Chen and Yeh, 2002).
Let us recall the (strict) distinction between standard models and ASMs. Chen and Yeh
(2002) describe ASMs as models composed by ”many heterogeneous interacting adaptive
traders”. They claim that an ASM is a promising way to study the stock market as a complex
adaptive system, because it is rich in emergent dynamics and it is rich in emergent properties.
Let us now turn to the ACE view on financial markets. According to LeBaron (2006)
models in the realm of agent-based computational finance view financial markets as inter-
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acting groups of learning, boundedly-rational agents, in which dynamic heterogeneity is
critical.
There are many similarities in these two definitions. First of all, interaction of partici-
pants is central in both of them. Secondly, one definition requires adaptive, the other learn-
ing behavior. Learning is in fact a form of adaptation in a computational sense, and these
two terms are often used interchangeably. Further, both definitions emphasize the need for
heterogeneous behavior. In addition the ACE view emphasizes bounded-rationality. One
important criticism on the ”homogeneous literature” is, that there all traders are assumed to
be ”rational”, whereas experiments point out that bounded-rationality is an important aspect
leading traders to behave heterogeneously. The main property thus that makes a group of
agents heterogeneous is bounded-rationality.
This leaves just a slight difference in the definitions above of an ASM and an ACE model.
They differ in the naming of the participants in the models. The first definition refers only to
traders, and does not talk about agents, or about how traders are represented. Traders might
be modeled as computational agents (whatever the term covers) but not necessarily.
Chen and Yeh (2002) is talking, thus, about ”traders”, and LeBaron (2006) about ”agents”,
but do they really mean different type of participants? In agent-based modeling of financial
markets, agents are particularly used to represent traders. Further, in the finance literature
the term agent refers to financial traders, such as brokers or market makers. In that sense
the two expressions thus might cover the same meaning. If so, ASMs can be considered as
market models in the realm of agent-based computational finance and the expression agent-
based ASM becomes redundant. If not, still the question remains which definition of the
term agent the various researchers adopt. How does the ACE literature define an agent? Do
the definitions and implementations correspond to the characteristics mentioned by Axelrod
(2003), i.e. do these agents interact with little or no central direction? We have to mention,
that the definition of ASMs is not a computational definition, but it cover also experimental
laboratories. According to this view, models in the realm of ACE are a subset, a specific case
of ASMs. Finally, some people who apply the ACE methodology might call their model an
ASM without adhering to Chen’s definition.
Once again there is no common agreement on what the concept agent covers. The ex-
planatory power of the model is ultimately more important, than the form of representation.
Therefore, in the remaining of this chapter we drop the adjective ”agent-based” for the mo-
ment, and refer to all the models from the presented literature as artificial stock markets.
Whether and to what degree one considers them agent-based ASMs is a topic for further
discussion and depends on the definition of the notion agent.
Based on the many definitions and contexts in which agents, ASMs and ABASMs are
referred to, we conclude this discussion with our own definition. We define artificial stock
markets as market models that have at least a well-defined price formation mechanism for
at least one asset for which prices emerge internally trough the interaction of market partic-
ipants. Agent-based artificial stock markets are artificial stock markets where market par-
ticipants (but possibly other elements as well) are represented as agents. The term agent is
widely used in various areas in different context. Our definition is that, in the literature on
ASMs, it is a representation of a market participant (or a group of market participants using
similar strategies), having a form that varies from a simple equation to complex software
components endowed with human-like artificial-intelligence based adaptive behavior.
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3.2 An overview of ASMs
In the remainder of this chapter we present some artificial stock markets from the literature.
The criteria for selecting the ASMs that we study here is, that they should incorporate an en-
dogenous price formation mechanism, and a representation of the behavior of traders. More
precisely, we select market models that have at least a well-defined price formation mecha-
nism for at least one asset to the extent that prices emerge internally trough the interaction of
represented market participants. Whether these can be characterized as ASMs was the topic
of discussion of the previous section, and depends on the definition adopted.
When searching for ASMs we took into account the references from the ACE website2,
references from the papers we studied, and we additionally made use of search engines. The
list is certainly selective and incomplete, but it reflects the main research directions and the
market organizations represented in literature. We focus here on the following artificial stock
markets:
1. SSM: the stochastic simulation model introduced in (Lux and Marchesi, 1999), and
further studied in (Lux and Marchesi, 2000) and (Chen et al., 2001);
2. ABMI: the agent-based model for investment proposed in (Farmer, 2001);
3. ABS: the Adaptive Belief System as described in (Brock and Hommes, 1998) and
(Hommes, 2001);
4. GASM: the Genoa artificial stock market introduced in (Raberto et al., 2001) and ex-
tended in (Raberto et al., 2003) and (Cincotti et al., 2003);
5. LLS: the ”Levy, Levy and Solomon” microsimulation model introduced in (Levy et al.,
1994), and studied in (Levy et al., 2000) and (Zschischang and Lux, 2001);
6. SF-ASM: the Santa Fe ASM as described in (LeBaron et al., 1999), (LeBaron, 2002)
and (Tesfatsion, 2004);
7. BS: the business school representation in (Chen and Yeh, 2001) and (Chen and Yeh,
2002);
8. MDS: the microscopic dynamical model from (Daniels et al., 2002), (Daniels et al.,
2003), (Blume and Durlauf, 2005) and (Smith et al., 2002);
9. OMP: the opinion, media and past-based financial market in (Franci et al., 2001) and
(Matassini and Franci, 2001);
10. CTAM: the continuous time asynchronous model introduced in (Shatner et al., 2000)
and extended in (Daniel et al., 2006), (Muchnik et al., 2005) and (Muchnik and Solomon,
2005) to an asynchronous simulation platform under the name of NatLab;
11. EGM: the extended Glosten and Milgrom microstructure model in (Das, 2003) and
(Das, 2005);
2http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm
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12. EMM: the ASM based on an electronic market maker in (Chan and Shelton, 2001);
13. KapSyn: the KapSyn framework described in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000), (Loistl et al.,
2001), (Loistl and Veverka, 2004) and (Landes and Loistl, 1992);
The first seven artificial markets implement single-price call auctions. The rest of the
studies focuses on continuous execution mechanisms.
1. SSM: the stochastic simulation model
SSM is based on the nonlinear approach, to be more precise, to represent investors a
mass-statistical approach is used. The method considers a few key behavioral variants
and models agents in groups (as a mass), switching the proportion of agents over the
alternatives in a stochastic manner. The dynamics covers switches within the prevail-
ing mood among various types of traders, such as within noise traders (from optimistic
to pessimistic) as well as switches of agents between the noise trader and fundamen-
talist group. Switching groups happens in response to observed differences in profits.
Switches between different groups is modeled by means of Poisson transition proba-
bilities. The model resembles call trading sessions with single-price auction mecha-
nisms. Prices are determined by a market maker. The market maker adjusts prices in
reaction to imbalances between demand and supply.
The aim of the studies around SSM is to investigate the time series properties (es-
pecially nonlinear features thereof) of simulated data and its dependence on market
settings.
On the one hand, tests give unstable results in that both acceptance and strong rejec-
tion of IID series can be found in different realizations of the model. On the other
hand, when testing for volatility clusters, a good fit is reported both to theoretical and
empirical data, in the sense that when estimating GARCH models, the results appear
robust and the chosen GARCH specification closely resembles the typical outcome of
empirical studies
2. ABMI: the agent-based model for investment
The goal of this paper is to illustrate how simple agent-based systems can be used for
modeling and studying stock markets. There are a few types of investors and a market
maker, all represented as agents. The role of the market maker is to adjust prices as a
function of the order imbalance.
The study shows in what sense the market mechanism matters. Risk-averse behavior
of the market maker, for example, introduces trends in prices. This is caused by the
fact that if the market maker acquires a position he wants to get rid of it. Structure in
price series creates opportunity for technical traders.
In the model there is a point at which the market is efficient (i.e. everyone breaks
even). The authors analyze under which conditions the market will converge to this
point.
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3. ABS: the Adaptive Belief System
The ABS is based on the nonlinear dynamic approach. The aim of the studies around
the ABS is to investigate the dynamics in simple asset pricing models with traders hav-
ing heterogeneous beliefs. Within ABS financial markets are modeled as evolutionary
systems. In this model investors are represented in similar way as in the SSM in the
sense that investors with different forecast functions form groups of traders (typically
fundamentalists and chartists), and the fraction of traders in various groups evolves
over time. The difference between the SSM and the ABS is that in the former the
probability of a change is stochastic, in the latter the transition is deterministic. The
evolution of fractions is based on the idea that most investors choose the prediction
strategy that generates the highest past performance. The results point out that het-
erogeneous beliefs may lead to market instability: a large fraction of fundamentalists
tends to stabilize prices, whereas a large fraction of chartists tends to destabilize them.
4. GASM: the Genoa artificial stock market
The Genoa artificial stock market was introduced in (Raberto et al., 2001). The main
problem studied in the GASM is how the market microstructure and the macroeco-
nomic environment affect market prices. In order to address this problem a multi-agent
framework has been proposed using which it would be possible to perform computa-
tional experiments with various types of artificial agents. The three papers analyzed
here underpin this property of the GASM. The experiments presented in these papers
differ with respect to the type of the traders used. From this point on we denote the
variants of the Genoa stock market as GASM-1 (the version described in (Raberto
et al., 2001)), GASM-2 (the version described in (Cincotti et al., 2003)), and GASM-3
respectively (the version described in (Raberto et al., 2003)). In GASM-1 all investors
generate orders stochastically as a function of historical volatility, whereas in GASM-2
and GASM-3 intricate technical trading strategies are introduced additionally. More-
over, in GASM-3 fundamentalist traders are also represented. In all versions it is taken
into account that agents have finite resources. In GASM-2 and GASM-3 additionally
the dynamics of markets in case of cash inflow is analyzed.
In the GASM the limit price of the orders depends on the quoted bid and ask prices.
By making limit orders dependent on volatility, the model introduces correlations of
price and volatility. All three models are able to exhibit some of the stylized facts of
financial time series, such as fat tails and volatility clustering. The volatility clustering
effect in GASM-1 is sensitive to the size of the model. If the number of agents becomes
very large, volatility clustering tends to disappear.
In GASM-2 price processes exhibit strong reversion to the mean. Mean reversion is a
tendency for a stochastic process to remain near, or tend to return over time to a long-
run average value. Given this property mean-reversion traders perform better than
other type of traders. On the long-run the performance of the strategies depends crit-
ically on the market condition (steady or growing) and on the periodicity of portfolio
reallocation. Finally, this model rejects the random walk hypothesis.
In GASM-3 the long-run wealth distribution of agents with different trading strategies
is studied. In this model fundamentalist traders are also investigated. Results show
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that a trading strategy cannot be judged solely on the basis of the strategy itself. Its
success depends also on the market conditions.
5. LLS: the Levy-Levy-Solomon microsimulation model
The LSS model is a pioneering work applying the microscopic simulation approach to
the study of financial markets. Investors have a limited memory span of a number of
periods on which they base their forecast functions. They use similar utility functions,
but they have different risk aversion parameters and a different memory span. To make
the expectation of investors with an identical memory span heterogeneous, the utility
value to be maximized is altered with a normally distributed random number.
Studies based on LLS show an extreme dependence on initial conditions. The condi-
tions varied one by one are the random price history given at the start of the simula-
tions, alternative utility functions, different attitudes to risk, different memory span,
and the initial distribution of wealth.
If all the traders have identical memory span, price series tend to follow a cyclic be-
havior with booms and crashes. With respect to the traders’ wealth and to the mar-
ket efficiency, results based on the LLS suggest that investors with constant shares of
stocks in their portfolio perform better than other strategies. Further, results suggest
that those ready to accept a higher risk will also earn higher returns (on average) so
that as a group (irrespective of individual failures) they will increase their share of
wealth. In general, the outcomes in terms of the dominance of one group (with similar
memory span) over other ones depends on the overall number of agents.
6. SF-ASM: the Santa Fe ASM
The Santa Fe ASM is one of the most heavily cited, and one of the first sophisticated
agent-based financial market models that applies a bottom-up approach for studying
stock markets. The approach applied in the model is ACE. The goal of the SF-ASM is
to understand the dynamics of relatively traditional economic models. Investors base
their orders on a set of strategies that evolves over time by means of genetic algorithms
(GA). Results suggest that the efficiency of the market and the performance of the
traders depends on the speed with which traders update their set of strategies.
7. BS: the business school representation
The BS is an agent-based model of a so-called ”school”. The idea behind this school
is similar to the approach used in the SF-ASM in that the set of strategies (here the
school) used to forecast future values evolves over time as a function of their perfor-
mance. Investors update from time to time the forecast function they use if it does
not predict satisfactorily. Forecast functions are selected from the school. The pop-
ulation of forecast functions in the school is evaluated and evolves over time using
a GA-based technique. Experiments in the BS result in random IID return series in
a world with technical traders. Consequently, this study cannot reject the efficient
market hypothesis.
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8. MDS: the microscopic dynamical model
MDS is a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous two-sided auc-
tion under the assumption of IID random order flow. The goal is to understand how
prices depend on order flow rates, without paying attention to the problem of what
determines these order flow rates. In MDS both limit and market orders are generated.
Similarly to the GASM model the price of limit orders depends on current bid and ask
quotes. This coupling provides a nonlinear feedback in the model that makes the price
process complex. One of the main findings within the model is the property that the
liquidity for executing a market order can be characterized by a price impact function,
i.e. properties like depth, bid-ask spread, the time and probability of filling orders, can
be expressed as a function of the shift in the price and the size of the order that caused
the shift.
9. OMP: the opinion, media and past-based financial market
In OMP the microscopic simulation approach is applied. In this model, when formu-
lating their trading intentions, traders do not only analyze historical data but also take
into account the forecast of other, successful agents, and they might receive news.
In the papers based on the OMP the most successful trading strategy is derived. Then,
the robustness of this optimal strategy, its performance and the applicability to real
markets is discussed. In the studies conducted based on the OMP, distribution with fat
tails and volatility clusters are found. The alternation in the volatility is explained by
the imbalance between demand and supply.
10. CTAM: the continuous time asynchronous model
CTAM is a continuous, asynchronous model where individual traders interact. This
model is based on the microscopic simulation approach. Continuous, asynchronous
interaction is achieved, applying event-based simulation (Markov Nets in extended
versions), i.e. by paying special attention to the timing and the frequency of orders.
Traders in CTAM are not continuously active, but they ”sleep” and ”wake up” either
at predefined time intervals, or after the execution of an order, or in reaction to some
market event, such as news or price change. Recently, the CTAM has been extended to
a generic asynchronous simulation platform, namely NatLab (Natural Asynchronous-
Time Event-Lead Agent- Based Platform). The NatLab platform supports experiments
with multiple trading strategies. In addition, it supports behavioral experiments, as
most of these strategies are designed and maintained by humans competing in a con-
tinuous double-auction market on NatLab. Simulations conducted on the NatLab plat-
form show, among others, that market dynamics can be drastically changed by a small
fraction of trend followers. Further, winning strategies are studied and discovered.
These depend, however, on market conditions.
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11. EGM: the extended Glosten and Milgrom microstructure model
The EGM and EMM (see below) belong to the few studies that focus on the market-
makers’ quote-adjusting strategy. Both ASMs are inspired from the market microstruc-
ture literature. They are designed with the aim to show the influence of informational
asymmetry on the bid-ask spread in financial markets. EGM extends the Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) information-based model. In the EGM model, the market maker tries
to discover the fundamental value of a stock by means of Bayesian learning. He de-
termines the bid and ask quotes based on his expectation of the real value, the order
flow, and his prior knowledge regarding the ratio of informed and uninformed traders.
In the articles on EGM a nonparametric density estimation technique is proposed for
maintaining a probability distribution over the true value that the market-maker can
use to set prices. Discrete time simulation is applied in the model, and a probabilis-
tic representation of order flows is considered. In the papers the performance of the
market-maker in markets with different settings is evaluated. Findings suggest that the
market is very volatile and spreads are high in periods immediately following a price
jump. However, the learning algorithm applied by the market maker resolves the infor-
mational asymmetry rapidly. The market settles soon into a regime of homogeneous
information with small spreads and low volatility.
12. EMM: the ASM based on an electronic market maker
The EMM, like the EGM focuses on the market-maker’s quote-adjusting strategy. It
is an information-based computational model based on the market microstructure lit-
erature. A Poisson process is applied to change the true value of the stock, and to
generate market orders that represent decisions of informed and random traders. The
goal of the paper is to model the market-making problem in a reinforcement learn-
ing framework, to explicitly develop market-making strategies, and to discuss their
performance. Reinforcement learning is a learning technique in which agents aim to
maximize their long-term accumulated rewards. No knowledge of the market environ-
ment, such as the order arrival or price process, is assumed. Instead, the agent learns
the fundamental value from realtime market experience and develops explicit market-
making strategies, achieving multiple objectives including maximizing of profits and
minimization of the bid-ask spread. The simulation results show initial success in
using learning techniques to build market making algorithms.
Two situations are analyzed. In the basic model the market-maker quotes a single
price (bid and ask are the same), in the extended model bid and ask quotes differ from
each other. In the basic model the optimal strategies are determined analytically and it
is shown that the reinforcement algorithms successfully converge to these strategies.
While in the basic model the market-maker only needs to control the direction of the
price, in the extended model both the direction of the price and the size of the bid-ask
spread has to be considered. It turns out that, in this model, there is one strategy (the
actor-critic algorithm) that generates stochastic policies that correctly adjusts bid/ask
prices with respect to order imbalance and effectively controls the trade-off between
profit and spread. Furthermore, the stochastic policies are shown to outperform deter-
ministic policies in achieving a lower variance of the resulting spread.
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13. KapSyn: the KapSyn framework
In studies describing the KapSyn framework the importance of representing market
microstructures is emphasized. The model imitates the microstructure of various stock
exchanges, especially with respect to their price-finding procedures. The stock mar-
kets focused on are the XETRA and the NASDAQ. Investors are represented at indi-
vidual level. It is important to mention that the KapSyn is the only ASM in which
intra-day data is generated. The representation of XETRA implies a market structure
with auctions opening and closing a trading day, intraday auctions in between if nec-
essary, and continuous sessions in the meantime. KapSyn also represents so-called
designated sponsors (brokers) who interact on XETRA and NASDAQ.
More than one stock is traded on the KapSyn. Investors have actions at their disposal
associated to each stock. An action can be placing a buy order, placing a sell order or
changing the expected value. With each action a so-called reaction time is associated.
The reaction time depends on the expected utility that the action can generate and is
lower for higher utilities. At each simulation round an action is selected for execution.
Selection depends on the reaction time associated to the actions. Actions with smaller
reaction times have a higher probability to be selected.
The findings within the KapSyn point out that efficiency of markets (with respect to
the transaction costs) depends highly on the microstructure and liquidity of stocks.
Results show for example, that NASDAQ is more efficient for mid-size orders, while
XETRA is more efficient with respect to the execution of small and block-size trades.
The role of designated sponsors is demonstrated in non-liquid markets. The authors
also suggest changes to the structure of real markets in order to improve efficiency.
They claim that reducing the designated sponsors’ maximum spread can increase the
market efficiency in XETRA, and an optimum number of six auctions per trading day
is proposed to reduce transactions costs in XETRA.
The ASMs described above apply mainly one of the constructive approaches (nonlinear,
microscopic, or ACE) to study market dynamics (see Section 2.5 and Table 2.1). The bound-
aries between the various constructive approaches are, however, too thin, therefore most of
the ASMs can be characterized by more than one approach. Accordingly to the approach
that is claimed by the authors, a nonlinear dynamics approach is applied in SSM and ABS,
microscopic simulation is the basis behind the LLS, MDS, OMP and CTAM. Finally, the
ABMI, GASM, SF-ASM and BS as well as the EGM, EMM, and KapSyn can be classified
as agent-based computational studies, the main structure of the latter three relying strong on
the market microstructure literature.
In the next two sections we analyze the design and mechanisms of these artificial stock
markets based on the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 2. First we describe how
organizational elements are represented in these models and then we discuss the variety of
applied price formation and order execution mechanisms, and the related traders’ behavioral
representation. The findings within these ASMs related to market dynamics are summarized
in Section 3.5. After analyzing these markets in more detail we discuss to what degree they
are agent-based, and how they define and represent agents.
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3.3 Organizational aspects of Artificial Stock Markets
The most realistic way of modeling a system (in this case a stock market) would be to rep-
resent every detail, to precisely implement its whole structure. This representation seems,
however, impossible given the variety of complex structures and mechanisms of stock mar-
kets and further the presence of several hidden factors and processes that are not (or cannot
be) revealed. Further, in order to study the effect of some specific factors on the market dy-
namics, we need to exclude other ones. For this reason, controlled environments are needed
in which factors of influence can be added and modified in a flexible way. The market struc-
ture chosen, and the simplifications and approximations made depend of course on the aim
of the research. The consequences of the choices made need to be examined however. In
this section we summarize what choices are made in the various ASMs regarding the ar-
chitectural elements of the markets they model. A structured overview of the institutional
organization of the studied markets is provided in various tables.
3.3.1 Traded assets
Although hundreds of assets are traded on stock markets, in general ASMs model only few
assets. As illustrated by Table 3.1, usually two types of assets are traded on artificial stock
markets: one risk-free and one risky stock. Multiple (risky) assets can be traded at the GASM
and KapSyn markets. At the GASM market, experiments with two stocks have been con-
ducted, while at KapSyn the number of stocks can be as high as 122 in earlier versions, and
50 in newer versions, this quantity being limited by computational implementation. Risk-
free assets might represent mutual funds or bonds paying a constant interest rate. In most
cases, however, they represent the cash reserve of traders. In some of the models, risk-free
assets are not explicitly handled. In these models traders are not concerned with their port-
folio or wealth. Implicitly a risk-free asset, namely cash, is always present as prices are
expressed in terms of money.
Dividends paid by risky assets are represented in few of the cases only, such as ABS, LLS,
SF-ASM and BS. The dividend process might introduce additional dynamics in the prices.
Dividends vary usually on the basis of stochastic processes.
There is a well-determined fundamental value in most of the ASMs. This value typically
follows a random IID (independent and identically distributed) process. There are only a few
exceptions to stochastic changes. In the BS the fundamental value depends on the current
price and the dividend paid. In the ABS and SF-ASM the dividend paid by the risky stock is
compared to the interest rate of the risk-free stock to get its real value. Equal rates mean that
the real value equals the current price and dividend. Lower dividend percentage suggests
under-valuated stock, whereas higher dividend percentage is perceived as an overvaluation
of the stock. Interestingly, in KapSyn there is no unique fundamental value, but all investors
have their own individual belief about it.
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Table 3.1: Representation of the stocks traded in the ASMs
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3.3.2 Orders
Based on Table 3.2 we can conclude that ASMs usually choose to express trading intentions
of traders either by market or by limit orders. These are the most common orders at stock
markets as well.
In artificial markets representing call-auctions, the initiated orders are often market or-
ders. In the SSM model, orders are in fact not explicitly represented, but only the excess
demand. In GASM, LLS and SF-ASM limit orders are generated. Orders at LLS and SF-ASM
are modeled as demand functions of investors regarding the risky asset in function of the
possible stock prices. In this case investors send to the auctioneer a set of price-dependent
limit orders.
On continuous markets limit orders or both limit and market orders can be placed. Both
limit and market orders are placed in MDS, OMP, CTAM, EGM and EMM, market orders
being matched against the quoted bid and ask, limit orders being entered into a limit order
book if they cannot be cleared. Further, limit orders in OMP can be turned into market
orders. In EGM and EMM investors’ trading intentions are expressed in the form of market
orders, and the market maker determines bid and ask quotes with limit prices.
In the KapSyn market, limit orders are generated, but traders might also decide to accept
quoted orders, which is in fact equivalent to placing a market order. Unexecuted orders at
MDS,OMP,CTAM and KapSyn can be canceled if wished. Orders placed at the OMP market
can contain thresholds for canceling them, which can be changed with time.
3.3.3 Market participants
In Table 3.3 we summarize the type of the markets participants represented. In the ASMs
studied traders typically perform one action: they place orders as the result of some decision
(that is mainly utility maximization in every trading round). In this way only investors are
represented by these traders. There are several studies in which investors are not modeled
individually. Instead, just the orders placed are modeled arriving according to some distrib-
ution, such as at MDS, EGM and EMM. In SSM and ABS a mass-statistical approach is used.
This means that traders are not represented individually, but just masses (groups) of traders
with similar strategies. What is under analysis here is the evolution of fractions of traders in
various groups. In ABS, investors are represented by simple equations that define their trad-
ing decisions. Individual investors with their own (sometimes complex) decision-making
behavior are simulated in ABMI, GASM, LLS, SF-ASM, BS, OMP, CTAM and KapSyn.
In ASMs that resemble call-auctions (the first seven in the list), the final order execution
is often carried out by an automated execution system, and as a consequence financial agents
(such as brokers or market makers) are rarely modeled. Brokers who commit themselves to
execute orders for others are not represented in the majority of the studies. In fact, we found
one single study, the KapSyn where the role of the brokers is recognized and brokers are
represented.
In a few studies the behavior of market makers is modeled. In fact there are only three
ASMs modeling call auctions (SSM, ABMI and SF-ASM) and three ASMs based on contin-
uous sessions (EGM, EMM and KapSyn) in which a market maker is explicitly represented.
The way they are modeled ranges from simple price-adjusting equations to sophisticated
learning mechanisms. We will discuss their tasks and behavior in more detail in Section 3.4.
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Table 3.2: The type of orders in the ASMs
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Table 3.3: The representation of market participants in the ASMs
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Table 3.4: Trading sessions and execution systems in the ASMs
3.3.4 Trading sessions
At most of the ASMs call market sessions are implemented. Within SSM, ABMI, ABS,
GASM, LLS, SF-ASM and BS, for example, traders or selected groups of traders simultane-
ously place orders at every discrete point of time that is modeled in the simulation.
There are several ASMs that implement continuous trading sessions. On markets with
continuous trading sessions, an order can be placed at any time and transactions are made
whenever possible. Consequently, traders do not need to make decisions simultaneously.
Most ASMs apply however discrete-time simulation (i.e. discrete time intervals, simulation
rounds with even time intervals in between) to model markets. In these, typically, the trader
whose decision is considered next, is selected from the population by a central mechanism
at every simulation round. In OMP a randomly selected trader makes a trading decision
(place, accept or cancel an order). In the MDS, EGM and EMM no special implementation
is needed, because traders are not focused on individually, but orders arrive one by one under
the assumption of random order flow.
At the KapSyn stock market continuous time is implemented by using a discrete state
space. Transition from one state into another depends on time related parameters. In this
framework agents’ decision process regarding which action to take next is independent of
each other and takes place simultaneously in parallel. A decision process contains the fol-
lowing steps. First, each agent determines a set of alternative actions for each stock. Then,
each agent selects one action for each stock. Finally, one action is selected for each agent.
All the selections depend on the utility and execution time of the actions. The greater the
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expected benefit gained from the action of an agent, the shorter will be the reaction time and
the higher the selection probability. After all agents have made their decision with respect
to the next action to be carried out, the system executes the action with the shortest reaction
time. After an action that is observable by all market participants, i.e. a buy or a sell action,
the decision process determining the next action is repeated on the basis of the new market
conditions. Therefore, in this case, only one action is executed in a simulation round.
In order to model continuous trading sessions, at CTAM discrete-event simulation is
applied. In this model traders do not continuously make decisions. Rather, they ”sleep”
and ”wake up” at times defined by previous decisions, that might concern pre-defined time,
execution of an order, or reaction to some event. Each operation in the model is performed
by the computer in the appropriate time order.
3.3.5 Execution systems
The execution system typically applied during call market sessions in most of the artifi-
cial markets is the single-price auction. Examples are the SSM, ABMI, ABS, GASM, LLS,
SF-ASM, and BS. In these models traders simultaneously submit orders that are centrally
matched at a price at equilibrium.
Besides call-auction type of markets, continuous-auction markets are represented in the
literature as well. Within most of the ASMs that implement continuous trading sessions
price formation is commonly based on automated central execution systems, such as within
the MDS, OMP and CTAM. Traders in these can trade directly with each other, without the
intervention of a third party.
Although in real life continuous quote-driven markets are very common (Reilly and
Brown, 2003; Demarchi and Foucault, 2000), only very few studies try to conduct experi-
ments in such a kind of environment. The difference between continuous auction markets,
and continuous quote-driven markets is that in the second one a market maker is responsi-
ble for executing orders, traders can trade with each other only with the help of this market
maker, and the market maker can or has to take position (i.e. trade for own account) if
necessary. We indeed observed ASMs implementing this feature in our literature survey. Ar-
tificial markets that represent continuous quote-driven trading are basically inspired by the
microstructure literature. Accordingly, within the EGM, EMM and KapSyn models market
makers set bid and ask quotes and execute orders based on their beliefs, position and received
orders.
The most detailed, realistic representation of stock exchanges is implemented by the
KapSyn model. Price formation in this model depends on the microstructure of the stock
exchange that is modeled. In this sense the NASDAQ is represented as a dealer (quote-
driven) market, where trades are made at the dealers’ quoted bid and ask price.
In the KapSyn, hybrid markets, namely a representation of the XETRA market struc-
ture, are also studied. Transactions on XETRA take place based on the content of the order
book, that is at best bid or ask. Further, in special cases (e.g. open, close, extreme price
change) auctions can be conducted. The market price determined by the auction is the quoted
price at the highest trading volume (Loistl and Vetter, 2000).
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3.3.6 Market rules
The protocols in ASMs are confined mainly to the possibility whether to allow or not short
selling (i.e. selling shares without possessing them), and to limit the size of the orders. At
Santa Fe, for example the maximum number of shares that can be traded is 10, while it is
possible to sell short up to 5 shares.
Prices and dividends in the ASMs are always made public without any delay. In case
of continuous-auction markets with central automated order execution mechanism, that is
at OMP, MDS and CTAM, the maximum bid and minimum ask quotes from the limit order
book are public. AT KapSyn, if the XETRA model is selected, the content of the whole limit
order book is available to all participants during continuous trading sessions, and the best
bid and ask quotes are published during call-auctions. Information reflects only price and
volume and does not disclose the identity of the traders.
Several other assumptions are made in the ASMs, such as publicly known forecast func-
tions, agents who have perfect knowledge about market equilibrium equations, prices and
fractions of trader types (e.g in the ABS). Although information of this type is not available
on real markets, it makes artificial markets easier to be validated and makes the dynamics
easier to be studied.
3.4 Price formation and the behavioral aspects in ASMs
In this section we focus on the decision problems that traders face, based on their role,
as discussed in Section 2.3. We analyze how these issues are represented in the ASMs
studied here. The problem we face is that, although the role and the outcome of the actions
participants take (orders placed, transactions) are more or less visible on real markets, the
details of the strategies, decisions, reasoning behind their actions are not really observable
by others. Designers, therefore, have to make a number of assumptions when they represent
traders.
3.4.1 The order-placing behavior
The way how various ASMs represent behavioral factors related to placing and determining
orders is based on the factors identified in Section 2.3, and is elaborated in more detail in
this subsection.
3.4.1.1 Policy statement
The objectives of the investors are summarized in Table 3.5. How they try to realize this
depends on the strategy they use: fundamental, technical, random or another strategy. The
main investment objectives of the modeled investors in ASMs is to get as much profit as
possible. At the SSM, ABMI, ABS, EGM and EMM they aim to achieve this through arbitrage
opportunities, i.e. by trading when price does not equal perceived value. At ABMI seasonal
traders are also represented. Seasonal traders, like farmers, buy during one period and sell
during the next one. At LLS, SF-ASM, BS and KapSyn traders maximize some kind of
utility function. Further, traders aim to optimize their portfolio at the GASM, to maximize
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Table 3.5: The investment objectives of traders in the ASMs
wealth at CTAM and to achieve a personal gain with minimal loss at OMP. At MDS, EGM
and EMM investors are not explicitly represented. In these models just the order flows are
generated. The type of the orders generated depends on the percentage of specific type of
traders (informed, noisily informed, uninformed) in the population. At KapSyn, where more
assets are traded, participants have an individual benchmark portfolio in mind, which they
want to achieve. Regarding the time-horizon, the majority of the objectives can be said to
be long-term as they remain fixed during the full length of the experiments.
In most of the studies there are no investment constraint. In a few ASM’ investment
constraints are restricted to a finite amount of cash available to the traders, or a fixed number
of shares.
Investors’ attitude to risk is modeled by some ASMs by introducing risk averse traders.
They strive to minimize loss within the OMP and minimize risk within the CTAM. Investors
at SF-ASM, BS and at the extended LLS model in (Zschischang and Lux, 2001) are constant
absolute risk-averse (CARA) utility maximizers of wealth, meaning that the risk they take is
always a fixed percentage of their wealth. Further, at the KapSyn market, risk is measured as
the deviation of the actual portfolio from the desired portfolio.
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3.4.1.2 Investment strategy
The assumptions the various ASMs make with respect to the hardly observable aspects cov-
ering an investors’ decision is presented in Table 3.6. Investment strategies are differentiated
based on the information that traders exploit to place orders or to forecast future values.
Investors are classified accordingly as informed or fundamentalist traders, which might be
perfectly or noisily informed, technical traders and random traders.
• Fundamentalists or informed traders are focused on within SSM, ABMI, ABS, GASM-
3, CTAM, EGM and EMM. Within the ABS some of them have a perfect foresight of the
next market price, and in the rest of the studies mentioned they know the fundamental
value. Noisily informed traders are represented in SSM, CTAM and EGM. At SF-ASM
investors compare the dividend payed by the risky stock to the interest rate of the risk-
free asset in order to have an indication of the fundamental value. Fundamentalists
believe that the risky asset is over-valuated (under-valuated) if it pays more (less)
than the risk-free asset. At the KapSyn market all agents have individual expectations
regarding the fundamental value of a stock.
• Technical trading strategies based on historical data are considered in all ASMs
except for the MDS, EGM and EMM markets. Agents in SSM look at price trends,
but they additionally might take into account the opinion of other more successful
participants. In this ASM the number of traders with different strategies changes over
time by means of transition probabilities. The transitions depend on the opinion of
other groups, on price trend and profit. Besides trend followers, biased traders are
focused on in the ABS, who just simply add or subtract a small number from the
current price. Trend followers are focused on in the ABMI model as well.
A variety of technical trading strategies is applied in the experiments within GASM.
These include mean-variance trading, relative chartist trading and mean-reversion,
momentum and contrarian trend traders. Mean-variance trading is based on the mod-
ern portfolio theory pioneered by Markowitz. Traders using a mean-reversion strategy
believe that the price will return to a long-run mean value. Relative chartist traders
determine the desired weigh of an asset in their portfolio based on performance mea-
sures. Momentum traders think price follows trend: if it is increasing, it will continue
to increase, and if it is decreasing, it will continue to decrease. Contrarian traders
believe that the price will change trend.
Investors in the LLS model take into account an average of a number of past historical
returns, and a random value is added to their demand to account for heterogeneity and
noise.
In addition to fundamental measures, technical measures are used by traders at SF-
ASM for forecasting future values. Here the traders apply moving average functions
for the last few periods in order to try to guess into which direction prices will move.
In BS arbitrarily many forms of forecast functions are generated. These are combina-
tions based on past prices and dividends. In the OMP a unique determination of the
forecast value is given, where, besides the analysis of historical data, the opinion of
other market participants, and the forecasts of the media is taken into account. In this
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Table 3.6: The investment strategies of traders in the ASMs
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ASM traders decide when to trade based on the idea of a trading rectangle. The trad-
ing rectangle is determined by the current time, a target price, a stop loss price and a
threshold time (investment horizon). When price and time values fall within the range
of this rectangle the traders do not feel pressure to trade, but once one of the limits
are exceeded they consider to perform an operation. For instance, in case of shares
bought, the target price is the price that would push the trader to sell in order to cash
the gain, the stop loss price represents the price at which the trader would sell to limit
the loss. In the extended version of the OMP a specific trader is introduced which
searches in a lookup table with historically successful strategies. In CTAM traders try
to fit a polynomial function to past time series. Within the NatLab platform, that is
based on CTAM, arbitrary many strategies can be modeled. Experiments presented in-
clude, for instance, trend followers, mean reverting traders, daily traders, and traders
switching strategies. Further, experiments with humans are conducted to capture their
strategies. Finally, up to 40 technical scenarios are possible in KapSyn.
• In addition to fundamental and technical trading strategies random trading strategies
are very common in ASMs. On the one hand, random orders often represent the
decision of noise traders. On the other hand, random order generation might also
model a variety of trading strategies without paying special attention to the individual
behavior of traders. In some cases random traders are needed to provide liquidity in
the market. Random orders are generated, for example, within GASM, MDS, CTAM,
EGM and EMM. Random traders can be actually looked upon as ”bounded myopic”
technicians. Further, expected values are sometimes altered with random values to
represent errors and bounded rationality in the forecasts of traders. At the GASM
market the expected value is calculated based on the current price and a random draw
from a Gaussian distribution where the standard deviation is dependent on historical
volatility. In this case random traders are used to represent noise traders.
3.4.1.3 Portfolio maintenance
Asset allocation. Since most studies, except KapSyn and GASM, focus on trading one type
of risky asset, the choice for the assets to be included into the portfolio always regards that
risky asset. The required weight of the stocks usually depends on the utility function applied.
This is the case for example, in the GASM, SF-ASM, LLS and the KapSyn models. At GASM-
2 the required weight of the assets depends on the strategy and the utility function applied.
Orders. As described in Section 2.3.1.3, based on (Reilly and Brown, 2003), investors
primarily place orders as part of a portfolio management process, orders thus being entailed
by the difference between required and current portfolio contents. This explicit form of
portfolio management is applied at the GASM stock market and at the BS to determine the
size and side of the orders. In general in ASMs there is no explicit modeling of portfolio
management, but traders implicitly maintain a portfolio, even if it consists of one stock, and
as a consequence the issues mentioned with respect to portfolio management hold for the
way the attributes of orders are determined in general. Table 3.7 illustrates this in more
detail.
The studies that are not explicitly concerned about the portfolio management problem,
determine the orders only as a function of the future expectations of the traders. In the ABS,
70
85
3.4 - Price formation and the behavioral aspects in ASMs
Table 3.7: Various ways to determine the dimensions of an order in the ASMs
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for example, orders are expressed in the form of forecast functions; on the SF-ASM and the
LLS markets the trading volume is a demand function based on the traders’ forecast as a
function of price and risk. Further, the number of shares to trade can be based on forecast
and a fraction of the wealth, like in the OMP and CTAM. Orders are not always explicitly
determined. For instance, in SSM the excess demands are defined as a function of the number
of individuals in each group.
The relation between the forecasted value and the market price can be used to determine
the trading side of an order. In the most simple case traders decide to sell/buy if the expected
price is below/above the current market price. Within OMP, traders choose the trading side
according to the aforementioned trading rectangle. Further, often stochastic functions are
applied to determine the trading side. Buy and sell orders are placed with equal probability
in MDS, EGM and for random traders in CTAM. At KapSyn the probability of being se-
lected is related to the expected utility. There, the traders select the order they want to make
stochastically based on some utility function and probability distribution.
Regarding the quoted price of the limit orders, in the literature the limit price defined by
the traders is often the forecasted price of the stock. In reality however, traders do not submit
their forecast values, but at a limit price deduced from this value. This feature is taken into
account in CTAM.
3.4.1.4 Monitoring and adaptation
In general traders monitor the following data in the ASMs: the new market prices, perceived
fundamental values, bid and ask quotes when applicable, and the performance of themselves
and of others. As mentioned in Section 2.3 monitoring serves and entails adaptation.
There are two views with respect to the importance to represent adaptive behavior. Ac-
cording to the first view adaptation is not important. Proponents of this view, like (Gode and
Sunder, 1993), argue that ASMs with random traders, also referred to as zero-intelligence
traders, can properly model traders’ behavior. According to the second view it is important
to represent adaptive behavior, because the environment in which traders interact continu-
ally changes (prices, news, goal). In some studies, e.g. (LeBaron, 2001), it is claimed, for
example, that evolution is the core dynamic at work of agent-based markets. The question
is to what degree the traders represented need to be adaptive so as to realistically reflect
market dynamics. Do they need to learn, do they need to adapt their strategy in order to be
successful and/or to survive?
Adaptive behavior can be realized and represented at various levels. It can range from
static functions taking as arguments data from the changing environment, to evolution of a
whole set of strategies. Within these we can differentiate the following types of adaptation:
random (non-adaptive) behavior, weak adaptation with traders sticking to a static parame-
terized strategy, adaptation with traders switching their strategy to a new one taken from a
fixed set of parameterized strategies, and strong adaptation with an evolving set of strategies.
Further, depending on the representation of traders (i.e. cumulative or individual) adaptation
can be realized either at group level or at individual level.
• Random behavior. (Gode and Sunder, 1993) show that a market with zero-intelligence
agents acting randomly can converge to the theoretical equilibrium price in a contin-
uous double auction framework. This view suggests that price is determined by the
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market structure rather than by the intelligence of the agents. In order to study the
effect of market organization on market dynamics and market quality, one indeed has
to be aware of the effect of traders’ behavior and traders’ interactions. Keeping thus
investors’ behavior simple helps to understand this relationship. This reasoning is
applied at MDS.
• Weak adaptation at group level. In EMM and EGM orders are generated based on
some stochastic process which do not take changes in the environment into account.
Although adaptation in these markets is very weak, it is not completely random, since
the type of the orders placed depends on the fundamental value.
• Adaptive behavior at group level. In ABS and SSM a fixed group of strategies is de-
fined. However, the fraction of traders belonging to one of these groups changes over
time. In the ABS, financial markets are modeled in the form of nonlinear stochastic
systems. In this model prices and beliefs co-evolve over time. The fraction of different
agent-types changes based on the successfulness of the strategy used. Similarly, in the
SSM, there is a transition probability associated with the number of different types of
traders. In these studies successful strategies have a bigger influence on prices.
• Adaptive behavior at individual level with a fixed set of strategies. Recent studies
suggest that emergent properties of markets are entailed through interaction of individ-
uals. It is important, thus, to represent these properly. Many studies model investors’
behavior at the individual level. The strategy of traders in various ASMs differs given
the nature of the approaches applied. Within each ASM only one type of monitoring
and adaptation strategy is used which is the same for all the individual traders. As
illustrated by Table 3.8, adaptations vary from simple value adjustments to intricate
evolution of strategies.
Most often traders use one single strategy during the full length of a simulation.
Traders in ABMI, GASM, LLS, OMP, EGM and KapSyn apply the forecasting/trad-
ing strategy associated to them at the beginning of a simulation. In OMP only one
type of agent exhibits adaptive behavior. This agent selects its next strategy from a
table in which good performing strategies are monitored. In KapSyn there is a slight
adaptation of beliefs in the sense that technical traders simply correct the expected
value of a stock upward or downward. Most traders in CTAM use one single strategy
as well. In some experiments, however, traders who occasionally switch between two
strategies are introduced as well.
• Adaptive behavior at individual level with evolving strategies. In SF-ASM and
BS traders can switch strategies if they are not successful enough. At SF-ASM each
trader has its own set of strategies, from which they choose the most suitable one every
trading round. Strategies within a set have in fact the same structure, they differ only
with respect to the value of the parameters used.
There are two commonly used techniques to implement adaptive behavior concerning
the evolution of the whole set of strategies: neural networks and evolutionary algo-
rithms. Two of the ASMs presented apply these techniques: the SF-ASM and the BS.
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Table 3.8: Evolution of strategies in the ASMs
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At SF-ASM agents have individual sets of strategies, and genetic algorithms are used
to evolve such a set over time. Strategies are described by so-called ”condition- fore-
cast” rules, where the condition part contains market state indicators (fundamental
and technical) and the forecast part contains the forecast parameters of the expectation
function (trend, variance). Selection, mutation and crossover are applied to adapt the
set of strategies to the changing conditions. At SF-ASM agents who learn (i.e. evolve
their set of strategies) are selected centrally with some probability every given trad-
ing period. Choice for learning is thus globally determined by the system and is not
initiated by the trader itself.
In the BS model investors try to find the best trading strategies in a so-called business
school by means of genetic programming, where forecast functions are learned and
adapted to changing conditions. In this ASM agents who are not successful consider
the possibility to use another forecasting strategy. They select their new forecast-
ing function from a set of strategies (called the school) which evolves over time. In
an evolution phase badly performing strategies are eliminated and give place to new
strategies. At BS at every trading period in the experiments there is a probability for
each trader to go back to learn. This probability depends on the relative net change
in wealth (compared to all traders) and on the growth-rate of wealth. Learning means
choosing a forecast function (randomly) from the set of functions that would have
performed better for the latest given number of periods.
In BS it is analyzed whether it makes sense to learn. Findings suggest that learning
makes sense since if a successful agent is blocked for some time, his predictions per-
form poorly later. However, it is observed that if a successful strategy will be used
by more traders, after a while it will be no longer successful. This property reflects
information dissemination in the time series.
A key-question in implementing evolution in behavior is how to measure the ”fitness” of
a strategy. A strategy can be said to perform well (given the market conditions) if it is the one
which provides the maximum return, wealth, utility, or the minimum forecast error among
all strategies used. At SF-ASM, the distance of the forecast value from the real outcome
indicates the fitness of the forecast function. In the BS ASM a ranking measure is provided,
upon which traders can measure how good they perform related to the other participants.
3.4.1.5 Time factors
An important aspect that is related to modeling most of the organizational factors discussed
so far, is time. Below we give a discussion on how the various dimensions of the time factor
are represented in the ASMs. A summary is given in Table 3.9.
• Time-horizon of the investment objectives: investment objectives in the ASMs stud-
ied generally hold during the whole experiment.
• Forecast horizon of the investment strategies: traders usually forecast one period
ahead.
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• Past horizon for historical data analysis: the length of past time period for analysis
varies a lot, theoretically any combination is possible. The maximum value used in
the selected literature is 420 time steps in the LLS model.
• Timing of order placement: as we indicate in the ”frequency of order placement”
column in the Table 3.9 very often either all traders or a group of randomly selected
traders will place an order.
In almost all call-auction type of markets, namely in ABMI, ABS, GASM-1, LLS, SF-
ASM and BS, all traders simultaneously make a trading decisions. Their decision
usually results in placing a new order. In GASM-2 and GASM-3 only part of the traders
is selected stochastically. Selecting only a fraction of traders is a way to simulate
asynchronous behavior, mimicking the fact that they carry out different tasks at the
same point in time. This representation implements the property that traders are not
confronted with the problem of making trading decisions all the time and whenever
others are trading.
In ASMs that implement continuous trading sessions asynchronous behavior of traders
is self-evident. In these models, at every simulation round, usually one order is gen-
erated. In case of aggregated representation of investors or their decision (e.g. MDS,
EGM and EMM) this order is stochastically generated. In case of individual represen-
tation of traders one of the traders is selected to make a decision. At OMP the next
investor to make a decision is randomly selected. He decides whether to trade or not
based on a threshold and the market state that define the so-called ”trading rectangle”.
At KapSyn the next event to be carried out depends on the reaction time of all events
prepared by investors. This implementation attempts to represent the fact that mar-
ket events happen at non-even intervals after each other. Finally, in CTAM the time
moment for placing an order can be predefined or triggered by some event, such as
news or a price change. It is important to note that timing of orders in CTAM and
KapSyn is decentralized (determined by the investors) and not determined centrally by
the system. This implementation represents a kind of autonomy of the traders.
• Waiting patience for the execution of an order: represents the time for which an
order remains valid. In call-auctions, where trading of market order takes place every
time period, and investors receive an answer immediately, this factor is not relevant.
However, in markets where continuous sessions are represented and/or limit orders are
placed, unexecuted orders can be canceled after a while. The waiting time depends, for
example, on the threshold within the OMP, and is removed or canceled stochastically
within the MDS.
• Time for monitoring changes and update: traders observe the changes in the en-
vironment and monitor their performance from time to time. In general, new values
are observed every trading round. Performance measures are used in models in which
traders change or adapt their strategy. Traders decide mainly stochastically, based on
a predefined threshold, linked to a fitness measure, whether to update their strategies.
In SSM and ABS fitness is implicitly taken into account every trading round. For the
agents at the SF-ASM slow and medium learning periods of 100 and, respectively, 250
time periods are applied. In BS this period can take a value up to 20 trading rounds.
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Table 3.9: Choice for time-related factors in the ASMs
3.4.2 Order execution in ASMs
The various way orders are executed and as a result prices are formed on the ASMs studied is
summarized in Table 3.10 for single price auctions and in Table 3.11 for continuous trading
sessions. In the remainder of this section we elaborate on the different execution mechanisms
implemented.
3.4.2.1 Order routing and order execution by brokers in ASMs
In stock markets orders initiated by investors are taken over by brokers for further routing
and execution (cf. Section 2.3.2). Although on real markets several brokers interact, with the
well-defined role to execute orders on behalf of the investors, they are not represented in the
ASMs studied. There is one exception, namely KapSyn, which recognizes the importance to
include brokers in ASMs. The paper mentions that the authors haver realized this after they
consulted financial analysts. The question is in which measure the introduction of brokers
in various ASMs influences the market dynamics. We believe they have some influence as
they might improve the price of the orders received, encourage trading and as a consequence
provide liquidity and further, they might trade for their own account as well.
3.4.2.2 Order execution (by market makers) in ASMs
The main role of the few market makers in the ASMs studied is to monitor the market
through quoting bid and ask, and to execute the orders received from investors. Two main
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types of execution mechanisms are represented: single price call auctions and continuous
quote-driven order executions.
The activity of the market makers to keep their position and their role to provide liquidity
for inactive stocks is rarely modeled. One exception is the KapSyn market where so called
”designated sponsors” interacting on the XETRA representation, can, but are not obliged to,
set bid and ask quotes, to increase liquidity when there is only one order standing without
a counter order. Further, at ABMI the market maker trades based on his position. In this
case, however, no special public bid and ask quotes are published, given that all orders are
market orders, and price is centrally set according to an automated mechanism. At EMM,
the position of the market maker influences his decision as well. At other markets liquidity
is provided in the sense that market makers are selling and buying for themselves.
• On call auctions order execution involve determining a transaction price. In SSM
the market maker determines changes in price by reacting on imbalances between
demand and supply. Similarly, in the ABMI the market maker is represented by a
simple equation on which price changes are based. At SF-ASM orders are aggregated
and the market price is defined by a so-called auctioneer, who actually carries out an
automated execution of orders.
In ASMs that implement order-driven call market sessions, the main decision to take is
how to define and determine the equilibrium price. In SSM, ABS and LLS the markets
price is determined such that supply matches demand. In order to find the equilibrium
point, these models assume that the supply and demand functions of the traders are
known by the order execution system. At SF-ASM, as well as during call auctions at
the XETRA version of KapSyn, equilibrium is determined at the price at which trading
volume is maximized. A new market price is often at the intersection of demand and
supply curves (like at GASM), while at BS price is based on the excess demand/supply
discounted with some adjustment value.
• During continuous sessions market makers need to match received orders against
each other. To this end they determine bid and ask quotes that take into account
the content of the limit order book. Market makers are represented within EGM and
EMM, where a multi-round Glosten-Milgrom model (see for a description for exam-
ple (O’Hara, 2002)) is implemented for determining bid-ask spreads. In fact, in the
EGM the market maker has a price discovery role, he sets the bid and ask quotes
based on the market orders received, on his knowledge and assumptions regarding the
fundamental value of the traded stock, and on his assumption regarding the propor-
tion of informed traders (who know what the fundamental price is) versus uninformed
ones. The electronic market maker in EMM sets its bid and ask quotes while striv-
ing to maximize its profit given the order imbalance. In these ASMs the behavior of
the market makers is adaptive. The learning market maker is implemented based on
the Glosten-Milgrom model from the market microstructure literature (Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985). In EGM the Bayesian learning technique, in EMM reinforcement
learning is applied. The market makers at KapSyn modify their quotes with respect to
the limit order book. They cannot quote however, a price worse than the limit orders
in the book.
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Table 3.10: Variations on the market price at single price auctions
Table 3.11: Order execution at continuous sessions
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In all studies the timing of the new quotes is entailed by the arrival of new orders. In
EMM the electronic market maker reacts when the order imbalance reaches a prede-
fined threshold. Market makers, in general, do not have to change the quotes otherwise
since, in the ASMs, they are not required to provide liquidity for non-active stocks. In
fact the markets represented do not deal with inactive stocks, except in the XETRA
representation within KapSyn.
Another task of market makers on continuous markets is managing the limit order
book. In limit order books (LOB) unexecuted limit orders are stored. LOB’s are part
of markets with continuous trading sessions that handle limit orders. These are: MDS,
OMP, CTAM, and the XETRA representation within KapSyn. In all these markets
management of the LOB means storing limit orders and determining the buy order
with highest price and the sell order with lowest price.
While in EGM, EMM and KapSyn the market microstructure approach is used, the
rest of the continuous session-based ASMs apply an automated order matching mech-
anism.
Execution systems at MDS, OMP and CTAM represent a continuous automated or-
der execution mechanism, where new orders are matched against unexecuted orders
that are stored and arranged based on their price in a limit order book. Unexecuted
limit orders are sorted (buy orders increasing, sell order descending), new market or-
ders are executed immediately against the sorted book and limit orders are compared
to earlier arrived, unexecuted orders in the book. If the quoted price of a sell order is
lower than the price of a buy order a transaction is made for the minimum of the quoted
amounts. The market price is the quoted price of the order placed earlier, that is the
quote. This price formation mechanism implements simple automated order matching
but does not reflect more complex order clearance where market makers themselves
are involved.
As illustrated by the large scale of design and implementation approaches applied in the
ASMs studied here, there are arbitrary many ways to represent traders, to determine a fore-
casting strategy, to implement adaptive behavior, to construct a portfolio and develop other
decision strategies that lead the investors to place certain orders. In addition a variety of
order execution and price setting mechanisms are represented. And this is in fact what we
expect, given the hardly observable feature of traders’ behavior and price formation illus-
trated with clouds in Figure 2.2. The question remains how the traders’ performance, and
especially the market dynamics is influenced by these implementation choices.
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3.5 Findings of ASMs
Artificial stock markets are primarily designed to help us understand market dynamics. For
this reason they mainly focus on the analysis of price or return dynamics within some spe-
cific market structure. Several ASMs try to study what kind of structures and behaviors can
reproduce time series with characteristics similar to those on real markets. They also con-
sider and test findings of theoretical and empirical models from the literature. In relation to
market efficiency some models also study whether there exist strategies that are consistently
more successful than others. A final goal is to pinpoint under which conditions the ASMs
manage to achieve one or more of these objectives. Some of the results of the ASMs studied
are highlighted in Table 3.12.
3.5.1 Evidence for theoretical predictions
Classical theoretical models claim that markets are efficient. In ASMs testing the efficiency
of the markets is a central topic. In the studies on ASMs it is usually analyzed whether the
price or return series generated are random, or whether some pattern (linear or non-linear
correlation) can be observed. There is a discussion going on whether randomness or patterns
in the time series say anything about the efficiency of markets, or are sufficient to prove
or reject the EMH (see the discussion on the EMH in Section 2.4.4). These tests are also
used, to analyze whether price series exhibit realistic properties, found by empirical studies.
A more widely accepted way to test (informational) efficiency, is to check whether and in
which measure the market price can trace the fundamental value of a stock. This is however,
only possible if the fundamental value is known. Further, a persistent long-term success of
the same agent or strategy suggests inefficiency of markets.
Depending on the applied organizational and behavioral settings evidence is reported
both for classical theory and empirical ”stylized facts” .
The efficiency of different market structures is explicitly studied within the KapSyn
framework. Here it is shown that efficiency depends on the execution systems and the size of
the orders, NASDAQ being more attractive for mid-size orders, while XETRA being more
efficient for small and block size orders. Further, suggestions are given on how to change the
organization of markets in order to improve market efficiency. It seems that limiting auctions
to up to 6 per day could improve market efficiency, as it reduces transaction costs.
Evidence for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the related Rational Expecta-
tion Hypothesis (REH) is found within the BS model. In this market both EMH and REH,
are emergent properties. They cannot be rejected at aggregate level for several time series,
even if most of the market participants do not believe in them. This finding is in line with
the property of the EMH, that markets are efficient if sufficiently many investors believe
that they are inefficient, and proves that features at macro level are not necessarily the same
as features at micro level. In this study efficiency is tested both by analyzing time series
properties, and by analyzing the grade of successfulness of learning traders. It turns out that
traders’ learning activity ”is not entirely futile”, as 51% of the searches in the business school
leads to more success. However, no strategy is reported using which it would be possible to
earn above-average profit, fact that suggests that the given market is efficient.
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Table 3.12: Findings of ASMs
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In the simplified ABMI investment model, where interacting investors have credit limits,
the market tends to a point where everything is in equilibrium, i.e the wealth of traders
breaks even. If, additionally, seasonal traders are involved in the same model, the market
gets more efficient if trend followers learn the pattern entailed by seasonal traders. Also, the
experiments within the ABS lead to dynamics close to equilibrium. The case with slowly
learning traders at SF-ASM approximates the equilibrium point predicted by the rational
expectations hypothesis. Finally, by making the simulation scenarios more complicated,
time series properties become random at the extended LLS market.
At EGM and EMM, informational efficiency on the markets is tested by looking whether
market makers can trace the fundamental value. At EMM the market maker can approxi-
mate the fundamental value better over time, if he applies reinforcement learning. In mod-
erately noisy environments reinforcement strategies converge successfully to optimal ana-
lytical strategies. At EGM the market maker successfully tracks the fundamental value as
well by applying Bayesian learning, even if only half of the traders is perfectly informed.
In this model negative autocorrelation can be observed for high frequency data. However,
autocorrelation of raw returns decays rapidly and there are no arbitrage opportunities for low
frequency data, indicating randomness and efficiency of the market.
In ABMI it is shown how the demands of the investors create inefficiencies. If the traders
have a credit limit and change the scale of investment based on their wealth and credit limit,
the market tends toward a point where everything is efficient. This point is noisy, there are
fluctuations around it, but each agents’ wealth stays more or less fixed. When a large number
of different strategies is additionally introduced efficiency takes a long time to establish and
markets become chaotic and volatile fast afterwards because of the dynamics stemming from
the interaction between the different strategies.
3.5.2 Patterns in price series
Many ASMs find evidence for stylized facts, this feature being mainly entailed by inter-
actions between heterogeneous agents. Fat tails and volatility clusters are observed within
ABS, GASM, SF-ASM, MDS and OMP. Fat tails and negative autocorrelation of returns at
one lag are reported in EGM. In addition, within SF-ASM a correlation between the trading
volume and volatility is found. In ABS chaotic cycles are observed. Bubbles and crashes oc-
cur within LLS and CTAM. In LLS these occur if only short-term trend strategies are applied
by the investors. However these disappear as soon as traders holding shares as a constant
faction of wealth are introduced which will dominate the market. In CTAM bubbles and
crashes are caused by a tiny fraction of trend followers. Further, a reversion to mean is re-
ported in the study on the GASM market. At ABMI patterns are entailed by the position and
risk aversion of market maker, who needs to get rid of her position.
In some of the ASMs successful trading strategies are discovered. Trend followers in
the ABMI, as well as the lookup table strategy in OMP, mean-reversion traders at the GASM
market, and fast learning technical traders at SF-ASM can systematically dominate the mar-
ket, meaning that the market is not efficient in these cases. In CTAM the short range mean
reverting behavior is the winning strategy in a market with no periodic daily trend. In case
of periodic fluctuations risk-averse trend followers are the most successful. Further, market
settings exist within MDS that reproduce linear time series, where patterns approach a linear
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function for large granularity. In some of the studies that reject linear predictability, evidence
for non-linear effects is found. This is the situation in the ABS and in some other ASMs dis-
cussed in (LeBaron et al., 1999). Further, although in general (for 85%) price series within
the BS are random, in a few cases nonlinear signals are discovered in this model as well.
Linear and non-linear features of price series reject the random walk property.
Findings of experiments within ASMs confirm the fact that the market mechanism chosen
matters. Therefore, many authors claim that evidence for stylized facts is crucial, because
realistic models are needed for studying market dynamics and for drawing realistic conclu-
sions.
3.6 To what degree are the ASMs agent-based? - a discus-
sion
Taking as a starting point the various definitions on agents and autonomy, presented earlier
in this chapter, in this section we attempt to determine to what degree the ASMs presented
above are agent-based. To this end we analyze what is meant or might be meant by ”agent” in
the various models and we discuss whether these can be looked upon as autonomous and/or
intelligent.
In general, in the ASMs studied, all investors or order generating processes that represent
investors’ decision can be viewed or implemented as agents. Further, market makers or
processes of price formation can also be considered as agents.
With respect to the grade of autonomy, all individual components can be considered as
being autonomous in a sense. However, most of the traders do not decide themselves whether
they will trade in the next trading cycle or simulation round or not. Instead, they are selected
globally by the system (see Table 3.13). The few ASMs in which timing of decision-making
is internal to the traders are the GASM-2, GASM-3, CTAM and KapSyn. GASM-3, however,
does not really differ from a global selection mechanism, since in this case the internal value
refers to a probability of trading which is the same for all the traders. In GASM-2 technical
traders have an individual ”reallocation periodicity” value that states the period after which
traders’ might reallocate the composition of their portfolio. In CTAM traders react to some
events or wait for a while before they analyze the market conditions. These values differ for
the various traders and can vary over time. Finally, in KapSyn a reaction (or execution) time
is associated to each individually planned action as a function of their utility. Concluding,
we can consider trader representations in these three markets as exhibiting some kind of
autonomy.
As far as ”intelligent agents” are concerned, most traders are flexible but only a few of
them realize flexible behavior by means of ”artificial intelligence” capabilities. In a sense
all traders (except completely random ones) are responsive, as they react to changes in their
environment. Further, all investors are goal-directed, except for cases in which decisions
are represented by random order flows. Finally, social behavior, i.e. interaction in ASMs is
self-evident as participants need to trade with each other. Social behavior in a larger sense,
e.g. to consider other traders’ opinions is also considered in a few models, like the OMP.
However traders do not ”collaborate”.
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Table 3.13: Traders’ grade of autonomy in the ASMs
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Reactive behavior often is reflected only in the fact that traders take a decision based on
new market data, such as market prices or a new fundamental value. As illustrated by Ta-
ble 3.8 reactive behavior by means of changing the trading or forecasting strategy is specific
only to the traders within SSM, ABS, SF-ASM, BS and OMP. Further, learning techniques
are applied on the market makers’ side within the EGM and EMM. Among these, in EGM
Bayesian learning, while in SF-ASM, BS and EMM artificial intelligence based techniques
are applied, namely genetic algorithms (GA), genetic programming (GP), and reinforcement
learning.
3.7 Summary
The main topic of this chapter is a survey on agent-based artificial stock markets. Therefore,
in the first part of this chapter, we made an attempt to give a universally accepted definition
of the notion agent-based artificial stock markets. However, this turned out to be no easy
task, given that there is no general agreement on the definition of the composing terms, and
in particular on the concept of agent. For AI researchers agents are intelligent autonomous
software entities endowed with AI adaptation techniques. For some people, however, agents
might mean just simple representations of forecast functions of a trader in form of an equa-
tion. According to this discussion one might view an ABASM as any market model in
which prices are formed endogenously as a result of participants’ interaction and in which
the representation of participants varies form simple equations of forecast functions to in-
tricate software components endowed with human-like artificial-intelligence based adaptive
behavior.
In the second part of this chapter we looked at several ASMs and analyzed how they
cover the important organizational and behavioral aspects of stock markets, as presented in
Chapter 2. Based on the comparison we deduce the following main conclusions:
1. usually only investor type of traders are represented, and the represented market mak-
ers generally carry out only automated order matching or price adjustment;
2. the importance to represent and study continuous trading sessions is recognized by
more and more researchers;
3. autonomous asynchronous behavior of traders is rarely represented, traders being
centrally coordinated;
4. all ASMs apply discrete time simulation; only one study applies event-driven simula-
tion;
5. there are arbitrary many ways to represent the hardly observable aspects of price
formation and trading behavior;
6. market settings such as market structure, trading strategies (i.e. how hardly observ-
able aspects are represented) as well as the number of traders influences a lot the
dynamics of markets and the properties of the resulting time series.
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As far as the traders’ role is concerned, most ASMs focus on representing the investor
type of behavior. Only KapSyn includes brokers, and only a few markets include market
makers whose behavior resembles a somewhat more complex decision-making process than
automated order matching or price determination (e.g. the EGM and EMM). In reality, how-
ever, the behavior of brokers and market makers directly affects price formation. The need to
represent market participants with different roles is pointed out in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000).
In many ASMs all traders place orders at discrete points in time. Orders are then ag-
gregated and the new price is determined at some equilibrium point. The way orders are
executed in these structures resembles call auctions. This way of modeling it is thus useful
to study the dynamics of single price call auctions. However, call auctions are not represen-
tative, since, as observed in (Smith et al., 2002; Demarchi and Foucault, 2000; Reilly and
Brown, 2003) and (Raberto and Cincotti, 2005), on most of the markets continuous trading
sessions dominate.
In line with the above observation more and more studies on ASMs recognize the impor-
tance to model continuous trading sessions. The need to study continuous trading is reflected
in the KapSyn, MDS and CTAM models described in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000; Smith et al.,
2002) and (Shatner et al., 2000). These markets try to implement continuous order matching
and even asynchronous decision-making. Most of the studies do this, however, by apply-
ing discrete time simulation and arrange trading in trading rounds. In KapSyn, for example,
continuous sessions are imitated by selecting one agent from the crowd whose decision is
carried out next. At every simulation round however, all agents make decisions simultane-
ously, which in not the case in continuous markets. Here the decision of the traders that are
not selected is ignored, and in the next trading round, everyone has to reconsider his deci-
sion taking into account the new state of the market triggered by the decision of the selected
trader. In reality all decisions are executed if possible, whether they were made simultane-
ously or not. Furthermore, decisions are usually not taken simultaneously, and do not wait
for others’ actions to be executed: someone can launch an action, before the decision of
another agent is completely carried out, causing a new market event.
A more realistic attempt at a continuous trading model is the CTAM presented in (Shatner
et al., 2000) where traders do not take decisions continuously but ”sleep” after actions and
”wake up” at predefined times, or as a result of events. Other studies model continuity
and asynchronous behavior by randomly (e.g. GASM-1) or stochastically (e.g. KapSyn),
selecting one trader whose decision is carried out, and automatically matching new orders
with pending ones if possible.
The problem with centrally and randomly selecting agents whose actions will be carried
out, is that, in this way, agents are no longer autonomous regarding their actions and, as
mentioned above, it might also happen that the decisions of some traders are not taken into
account (e.g. in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000)). Representations of traders in ASMs illustrate pas-
sive agents, while agents on the market are autonomous and decide themselves whether they
want their decision to be carried out or not. Autonomous behavior can only be accomplished
if the agents themselves decide when they want to trade as is the case in real markets.
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A vast number of trading strategies in a broad range of market organizations is illustrated
by the ASMs presented. Besides the strategies implemented in the ASM literature several
others are described by empirical and behavioral studies, and many more exist in reality,
a large part of which being not even observable or revealed. This variety has motivated
us to design a framework that accommodates this diversity as well as the as yet mainly
neglected microstructural features, such as continuous trading, asynchronous behavior and
autonomous behavior, and the representation of brokers. Therefore, based on the list of
critical factors and on the results (pointing both at possibilities as well as shortcomings) of
the analysis of current artificial stock markets we have developed a framework that provides
a tool for representing several types of markets and an arbitrary number of trading strategies.
We present this environment in the following chapter.
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In Chapter 2 we presented a broad range of market organizations based on a framework
that was built up in terms of carefully determined discriminating notions, such as the role
of market participants, trading sessions, and execution mechanisms. We also elaborated on
the hardly observable processes behind price formation and the hardly observable consider-
ations behind the behavior of traders. Then, in Chapter 3 we presented a number of artificial
stock markets (ASMs). We analyzed how these are organized, and how they deal with the
hardly observable aspects. We compared these ASMs based on the relevant organizational
and behavioral aspects proposed in Chapter 2. As concluded, in reality there is a vast num-
ber of markets the organization of which varies along a broad range, and there are numerous
variants of price formation mechanisms and traders’ behavior. In the ASMs encountered we
observe only a very restricted choice from this implementation space, they focus mainly on a
very specific static market structure and specific representations of traders’ behavior. More-
over, ASMs rarely represent common features, such as continuous trading and asynchronous,
autonomous behavior. These observations have motivated us to provide an agent-based ar-
tificial trading environment that can incorporate more varying and representative aspects of
markets and behaviors.
In this chapter we introduce and describe a modular agent-based trading environment:
ABSTRACTE, an ”Agent-Based Simulation of Trading Roles in an Asynchronous Contin-
uous Trading Environment”. As illustrated by its name, the most specific features of this
trading environment are the agent-based approach, the special attention paid to represent
various trading roles, asynchronous behavior of participants, continuity and modularity. The
ABSTRACTE is not one single artificial stock market, but an environment, a modular tool
for representing and studying several types of markets and an arbitrary number of trading
strategies. ABSTRACTE is designed with the aim to improve the study and understanding
of market dynamics.
We start the description by giving a motivation for designing this specific environment.
Then, we present its structure, and we describe its organizational and behavioral aspects
based on the list introduced in Chapter 2. After that, we give high level implementation
details, primarily to illustrate and underpin the mechanism and the features of ABSTRACTE.
In addition, we illustrate the possibility to experiment with various market structures and
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strategies on top of the framework. We provide an evaluation of the proposed environment
through illustrating how various price formation mechanisms and trading strategies can be
configured on top of it, and how earlier models of these particular market structures can be
replicated. We conclude the chapter by summarizing the added value of the ABSTRACTE
environment.
Preliminary parts of this chapter have been published previously. Asynchronous, contin-
uous-time simulation, and the representation of traders based on their role has been focused
on in (Boer and Kaymak, 2003; Boer, de Bruin and Kaymak, 2004), modularity and design
details have been described first in (Boer, Polman, de Bruin and Kaymak, 2004; Boer et al.,
2005a).
4.1 Motivation
The nature of the ABSTRACTE environment stems from our aspiration to take into account
the microstructural features of markets, and to abstract from specific individual strategies
and price formation mechanisms, allowing for the flexible representation of various strate-
gies. By designing and developing such an environment, we aim to achieve multiple objec-
tives. First of all, we would like to experiment with common and/or rarely studied market
types and behaviors, such as continuous trading sessions, brokers, market maker-based price
settings, autonomously and asynchronously acting agents. Secondly, we aim to replicate,
test and validate some of the existing artificial markets within it. In this way, the introduced
environment can help us to study whether findings of experiments within different market
models can globally explain some market dynamics.
In this section we aim to motivate why there is a need for the ABSTRACTE trading
environment and why we have chosen for specific properties and methodologies (such as
modularity and the agent-based computational approach) for designing and developing it.
We answer three main question in relation to this environment:
1. Why are we focusing on a trading environment instead of a single, specific ASM?
2. Why do we need an additional ASM at all if so many variants exist?
3. Why do we choose the agent-based computational approach from the variety of ap-
proaches that exist?
Despite the large amount of research on modeling stock markets, market dynamics are
still poorly understood. The difficulty to understand market dynamics is underpinned by
the contradictory and controversial findings of theory and empirical studies. As discussed
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 the hardly observable aspects of price formation mechanisms
and market participants’ behavior are the main reasons behind contradictory findings, since
everyone makes a different assumption on these. The arbitrary many ways to deal with the
hardly observable aspects has given rise to an increasing number of ASM variants. The
variety of stock markets and ASMs, on the one hand, motivates us to develop ABSTRACTE
as a trading environment. On the other hand, our particular view on what is important to
represent and our understanding of the workings of stock markets, motivates us to include
within ABSTRACTE aspects that are not generally covered by existing ASMs.
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The many forms of real markets, the varying aspects of market organizations, and the
various interpretations and assumptions regarding hardly observable aspects are the main
reasons why we do not intend to focus on one specific market, but to develop an environment
instead. ABSTRACTE is a trading environment in the sense that it does not contain concrete
implementations of the hardly observable aspects but empty placeholders instead to allow
for experiments with multiple market organizations and arbitrary many trading strategies. A
trading environment built in this way makes modeling more efficient in the sense that special
purpose ASMs do not need to be built from scratch but can be realized by just filling in the
empty placeholders. We cannot claim of course that the environment can support modeling
of every market structure and every possible trading behavior. In some cases it might need
some adaptation or extension in order to allow for additional aspects.
The reason for developing ”a new ASM” in our case is to support the following common
and rarely modeled aspects of stock markets:
• continuous trading sessions;
• hybrid trading sessions;
• market participants with different roles within the market;
• broker’s behavior;
• market maker’s bid-ask quoting strategies;
• autonomous behavior of participants.
We focus on simulating continuous trading sessions since these are very common on
stock markets and the importance to study them is recognized by more and more studies
(see Chapter 3). We provide the possibility to conduct call sessions as well because, as we
mentioned earlier in this thesis, there is a common tendency towards market organizations
with continuous trading sessions combined with call sessions during opening and closing of
the market.
As concluded from the comparative study provided in the previous chapter the partic-
ipants most often focused on are the investors. In ABSTRACTE we would like to take a
broader perspective and focus on the effect of the different roles of market participants on
dynamics. Accordingly we would like to provide a deeper focus on the market maker’s
behavior and to conduct experiments with negotiating brokers as well. Market makers mod-
eled in ASMs often carry out automated execution of orders, specific behavior of market
makers being mainly ignored. Exceptions are ASMs based on the market microstructure
literature. Within ABSTRACTE we aim to allow for the representation of various bid-ask
quoting strategies because these may have a decisive influence on prices.
Finally, we pay importance to support autonomous behavior of traders. In the majority
of ASMs traders are not autonomous in the sense that they are centrally selected, and thus
often they are not able to autonomously control the decision when to place orders.
The aim to mimic this autonomous behavior is one of the main reasons for applying the
agent-based methodology in order to develop ABSTRACTE. An additional reason is that, de-
spite the fact that there is no common agreement on the definition of ”autonomous agents”,
we can benefit from the standardization efforts made in this area. For instance, we base the
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implementation of the trading environment on JADE a framework to develop multi-agent
systems (described in (Bellifemine et al., 2003)), which is compatible with the standard pro-
posed by FIPA (the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents), ”an IEEE Computer Society
standards organization that promotes agent-based technology and the interoperability of its
standards with other technologies” (FIPA, 2007).
Further, agent-based computational economics approaches apply the bottom-up approach
for modeling economic systems. Accordingly they make it possible to study market dynam-
ics as emergent properties of individual agent interactions. An agent-based approach pro-
vides more flexibility than standard discrete event simulations. By flexibility we refer here
to the possibility to gradually include parameters the effect of which can be studied. Further,
the computational aspect of the approach enables us to observe explicitly the agents’ decision
behind their trading behavior as well as the effect of these decisions on prices. Moreover,
agent-based approaches provide the option to easily connect to learning algorithms.
In this section we motivated why we propose the ABSTRACTE trading environment. In
the remainder of this chapter we describe its structure and provide some design and imple-
mentation details. When designing the framework, we pay special attention to the represen-
tation of the common features of stock markets like continuous trading sessions. However,
we intend to incorporate specific properties of stock markets and the structure of ASMs from
the literature as well in order to be able to replicate and test their results.
4.2 The structure of the trading environment
Trading in a market is organized around three main components: the instruments that are
traded, the market participants who trade and the institutional structure behind price for-
mation. The institutional structure, i.e. the market microstructure, directly drives the price
formation mechanism and determines the type of a market. Instruments, like stocks, are
issued by certain companies, and represent ownership in that company. The value of instru-
ments depends therefore on the performance of the company. Being the object of exchange
however, instruments are more or less part of the market where they are traded. The price
of instruments, is thus, influenced by a multitude of factors, such as issuer specific news, the
market organization, and the decisions of market participants. As elaborated in Section 2.2.3
we differentiate two types of market participants: financial traders and investors. Financial
traders, on the one hand, have specific well-defined roles on the market. They are further
classified as brokers and market makers, based on their role. Investors, on the other hand, are
not an internal part of a market organization. They observe markets, make trading decisions,
and send their orders to financial traders interacting on markets.
According to the discussion above, the framework consists of three main components
(Figure 4.1):
• the marketplace;
• the set of investors;
• an information source.
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Figure 4.1: The components of the framework.
The marketplace models the institutional structure behind price formation, and includes
financial traders as subcomponents such as market makers and brokers. In addition, market
specific features of stocks (such as name, tick size) that can be traded on a specific market
are defined within this component. The existence of brokers and market makers, and their
behavior is strongly related to the market organization under study. They have special roles
and tasks, determined by the market rules of specific markets.
Given that investors, as defined, do not have a special role within markets, they are
represented separately. This implementation makes it easier in the future to let them trade in
multiple markets if wished so.
The information source component is introduced to implement the possibility of infor-
mation coming from the issuer. It is designed with the aim to generate news related to the
stocks traded on the market, such as dividends and information regarding the fundamental
value.
At a high level of abstraction, the following relationships exist between these compo-
nents. From time to time the information source component generates news about a stock.
News is sent to specific market participants. Investors receive news from the market place
and news related to the value of the stock, and generate orders. They send these orders for
execution to certain brokers or market makers on the marketplace. The process of sending
and executing orders depends on the specific execution system that is applied and on the
strategy of the financial traders involved.
Given the highly varying market organizations and the hardly observable aspects of price
formation and trading strategies, we do not focus on designing a specific market structure,
but strive to design a modular trading environment. Through this modularity we want to
support the possibility to run experiments with various market types and trading strategies.
In this sense the components are skeletons. They are designed to incorporate the generic
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aspects of a certain trader or process, without specifying details on the hardly observable
and varying aspects. To incorporate the latter aspects the framework contains empty place-
holders. Empty placeholders can be filled with arbitrary strategies and are thus, part of
the skeletons. With the help of these placeholders it is possible to implement properties of
stock markets that have not been focused on yet, as well as to incorporate the structure of
other ASMs in order to replicate and test their results. We provide within the framework
some ”pre-fills” of placeholders implementing common behavior encountered in ASMs or
in stock markets.
We elaborate on the detailed design and implementation aspects of the components and
the relations between them in the next three sections. The presentation of the environment
is organized along the list of organizational and behavioral factors we set up in Chapter 2.
First, we describe how we represent organizational aspects. Then, we discuss how we deal
with the hardly observable and varying features. Finally, implementation related details are
presented.
4.3 Organizational aspects
In this section we discuss how the organizational aspects discussed in Section 2.2 are repre-
sented in the environment. Behavioral aspects are focused on in the next section.
• Traded instruments
Like the majority of the ASMs, for the time being, we focus on experiments where
one risky stock is traded. Cash supplies are available to express the risk free choice
of traders. The information source component that represents the issuer can generate
dividends and fundamental values if required, and inform traders about the new values.
The fundamental value of a stock, and, as a consequence, the way it varies is a hardly
observable aspect of real markets. In order to adequately model this reality there is
a need for flexibility in the models regarding this issue. Therefore, the algorithms
behind news generation can be varied and extended within the framework.
• Orders
Both limit and market orders can be placed by traders acting within the framework.
Orders are described by a stock name, size, side and quoted price. Additionally, each
order has a time-stamp attached to it that indicates the time at which it was placed.
• Market participants
In contrast to the artificial stock markets from the literature, featuring only investors
and sometimes market makers, in this environment brokers are represented as well.
The presence of brokers is required, for example, in markets where continuous double-
auctions can be conducted, like the NYSE. If necessary, brokers can be excluded from
experiments. This is, for instance, necessary when replicating experiments of ASMs
that do not implement them.
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In the ABSTRACTE, there is at least one market maker assigned to each stock. The
primary task of this market maker is to take and execute orders of other market partic-
ipants. Order execution depends on the execution mechanism applied. Depending on
the organization represented the market maker might also need to determine bid and
ask quotes in reaction to orders or inactivity. The environment is designed in such a
way that, if wished, more market makers can take responsibility for the same stock.
This structure reflects competitive dealer-markets. However, we do not study these
type of markets in this thesis.
The detailed generic behavior of the market participants is discussed in the next sec-
tion.
• Trading sessions
Continuous trading sessions are very common on stock markets (Harris, 2003; De-
marchi and Foucault, 2000), and although they are rarely encountered in earlier ASMs
their importance is being recognized within more and more studies. Given the popular-
ity of continuous sessions we focus on designing and developing a continuous trading
mechanism. However, since many artificial markets implement call auctions, we also
incorporate call type trading session within the framework.
It is up to the user to decide with which form to experiment. If continuous trading
sessions are applied, orders can be continuously placed by investors, and trades are
arranged whenever possible. If call sessions are used, orders can be placed only at
designated times. Traders are notified whenever a call session opens and ends. Or-
ders placed during call sessions are aggregated and trading is arranged based on the
execution system applied.
• Execution systems
The execution systems that we primarily focus on are continuous quote-driven sys-
tems. On these type of markets bid and ask quotes are placed by market makers. The
way bid-ask quotes are ultimately determined is market and market maker dependent.
The decisions behind this process are in general hardly observable. Therefore, we
design and implement empty placeholders using which the experimenter can specify
this hardly observable aspect. Thus, experiments with different continuous execution
systems can be conducted within the framework, as specified by the implemented and
configured bid-ask quoting strategy of the market makers.
In order to provide the possibility to study auction-based markets, and to replicate
experiments of the common single price call auction form ASMs, a framework for
auction-based execution mechanisms is also incorporated into the environment. The
way trades are arranged and prices are ultimately determined is again hardly observ-
able in practice, and moreover varies from market to market. Therefore, we do not
choose for a specific, predetermined execution mechanism, but provide the frame-
work only. Empty placeholders give the user the possibility to experiment with various
strategies.
In addition, we support the representation of persistent double auctions, a mechanism
applied, for example, on the NYSE. During a persistent double auction brokers can ne-
gotiate between the quoted bid and ask prices of the market maker (see Section 2.2.5).
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• Market rules and regulations
Rules describe the type of the trading session, and determine details of the specific
execution mechanism applied within the framework. In general, based on the specified
market type, they might refer to the tick size, the upper and lower limit of a bid-ask
spread, the number of call auctions that should be conducted, the time interval between
two call-auctions, the specification of events that can trigger call-auctions on hybrid
markets (e.g. the intensity of change in prices), the (simulated) length of a trading day,
etc.
Regarding a-priori information, it is possible to simulate the publication of historical
price series, the bid-ask quotes of the market maker, and news provided by the infor-
mation source component, for example concerning the fundamental value. News is
available for participants that subscribed to receive it. The limit-order-book is theo-
retically closed. However, depending on the market-maker’s bid-ask quoting strategy
the best ask and offer might be visible being identical to the quotes. In the future, we
might consider experimenting with open book trading as well.
Post-trade information regarding the transactions, can be made public to all the partic-
ipants. The identity of the traders participating in transactions is registered for statis-
tical reasons, but it can be hidden from other participants if wished so.
4.4 Behavioral aspects
In the previous section we focused on the organizational aspects of the markets that are rep-
resented within our simulation environment. In this section we focus on the hardly observ-
able aspects of the markets and describe the design bed of price formation mechanisms and
traders. We base the description on the behavioral factors given in Section 2.3 and reported
in (Boer et al., 2005b).
In order to allow for a flexible representation of the price formation mechanisms and for
experiments with different trading strategies, the framework incorporates only skeletons for
the three trader types, i.e. market makers, brokers and investors. Skeletons only specify the
basic structure and generic behavior of the traders. On top of the skeletons traders’ specific
behaviors (strategies) can be implemented. Since we have chosen for an artificial agent-
based implementation of the traders, we illustrate them by focusing on their environment-
sensing, decision-making and acting behavior (see (Russell and Norvig, 2003)).
4.4.1 Order-placing behavior
Orders are primarily initiated by investors as a result of some portfolio management process.
Investors carry out the following generic behavior:
• they sense their environment;
• they interpret the sensed information and make trading decisions that result in orders;
• they ask a financial agent to execute the orders generated.
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The process and reasoning behind trading decisions is however a hardly observable as-
pect of investors’ behavior.
Accordingly, we represent the behavior leading to a trading decision of investors as a
black box (Figure 4.2). This box can be filled in with any strategy. The investor component
of the environment is designed in a way to reflect the generic behavior. Arbitrary order-
placing strategies can be configured to fill in the black box part of it.
Trading environement
event / information Trading Decision
orders
Figure 4.2: The generic behavior of investors.
As suggested by the literature on behavioral finance, illustrated by the various ASM
implementations, and discussed by Boer et al. (2005b), arbitrary many strategies might ex-
ist behind trading decisions. In general, as theory describes, trading decisions are driven
by portfolio management processes (Reilly and Brown, 2003). Accordingly, trading deci-
sions are based on the individual investment strategies that try to meet the particular policy
statement guidelines, and reflect the portfolio construction and maintenance decision of the
investors resulting in orders.
Given that the strategy behind the trading decision is varying and unknown, in the skele-
ton we need to allow for various possibilities.
Two main questions arise in relation to designing trading behaviors:
• how to trigger a trading decision?
• when to trigger a trading decision?
An investor considers to make a new trading decision in the following situations:
• the order he placed is filled;
• a market event happens: a transaction is made, the market price changes, or the bid-ask
quote changes;
• news arrives related to the fundamental value or dividends;
• a time horizon is reached (e.g. the holding period of a given portfolio).
In case the investor applies a portfolio management process, a trading decision might imply
reevaluation and reallocation of his portfolio.
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The trading decision results in a set of orders. This set can be empty, meaning that the
investor doesn’t want to place any new order. Given that we focus on one type of stock
for the time being, in the experiments conducted, investors decide to place either one single
order (possibly for more than 1 share) or no order at all.
The environment contains only the skeleton, which provides the generic investor-type of
behavior. It does not include a specific trading strategy, but an empty placeholder on top of
which different strategies can be implemented. In this way experiments with arbitrary types
of investors can be conducted in a flexible way. Various investors can be set to behave, for
example, like the traders at SantaFe (LeBaron, 2002), KapSyn (Loistl and Vetter, 2000) or
at a sort of ”business school” (Chen and Yeh, 2001) trying to maximize a specific utility
function, or to use arbitrage opportunities like traders in other markets (e.g.; Das (2003),
Chen et al. (2001)). Further, if required they could generate orders with random values like
the traders in (Shatner et al., 2000; Chan and Shelton, 2001) or (Das, 2003), trade a prede-
fined fraction of their portfolio (Raberto et al., 2001; Shatner et al., 2000) and use a variety
of fundamental and/or technical strategies to forecast future values. Thus, an investor com-
ponent in the framework is characterized by the particular strategy applied to make trading
decisions.
4.4.2 Order execution
4.4.2.1 Order execution by brokers
Brokers on financial markets are primarily entitled to execute orders on behalf of investors.
In this respect they are mediators. Of special interest is their role in persistent double-
auctions because in that case negotiation is involved. Similar to the investors’ skeleton, the
design of the brokers within the framework involves just their generic behavior, the chosen
strategies behind the decision problems being at the users’ freedom.
As discussed in Section 2.3.2 and illustrated by Figure 4.3, the common mediator behav-
ior of brokers consists of the following main tasks:
• sense their environment,
• receive orders from investors,
• decide how and in which order to execute the trading instructions received;
• arrange transactions and report on them.
The main decision problem brokers are faced with is thus how to fill the received orders.
This problem is illustrated by the first black box on Figure 4.3. There are various scenarios
possible. The number of possibilities is limited by market rules.
If a broker can handle more than one order at a time he needs to decide which of the
orders to process next. A broker might, for example:
• select the order with the earliest arrival time (FIFO mechanism); or
• select the order with the best execution probability (considering current market condi-
tions); or
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Figure 4.3: The generic behavior of brokers.
• aggregate and try to execute more orders with similar parameters at once.
The choice which order to select depends on the possible trading mechanisms that are
applied on the market in which the broker interacts. Theoretically a broker has three ways to
carry out a trading instruction:
• match orders internally: if, for example, there are other earlier received orders in the
order book (LOB) of the broker that clear at a price close to the current market price;
• try to negotiate with other brokers within the market makers’ quoted spread, for in-
stance, through persistent double auction, like at NYSE (represented by the black box
entitled ”negotiation strategy” on Figure 4.3);
• submit the (improved) order to a third party (such as a market maker or a central
matching system) for execution.
Brokers are allowed to negotiate with each other only within the specified bid/ask spread.
It does not make sense to negotiate outside it, as then it would be more profitable for one
of the parties to trade with the market maker. Brokers might apply a variety of negotiation
strategies. The decision they take during the negotiation strategy results either in a new quote
or the acceptance of a quote made by another market participant. A number of decisions need
to be taken if brokers choose to negotiate, such as the negotiation price offered, the changes
applied to the negotiation price, and the time-length for trying to negotiate an item. These
values might depend on the actual quote of the market maker, the offers that other brokers
make for negotiation purposes, the initial limit price of the selected order, etc. If the broker
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decides to accept a bid or offer, or if his quote is accepted, a transaction price is determined,
a deal is made and the transaction price of this deal is published as the new market price.
The strategy applied by a broker to select and execute orders can be influenced by his
inventory, either because he doesn’t want to invest, or because in certain markets constraints
are put on the level of inventory that brokers are allowed to keep.
The way brokers analyze information, and interpret it to select and execute orders, or
to define a negotiation strategy are hardly observable aspects and can take arbitrarily many
forms, properties illustrated by black boxes in Figure 4.3. We build the architecture of the
brokers in such a way as to allow for implementation and experiments with different strate-
gies. Since it is not clear how in reality brokers solve all the decision problems that they
face, we have to experiment with a number of possible solutions. Allowing for different
strategies enables us to study how the brokers’ success and the market dynamics depends
on the strategy applied. Hence, again the framework contains the skeleton that provides the
implementation of the generic behavior of broker-agents leaving a concrete strategy imple-
mentation for negotiation, and for order selection and execution as an empty placeholder to
be filled in by the user.
4.4.2.2 Order execution and the role of market makers on continuous markets
Market makers are financial agents on continuous markets with the specific role to provide
liquidity for the stocks they are responsible for. Accordingly, when designing the behavior
of market makers we focus on representing this particular feature. According to the generic
behavior of market makers described in Section 2.3.3, and illustrated in Figure 4.4, the tasks
that market makers need to repeatedly carry out, is to:
• perceive the environment;
• determine bid and ask quotes;
• receive orders and execute them against the quoted bid-ask values if possible;
• enter unfilled orders into the limit order book.
The question and the main decision problem market makers are faced with, is:
• when to change the bid-ask quotes; and
• how to determine them in order to reflect market conditions and to provide liquidity?
The strategy that governs the market makers’ decision depends on the market organiza-
tion where they interact, but also on individual and situational characteristics. In principle,
they reconsider the bid and ask quotes in two main situations:
• whenever new orders arrive; or
• whenever they perceive that the stock they are responsible for is not liquid enough,
which is reflected for example by the fact that no orders arrive for a while.
100
115
4.4 - Behavioral aspects
Figure 4.4: The behavior of market makers.
Additionally, other considerations, like their belief that current quotes do not reflect market
conditions, can lead market makers to revise the bid and ask.
Market makers apply various strategies to set their bid and ask quotes. In order to allow
for experiments with multiple market maker types, the skeleton of the market makers again
does not provide a concrete solution to this decision problem, but an empty placeholder to be
extended with user-defined strategies. Experiments with several market making algorithms
can be conducted and compared in this way, such as bid-ask determination based on Bayesian
learning as implemented by (Das, 2003), or based on position imbalance and a threshold like
in (Chan and Shelton, 2001), or simply based on the content of the limit order book, like
in KapSyn (Loistl and Vetter, 2000) or in continuous automated auctions. In fact order
execution on automated continuous markets can be considered as a special bid-ask quoting
strategy of a market maker.
4.4.2.3 Automated and equilibrium-based execution of orders
As we mentioned before, our primary aim is to represent continuous trading sessions. How-
ever, since call sessions occur as well in real life, and since many market models focus on
call sessions, we emulate these type of markets as well.
In this last short section, we focus on the way equilibrium prices can be determined dur-
ing call auctions. In the framework we allow this task to be carried out by market makers as
well as a specific auctioneer behavior. Based on the study in Chapter 2 we define the generic
auctioneer behavior of market maker as consisting of the following steps (Figure 4.5):
• collect orders during a call;
• determine the new equilibrium price based on the received orders;
• execute the orders that fit this price.
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Figure 4.5: Price formation at equilibrium.
The strategy used for determining the equilibrium price varies from market to market.
Often, it is not clear how it is solved in real markets. In the framework therefore, we again
provide an empty placeholder for it, and we let implementations plugged in by users deter-
mine the final strategy. Consequently, experiments with several different strategies can be
conducted, that can be, for example, the supply and demand intersection as implemented by
Raberto et al. (2001) or Brock and Hommes (1998), the strategy based on excess demand like
in (Chen and Yeh, 2001), or at highest volume, as determined in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000).
4.5 Implementing the ABSTRACTE environment
Note that the generic structure of market participants, described in the previous sections
reflects the wide, system theoretic view of Russell and Norvig (2003), and the formalized
view of Wooldridge (1999) on agents. Traders continuously sense their environment, make
decisions based on some internal state, and act upon their environment. This view on market
participants and the reasons described in Section 4.1 motivated us to use an agent-based
framework to implement the trading environment.
In this section we give a backstage view on the introduced environment. First, we briefly
present the agent-based environment in which ABSTRACTE is implemented and explain
the basic notions used in it. These notions are important, as we often refer to them when
describing our environment. Then, we describe how various components, especially agents,
are implemented within ABSTRACTE, and how they interact. Finally, we illustrate the
modularity of the environment by showing how a variety of strategies can be incorporated
and configured on top of it in a flexible way.
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4.5.1 The JADE environment
The agent-based environment on which ABSTRACTE is built on is JADE 3.4. JADE - Java
Agent DEvelopment Framework is a framework to develop multi-agent systems in compli-
ance with the FIPA specifications, an accepted standard definition of agent-based environ-
ments (Bellifemine et al., 2003; FIPA, 2007; Bellifemine et al., 2005).
Figure 4.6: An example of JADE containers and platforms (Caire, 2003)[pg.05]
4.5.1.1 Containers and Platforms
Each running instance of the JADE runtime environment is called a container. A container
can host several agents. A set of containers can form a platform. A single special main
container must always be active in each platform. The first container to start in a platform
must always be the main container. All other containers in this platform must be so-called
normal (i.e. non-main) containers. Normal containers must register with the main container.
In order to be able to do this the address of the main container (host and port) must be known
to them.
In a network more main containers can be started. Every main container is part of a
different platform to which new normal containers can possibly register. Figure 4.6 illustrates
the above concepts through a sample scenario showing two JADE platforms composed of 3
and 1 container respectively. Agents A2 and A3 are on the same container. Agents A1 and
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Figure 4.7: Reference architecture of a FIPA agent platform (Bellifemine et al., 2005)[pg.7]
A2 host on different containers, but the same platform, while agents A4 and A5 are part or
different platforms.
JADE agents are identified by a unique name. Provided they know each others name,
they can communicate transparently regardless of their actual location.
4.5.1.2 AMS and DF
On each main container two special agents are located, which are automatically started when
the main container is launched (Figure 4.7):
• the AMS (Agent Management System) and
• the DF (Directory Facilitator).
The AMS provides a naming service. It ensures that each agent in the platform has a
unique name. Further, it represents the authority in the platform: for instance it can create
and kill agents on remote containers. The DF provides a Yellow Pages service, i.e. it reg-
isters the services that the various agents offer. Agents are allowed to publish one or more
services in the DF. Through the DF an agent can find other agents which provide the services
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he requires. Messages are exchanged through the Message Transport System, also called
Agent Communication Channel (ACC). This software component controls all exchange of
messages within the platform, also allowing messages to and from remote platforms.
4.5.1.3 Agents and Behaviors
In JADE, each agent is identified by an agent identifier, called AID. An AID object includes
a globally unique name for each agent. The globally unique name consists of the agent’s
name and the name of the platform in which the agent lives. Within a platform agent names
must be unique.
The job an agent has to do is typically carried out within behaviors. A behavior repre-
sents a task that an agent can carry out. In order to make an agent execute the task imple-
mented by a behavior object it is sufficient to add the behavior to the agent. Behaviors can
be added to an agent when it starts and within other behaviors.
An agent can execute several behaviors concurrently. Scheduling behaviors is not pre-
emptive but cooperative. Therefore, it is the programmer who needs to define when an agent
switches from the execution of a behavior to the execution of the next one.
Behaviors in JADE embed a status and execute different operations depending on that
status. They complete when a given condition is met. There are some specific behaviors
implemented in JADE, such as the one-shot behavior and the cyclic behavior. One-shot
behaviors are executed only once. Cyclic behaviors are executed cyclically, they never com-
plete.
Further, JADE provides the possibility of combining simple behaviors together to create
complex behaviors. Complex behaviors include:
• Sequential behaviors; and
• Parallel behaviors.
Complex behaviors consist of sub-behaviors. As their name indicates, the sub-behaviors of
a sequential behavior are executed in sequential order, while the sub-behaviors of a parallel
behavior are executed concurrently. A complex behavior completes when all sub-behaviors
are completed.
4.5.1.4 Agent communication
JADE agents communicate through asynchronous message passing. Each agent has a sort of
mailbox (the agent message queue) where the JADE runtime posts messages sent by other
agents. Whenever a message is posted in the message queue the receiving agent is notified.
Processing messages from the message queue is the programmer’s task. If and when the
agent actually picks up the message from the message queue to process it is completely up
to the programmer.
Messages exchanged by JADE agents must have a predefined format. The format used
by JADE is the ACL (Agent Communication Language) language defined by the FIPA. This
format comprises a number of fields, in particular:
• The sender of the message in the form of an AID.
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• The AID’s constituting the list of receivers.
• The communicative intention also called the performative. The performative indicates
what the sender intends to achieve by sending the message. The performative can be:
– REQUEST, if the sender wants the receiver to perform an action,
– INFORM, if the sender wants the receiver to become aware of something,
– QUERY IF, if the sender wants to know whether or not a given condition holds,
– CFP call for proposal,
– PROPOSE, ACCEPT PROPOSAL, REJECT PROPOSAL, if the sender and re-
ceiver are engaged in a negotiation, and more.
• The content. This is in fact the actual information included in the message. It can
describe the action to be performed in a REQUEST message, the information that the
sender wants to disclose in an INFORM message, etc..
• The content language. The language of the content indicates the syntax used to express
the content. In order to understand each other, both the sender and the receiver must
be able to encode/parse expressions compliant to this syntax.
• The ontology. The ontology is the vocabulary of the symbols used in the content and
their meaning. In order to communicate effectively the sender and the receiver must
ascribe the same meaning to the same symbols for the communication.
• Control fields. Control fields are used to control concurrent conversations and to spec-
ify timeouts. Control fields might specify a conversation-id, or a requested keyword
with which someone should reply to a given message. A conversation-id control field
is used, for example, to give a unique identifier to the message. The sender of the mes-
sage then expects an answer with the same conversation-id. Further, a sender might
also fill in a keyword for a reply-with control field. In this case he considers an an-
swer to this message a message with the same keyword in an in-reply-to control field.
Finally, the reply-by control field informs the receiver of the message about the time
until which the sender waits for an answer.
4.5.2 The architecture of the ABSTRACTE environment
The ABSTRACTE trading environment consists of two main applications, that are run sep-
arately on the same platform:
• the marketplace and
• the investorbuilder.
The marketplace is the component that models the market organization. This is the place
where transactions take place and prices are formed. The marketplace application has to be
started first, because this runs the main container. Market makers and broker agents host on
this main container.
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The information source component described in Section 4.2 is included into the market-
place application as well. In this way we can avoid some time-synchronization problems.
The investorbuilder application is created with the aim to host the investors. Investors,
being not internal to a market, are implemented in a way to run separately from the market-
place itself. More than one investor-builder application can be running to interact with the
same marketplace, making it possible to run the ABSTRACTE in a distributed way. When
an investorbuilder application is launched, a new JADE container is created. This container
is linked to the specified marketplace, that is already running.
4.5.2.1 The agents
Agents in the ABSTRACTE environment are all extensions of JADE agents. The JADE
Agent class is the common superclass for user defined software agents. It provides methods
to perform basic agent tasks, such as message passing, life cycle support including start-
ing, suspending and killing an agent, and scheduling and execution of multiple concurrent
activities.
We distinguish two classes of agents interacting within the marketplace and the investor-
builder applications:
• trader agents, and
• manager agents.
Trader agents represent the market participants. They all have a portfolio: the amount of
cash that they have, and a list of stocks that they possess, the quantity for each of them,
and, optionally, a value attached to each stock. Manager agents are introduced to control
the market environment. They carry out tasks like keeping track of the time, creating and
managing a given list of traders, generating information, diffusing information, acting as an
intermediator between agents being hosted on the same or on different containers.
Taking into account the classification from Section 2.2.3 based on the role of market
participants we implement three different trader agents:
• the Investor,
• the Broker, and
• the MarketMaker.
Among these trader agents the Investor is part of the investorbuilder application, while the
rest is part of the marketplace.
In addition, there are a number of manager type of agents implemented, namely:
• the InvestorManager.
• the MarketManager,
• the AgentManager,
• the NegotiationManager,
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• the NewsManager,
• the TimeManager.
The InvestorManager is part of the investorbuilder application, and the rest is introduced to
manage the marketplace. Next we elaborate on the behavior of each of these agents one by
one.
4.5.2.2 Trader agents
Trader agents are implementations of the skeletons presented in the previous sections. Thus,
they do not contain a concrete implementation of a specific trading strategy, but empty place-
holders to allow for experiments with varying strategies, as discussed in Section 4.4. Run-
ning samples of agents are therefore composed from two parts: a generic part that imple-
ments the skeleton, and a varying part that substitutes the empty placeholder.
In order to let strategies vary among traders, we apply the ”strategy behavioral pattern”
as described by Gamma et al. (1997) and Freeman et al. (2004). User-defined strategies are
encapsulated in strategy classes, extending an abstract strategy class that is the aforemen-
tioned empty placeholder in the skeletons. Strategies and their attributes have to be declared
and described in structured files (XML-files).
The main task of trader agents (i.e. market makers, brokers and investors) is executed
through a main behavior. The main behavior of each agent is a cyclic listening behavior
through which they continuously sense their environment. In addition every agent carries
out role-dependent behavior. The role-dependent behavior of each agent is primarily event-
driven and depends on the agents’ specific settings.
• The Investor
Investor agents implement the skeleton of investors described in Section 4.4. Their
main behavior (InvestorBehavior) is to continuously listen to new information (see
Figure 4.8). They perceive and interpret the news received based on their individual
settings and strategy. Investor agents consider to place orders when news arrives,
when they get notified of the execution of an earlier placed order, or a given time
has elapsed. In all these cases the OrderPlacingBehavior is started. The way an
Investor agent interprets the information received and the way he decides what kind
of order to place, if at all, is not hard-coded within the ABSTRACTE but an empty
placeholder indicates where that decision should be made. The empty placeholder is
modeled by the AbstractOrderQuotingStrategy. The actual decision of an agent during
a simulation depends on the concrete strategy applied on top of this placeholder. The
generated orders are sent for execution to a market maker or a given broker.
Investor agents as described above are implemented in a way to represent individual
investors. Within ABSTRACTE it is also possible to run investors who continuously
generate orders, ignoring answers to their order. This latter variant represents a group
of investors, and can be useful if, for example we are not interested in individual
investors’ performance.
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• The Broker
The Broker agent implements the brokers’ skeleton described in Section 4.4. The main
behavior of the Broker is the BrokerBehavior. This behavior continuously listens to
messages and receives orders from the investors. New orders are put into an order
book. If the order book is not empty the broker tries to fulfill the orders from it.
The execution of orders is the task realized within the TradingBehavior of the Broker
depicted by Figure 4.9. Brokers first determine the order that they will execute next.
The selection of the order depends on the selection mechanism of brokers and on
the current market conditions. For a flexible representation of brokers’ behavior this
process should thus not be hard-coded but represented by an empty placeholder.
If Broker agents are part of a market where the persistent double auction mechanism
is applied (like on NYSE), they can try to negotiate. Negotiation is allowed only for
prices between the bid-ask spread. Buy orders with a price that is lower than the bid
and sell orders with a limit price higher than the ask are forwarded to the MarketMaker.
If negotiation is possible, the NegotiationBehavior is started. The design of this be-
havior is depicted by Figure 4.10. The aim of this task is to execute the selected order
at an improved price. Within this the broker decides about the new price he would
like to execute the order. He then compares his offer with the proposals (call outs) that
are on the market. If the call out on the counter trading side suits his value he accepts
it. It is the task of the AcceptCallOutBehavior to communicate the broker’s decision
towards the trading floor. The broker waits for a confirmation of transaction or refusal
of his acceptance by invoking the WaitForAnswerBehavior. This behavior can end by
either an answer or the expiration of the time the agent is willing to wait for an answer.
If the broker does not like the call out that would clear his order he tries to call out a
better price than the call out that is on the same trading side (buy or sell) as his order.
If he succeeds in this the SendNewCallOutBehavior is carried out to communicate the
intention to other brokers via the trading floor. The broker waits again a given time for
a reaction from other participants with the help of the WaitForAnswerBehavior.
In case the broker gets a positive answer to his call out a transaction takes place and
the broker updates accordingly his order book and portfolio. This task is solved by
the HandleTransactionBehavior. If the call out of the broker is overbidden he tries to
determine a new call out. If he does not succeed to execute the order within a given
time, the order will be sent to the market maker.
Just like the determination of an order for execution from a given order book, the
determination of a call out prices is a process that is hardly observable and can take
many forms depending on broker’s preferences. Therefore, both the selection of an
order and the determination of a new call out should be represented in a flexible way.
This is possible again with hard coding only empty placeholders for these processes.
The Broker agent in the current version of the ABSTRACTE is not modular yet. The
reason behind this is that we have not been interested in conducting experiments with
brokers for the purpose of this thesis. Therefore, we have not implemented this type of
trader agent yet for some time but have kept an earlier version of it. In this version the
selection of orders is made according to the ”first in first out” (FIFO) protocol. Further,
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determination of a new call out is by a stepwise increase/decrease as a function of the
limit price of the order to be executed, the bid and ask quotes, and the outstanding last
call outs.
• The MarketMaker
The MarketMaker implements the skeleton of the market maker as described in Sec-
tion 4.4. Market maker agents are the first trader agents that are started. There is
at least one market maker in every simulation. Automated execution systems can be
modeled by a market maker as well. The specific execution mechanism will then fill
in the empty placeholder.
There are two different main behaviors implemented for the MarketMaker: the
MarketMakerBehavior, and the AuctioneerBehavior. Which of them will be car-
ried out depends on the trading session modeled. During continuous sessions the
MarketMakerBehavior is started, on call sessions the AuctioneerBehavior is
carried out.
In Figure 4.11 the AuctioneerBehavior is depicted. The main task within this be-
havior is to wait for ”call” signs. The market maker accumulates within this behavior
the orders sent by investors. He stops accumulating orders at the end of a call. Then,
he tries to arrange trades based on the applied execution system. The actual execution
system fills in the empty placeholder modeled by the AbstractAuctioneerStrategy sus-
tained for this reason in the skeleton of the market maker. The market maker publishes
all the possible trades and notifies the involved traders about the transactions.
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Figure 4.11: Order processing by MarketMaker during call sessions
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Figure 4.12 illustrates the order processing behavior of the market maker in continuous
markets. In this case the main behavior of the market maker is the MarketMakerBe-
havior which is again cyclic. This behavior is started after the bid and ask quotes are
initialized. The value of these depends on the applied bid-ask quoting strategy to be
filled in on an empty placeholder, determined during configuration time. After initial-
ization the MarketMakerBehavior starts to receive and handle orders. When a new
order is arrived, the OrderMatchingBehavior is started. This behavior tries to match
the order with the currently standing quote on the appropriate side: sell orders with
bid quotes, and buy orders with ask quotes.
If the order can be traded with the quote, the MakeDealBehavior of the market maker
is started, as a sub-behavior of the OrderMatchingBehavior. The task of this sub-
behavior is to fill the order with the quote. As soon as the transaction is made, two sub-
behaviors are added to this latter behavior, that are executed in parallel way (indicated
with parallel lines in the figure). The PublishTransactionBehavior is used to report the
transaction, while the task of the ConfirmTransactionBehavior is to notify the agents
involved in the trading arrangement that their order has been filled. This behavior
sends the details of the arrangement to the initiators of the orders. Finally, it is the
task of the MakeDealBehavior to update the content of the limit order book. This is
necessary if, for example, the quotes used for arranging a trade, represented orders
from the limit order book. This task is completed by the UpdateLOBBehavior.
When the MakeDealBehavior ends, the UpdateBidAskBehavior is activated as a sub-
behavior of the OrderMatchingBehavior. This behavior takes care to determine the
new bid and ask quotes. As the way bid and ask quotes are determined is a hardly
observable aspect of real markets, and there are many possibilities to determine them,
this mechanism is not hard-coded but represented by an empty placeholder that is im-
plemented by the AbstractBidAskQuotingStrategy class. Notice that a similar arrange-
ment is implemented in the UpdateLOBBehavior discussed earlier, as this behavior
is hardly observable in reality as well, and it might be realized and implemented in
different ways.
If only part of the order could be filled, the OrderMatchingBehavior is restarted. If
the received order doesn’t match the quote on the appropriate side, it is inserted into
the limit order book and the UpdateLOBBehavior is started. Similar to the situation
after transactions, after the modification of the LOB, the MarketMaker revisits its Up-
dateBidAskBehavior in order to adapt bid and ask quotes to the changing situation. In
order to ensure liquidity the market maker also considers adapting bid and ask quotes
if no orders arrive for a while. In such a case again, the UpdateBidAskBehavior is
started, which applies the specified extension of the AbstractBidAskQuotingStrategy.
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Figure 4.12: Order processing by MarketMaker on continuous quote-driven markets
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4.5.2.3 Manager agents
• The InvestorManager
The InvestorManager agent is part of the investor-builder application. It is respon-
sible for managing a list of investors. Its main role is to solve the interaction between
a marketplace and the investors it manages within this investor-builder application.
• The MarketManager
The MarketManager agent is the main authority that controls the market. It is the
agent that takes care to open and close the market. It is responsible for the relation
between the marketplace and the investor-builder applications. It receives requests
of InvestorManager agents who act on behalf of investors who want to join the
market. Furthermore, it notifies the agents if the market needs to be closed.
• The AgentManager
The AgentManager agent has control over the agents that represent financial traders.
Its main task is to manage a list of various MarketMaker agents and a list of different
BrokerAgents. It is the agent who creates the financial agents, and through which
the created agents can be notified about events related to market organization, such as
opening or closing of a market.
• The NegotiationManager
The NegotiationManager agent represents the negotiation floor where Broker
agents negotiate. Negotiation floors are the places where continuous double auctions
are conducted. This agent controls negotiations, playing a sort of intermediary role
between brokers. It publishes bids and offers, if those are better then previous call-
outs, and rejects quotes placed earlier that are overbidden. Finally, it takes care to
conduct and publish transactions if an agreement has been made (see Figure 4.13).
• The TimeManager The TimeManager agent keeps track of time. It notifies other
agents when a call auction starts and ends.
• The NewsManager
The NewsManager represents the information-source component. This agent is started
immediately after launching the marketplace, and it generates fundamental value re-
lated information. Agents interested in new fundamental values need to subscribe to a
”news-list”. The NewsManager agent sends new information to all agents who require
it (i.e. are subscribed). Currently this agent is part of the marketplace application. We
plan to implement the information source component as a separate application in the
future so that it can represent information external to the market and can have influence
on multiple markets.
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Figure 4.13: Processes on the trading floor where negotiation takes place
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4.5.3 Agent interactions in ABSTRACTE
In this section we illustrate how agents within ABSTRACTE interact with each other. De-
scribing all details behind communication and all relations between agents goes beyond the
scope of this thesis. Here we aim to provide an overview on how communication takes place.
For this reason, we first depict the main relationships between the various agents. Then, we
describe how messages are exchanged between some of the agents. Finally, we illustrate the
content of messages through two examples.
4.5.3.1 Relationships between the agents
The most important relationships that hold between the various agents is depicted by Fig-
ure 4.14. The MarketManager agent is in the midpoint of this figure, illustrating its central
role. The MarketMaker agent creates the AgentManager agent, who in its turn, creates and
manages the required financial trader agents, namely the MarketMaker agents and the Bro-
ker agents. The AgentManager also creates the NegotiationManager with the help of which
broker agents can negotiate.
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Figure 4.14: The relation between the agents in ABSTRACTE
When an investorbuilder application is launched, a newly created InvestorManager joins
the marketplace and creates the required Investor agents. Investors send order requests to the
MarketMaker agents and the Broker agents. Those in turn, confirm or refuse the execution
of the requested order.
The MarketMaker agents publish trading arrangements reporting to the MarketManager.
The MarketManager forwards the information towards all interested InvestorManagers.
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The NewsManager agent generates fundamental value related news, and sends this in-
formation to agents (e.g. InvestorManager agents) who are subscribed to the news list. It
also notifies the market makers that there is news. The TimeManager informs the Market-
Manager about the development of the time when relevant events need to be planned, such
as a call that should begin or end, or when it is time to close the market. The AgentManager,
InvestorManager and NewsManager is notified by the MarketManager about these events.
The other agents are notified by the manager agent that created them.
INFORM
Investor InvestorManager NewsManager MarketMaker
fundamental value changed
SUBSCRIBE
for news about fundamental value
INFORM
current fundamental value
current fundamental value
INFORM
INFORM
new fundamental value
new fundamental value
INFORM
INFORM
fundamental value changed
Figure 4.15: The dissemination of fundamental information
4.5.3.2 Message flows
In this subsection we illustrate how some of the agents communicate with each other.
The dissemination of the fundamental value. Figure 4.15 depicts how information re-
garding the fundamental is sent towards market participants. Agents who are willing to
receive this information should subscribe for news at the NewsManager. If required by the
model, the NewsManager agent can notify the market makers any time the fundamental
value changes. After an InvestorManager agent is created, he subscribes to the NewsMan-
ager to receive fundamental information. The NewsManager confirms the subscription by
sending the current fundamental value to the market maker. InvestorManagers forward the
information to the informed traders on the market.
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The dissemination of market information. Investors receive fundamental information
from the NewsManager and market information from the MarketManager. As Figure 4.16
illustrates whenever the market price or the bid-ask quote changes on the market, the Mar-
ketMaker agent informs the MarketManager, which in turn informs InvestorManagers. In-
vestorManagers publish the information on a ”blackboard” so that all investors that they
manage have access to this publicly available set of information.
InvestorManager MarketManager MarketMaker
SUBSCRIBE
REPORT
INFORM
REPORT
INFORM
INFORM
current bid/ask
transaction
new bid/ask
transaction
bid/ask change
Figure 4.16: The dissemination of market information
The communication process of brokers. Figure 4.17 depicts how brokers communicate
with the NegotiationManager when they try to negotiate. They call out bids and offers for
this reason and send the call-out to the NegotiationManager. Call-outs are refused if better
bids or offers are made by other agents, or if they are not valid, when placed (i.e. they are
at a worse price than outstanding call-outs). Call-outs can be accepted by other brokers who
think the bid or offer is advantageous to them. All bids and offers are controlled by the
NegotiationManager, who acts as an intermediary between brokers, and takes care of the
transactions. When a Broker accepts a call-out or his call-out is accepted, the Negotiation-
Manager confirms the details of the trading arrangement to the involved brokers, and reports
the transaction to the MarketManager. If the broker cannot fulfill an order received by an
investor at a price between the bid-ask spread, he forwards the request to the MarketMaker,
who will take care of the order and communicate itself with the Broker who initiated the
order from then on.
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Investor Broker NegotiationManager MarketMaker
REFUSE
REQUEST
ACCEPT
CONFIRM
REPORT
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order (bid/offer)
NEGOTIATE
MarketManager
REQUEST REQUEST
CONFIRM REPORT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fill order
order (bid/offer)
transaction
transaction
fill order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transaction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Figure 4.17: Communication process of a Broker agent
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4.5.3.3 Messages
As pointed out in Section 4.5.1.4 the format of messages exchanged between JADE agents is
based on the ACL language defined by FIPA. We illustrate this format through two examples.
The first example is a request sent by an investor to a market maker to execute a given order.
The second example contains the reply of the market maker to this request.
Sample buy-order The message that expresses an order placed by an investor has the
following form:
(REQUEST
:sender
(agent-identifier
:name Investor1 mycomputer@mycomputer:1099/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://mycomputer:7778/acc
http://mycomputer:1931/acc )
:X-JADE-agent-classname investorbuilder.agents.investors.Investor)
:receiver
(set ( agent-identifier
:name MarketMaker mycomputer@mycomputer:1099/JADE ))
:content
”(action (agent-identifier
:name Investor1 mycomputer@mycomputer:1099/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://mycomputer:7778/acc
http://mycomputer:1931/acc )
(FILLORDER
:TRADER Investor1 mycomputer
:ORDER (ORDER
:ORDERID ”3”
:STOCK (STOCK
:NAME ABC
:AMOUNT 100
:PRICE 76.10)
:SIDE BUY)
:TIMESTAMP 1155853195968)))”
:language fipa-sl
:ontology Market ontology )
The message begins with a communicative intention, also called performative. The com-
municative intention of the investor is a ”REQUEST”, expressing that the investor requires
the market maker to perform an action. The intention is followed by information about the
sender. This information includes the unique name of the investor, the address where it hosts
together with its communication channels, and the name of the class this agent is an instance
of. Each sender needs to indicate to whom he wants to send the message, therefore, the
message also contains the unique name of the receiver. This is the part from which the agent
communication channel (ACC) can find out to which agent to route the message.
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Next, the content of the message is specified. Since the performative is a request, the
content needs to be a description of an action. For an action, the name and address of
the agent who initiated the task is again given. Then, the real content follows. In this
sample, the action that the investor wants to be carried out is the execution of an order. The
”FILLORDER” action contains data about the agent’s identity who places this order, the
details of the order and the time at which the order is placed. Each order of an agent has a
unique identifier. An order is given for a certain stock and quantity. In the sample above, the
limit price is also specified, for market orders this value is set to 0. Finally, the trading side
is given, in this case being a buy order.
The syntax of this content corresponds to the so-called fipa-sl language. The symbols
used in the content need to correspond to a predefined vocabulary (i.e. ontology). The
FILLORDER, ORDER and STOCK objects must, therefore, be predefined and added to the
ontology used. The vocabulary of the ABSTRACTE is determined by the Market ontology
class. FILLORDER needs to extend the JADE Action class.
Sample confirmed transaction The second example contains the answer of the market
maker to the investor’s request. In this case the market maker confirms a partial fulfillment
of an order.
(CONFIRM
:sender
(agent-identifier
:name MarketMaker mycomputer@mycomputer:1099/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://mycomputer:7778/acc
http://mycomputer:1931/acc )
:X-JADE-agent-classname marketplace.agents.marketmakers.MarketMaker )
:receiver
(set ( agent-identifier
:name Investor1 mycomputer@mycomputer:1099/JADE ) )
:content
”((TRANSACTION
(STOCK
:NAME ABC
:AMOUNT 80
:PRICE 75.96)
(SIGNATURE
:BUYER Investor1 mycomputer
:SELLER MarketMaker mycomputer
:PLACE MarketMaker
:TIMESTAMP 1155853195968)))”
:in-reply-to ”3”
:language fipa-sl
:ontology Market ontology )
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This message looks very similar to the previous one. It contains similar fields, the sender
being now the market maker and the receiver the investor. The content in this case is not
an action, but a predicate. The type of the content depends on the performative, which is
here ”CONFIRM”, a reply. The TRANSACTION and SIGNATURE structures again need
to be defined as part of the Market ontology. There is one additional field compared to the
previously presented example. The ”in-reply-to” field contains the identifier of the order
which has been executed. If an investor has sent more orders, he will know, by looking at
this attribute, for which of his orders he has obtained an answer.
4.5.4 Implementing ASMs and traders on top of the trading
environment
So far we have described the ABSTRACTE trading environment based on the framework
proposed in Chapter 2 which allows the experimenter to implement his own choice of im-
portant structural and dynamical aspects of stock markets and artificial stock markets. In
this section we present how these various market structures and strategies can be configured
in a flexible way on top of the proposed trading environment. ABSTRACTE is not a spe-
cific stand alone ASM, but just the skeletal structure of a trading environment. Within this
environment the structural place of the varying organizational aspects and strategies is well-
defined by means of strategy patterns (empty placeholders). Their content however is not
specified. In order to be able to conduct experiments, organizational aspects and strategies
have to be configured on top of the framework by completing and giving meaning to these
empty placeholders. New strategies can be created by extending the empty placeholders and
can be configured in a flexible way, without a need to change the framework. The various
strategies can have a different number and type of parameters.
Figure 4.18 illustrates how an agent is configured. The components The Skeleton of an
Agent, Agent Manager, and Configuration are part of the trading environment. The repre-
sentation of the various strategies does not have to be part of the framework itself. They
just have to be designed and implemented taking into account the strategy patterns (empty-
placeholders) within the agents’ skeleton. A configuration part is used to specify which
implementations of a certain strategy exist, and where can they be found. Here the strategies
and the related parameters can be registered and initialized uniformly based on a predefined
descriptive structure.
In case someone would like to experiment with a new strategy the following steps need
to be taken:
• implement the new strategy on top of the strategy pattern, i.e. by taking into account
the properties of the empty placeholder in place of which this strategy will be applied;
• register the new strategy (i.e. describe its name, location and parameters) within the
configuration component that belongs to the application or within a similar configura-
tion file;
• specify which configuration files should be read for the experiment that is planned,
specify the participants and the assigned strategy for each of them.
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Figure 4.18: Sample skeleton with implemented strategies.
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At configuration time the concrete strategy that is specified in the used configuration file is
linked to the skeleton. Consequently, during the simulation run the appropriate strategy will
fill in the empty placeholder.
4.6 Evaluation
The aim of this section is to illustrate the modularity of the ABSTRACTE trading environ-
ment, namely to indicate to what extent it is able to support experiments with various market
organizations and market participants. For this reason, we present experiments with two ar-
tificial stock markets implemented on top of the ABSTRACTE. These ASMs implement in
different ways the hardly observable aspects behind the price formation and the trading be-
havior of participants. They differ mainly with respect to the trading session applied and the
execution system used, and with respect to the strategy behind the market maker’s decisions.
In this section we describe these experiments and compare their dynamics and results.
Through the experiments, we aim to test the adequacy of the trading environment, that is to
test whether it functions correctly, i.e. as expected. It should be noted however that, since
the ABSTRACTE is an environment to support the design of multiple market organizations
and trading strategies, its correctness can only be evaluated in relation to the markets that
are simulated. Next, we say a few words about evaluation in general and then we present the
experiments.
4.6.1 Validation, verification and testing
By evaluation of the ABSTRACTE environment we mean ”testing its accuracy” in relation to
the markets that are simulated. It is important to distinguish between validation of a model,
verification of a model, and testing a model.
In order to understand this terminology we adopt the definitions by Balci (1998)[336]:
• ”Model verification is substantiating that the model is transformed from one form into
another, as intended, with sufficient accuracy. Model verification deals with building
the model right.”
• ”Model validation is substantiating that within its domain of applicability, the model
behaves with satisfactory accuracy consistent with the study objectives. Model vali-
dation deals with building the right model.”
• ”Model testing is ascertaining whether inaccuracies or errors exist in the model. In
model testing, the model is subjected to test data or test cases to determine if it func-
tions properly. (...) [T]esting is conducted to perform either validation or verification
or both. Some tests are devised to evaluate the behavioral accuracy (i.e, validity) of
the model, and some tests are intended to judge the accuracy of model transformation
into one form or another (verification).”
Evaluation of the ABSTRACTE environment is two-fold. We want ”to build the right
model” when representing reality, i.e. real markets. And, in case of replicating existing
models, we want to build the represented market model right. While validation against
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reality is very difficult if part of reality is hardly observable, verification against an already
built model is easier. It can be compared, for example, whether both models generate the
same output given the same input, if it is about deterministic environments. Otherwise, in
stochastic environments the statistical properties of the results should be similar. If not, at
least one of the implementations is not correct. Verification difficulties often arise from the
fact that the details and/or settings of the model that one wants to replicate are not completely
disclosed.
The difficulty to verify and validate market models arises from the complexity of the
reality that they model, and from the hardly observable aspects that are part of this reality.
Market environments contain many parameters that can influence the market dynamics, and
many aspects of real markets are hardly observable if at all. Consequently, simplifications
and abstractions are needed in models, and assumptions cannot be avoided. The main ques-
tion that market modelers face is: how is it possible to test whether a model appropriately
reflects and explains reality if parts of this reality are not observable?
A number of questions arise in relation to this issue:
• In which measure should a model reflect reality?
• In which measure should a model reflect reality so as to give new insights into its
dynamics?
• When can we say that its accuracy is satisfactory, consistent with the study objectives?
• How can we judge whether it is consistent with the objectives if parts of the modeled
system are not observable?
• Is the model’s explanatory or predictive power more important than its conformance
to reality?
• What is the trade-off between realistic features of a model and its explanatory power?
In order to analyze to what degree a model conforms to reality, calibration can be applied
(testing, fitting real data to the model) and experimental results concerning traders’ behavior
can be implemented (LeBaron, 2006). Given that part of reality is not observable, calibration
in ASMs is often possible only with respect to the statistical properties of empirical data, and
not the data itself.
In order to test the accuracy of the ABSTRACTE environment and the ASMs on top
of it, we first conduct functional testing. Functional testing is applied by providing inputs
(test data) to the model and evaluating the corresponding outputs (Balci, 1998). Then, we
analyze the properties of the time-series generated. We compare the results to predictions
of theoretical models, findings of empirical studies, and experimental studies carried out
with ASMs based on similar market organization. We mainly look whether the ASMs are
efficient, in the sense that we investigate whether time series are random, and whether some
persistent patterns can be observed.
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4.6.2 Experimental settings
The ASMs presented here are very simple models. When deciding about the organizational
and behavioral aspects of these ASMs we have chosen for simple representations. The reason
is that the aim of this chapter is to illustrate the modularity of the introduced environment. In
this section, therefore, we do not aim to study and give new insights into market dynamics,
but we want to test and show the accuracy of the proposed environment. Simple models
suffice for this reason. A case study designed for studying market dynamics in a specific
ASM (which is again configured on top of the ABSTRACTE) is presented in Chapter 5.
4.6.2.1 The ASMs studied
In order to illustrate the modularity of the ABSTRACTE environment we consider an ASM
with continuous trading sessions and an ASM with call trading sessions see (Table 4.1). By
definition the behavior of the market makers in these trading sessions is also different. The
two models focused on are:
1. the Roll market model; and
2. a call auction model.
The first ASM we have conducted experiments with, is based on the model introduced by
Roll, as described in (Campbell et al., 1997). The reason why we have chosen for this
model, is that it is analytically tractable. This means that the properties of the generated
price series can be analytically deduced and compared to the properties of the simulated
results. Consequently, we can use this model to evaluate the environment.
As a second case a simple call auction type of market is represented. In this model
price is formed at discrete points in time, as opposed to continuous trading. Through this
example we aim to show that within our environment experiments with call-auctions can
be conducted as well. This suggests that experiments of other ASMs from the literature
featuring call sessions can be replicated.
Table 4.1: The illustrated market models
Organizational aspects Behavioral aspects
Model Order Trading Session Execution System Order Placement Order Execution
Strategy Investor Strategy Market Maker
Roll market continuous quote-driven random fundamental value± spread
Call limit call price-driven random intersection supply-demand
4.6.2.2 Organizational aspects
• Stocks, orders, quotes and market participants
In all experiments described here, one risky stock is traded, and sufficient cash supplies
are available. In the first ASM, fundamental values are generated.
A single, representative investor agent is used to model many investors1. Investors
place market orders in the first model, in the second model they place limit orders.
1In Chapter 5 we present a case study in which more investors are individually represented.
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In both implementations a market maker is responsible for the liquidity of the stocks
and the execution of orders. In the first model, that is quote-driven, bids and offers are
quoted by the market maker.
• Trading sessions and execution systems
We present experiments both in continuous and call trading sessions. In the first model
trading sessions are continuous and the execution system is quote-driven, while in the
second one call auctions are modeled.
By focusing on continuous markets we aim to show that our trading environment is
designed in a way to allow for experiments with these common, but rarely represented
trading sessions. As mentioned before, the experiment with call auctions is presented
to illustrate the possibility to configure multiple market structures within the intro-
duced environment, and the possibility to replicate experiments of ASMs from the
literature.
4.6.2.3 Price formation and behavioral aspects
• Order placing by investors
In line with the purpose of this section, the investors’ trading strategy is similar in
both models. Investor agents continuously place orders, their common investment
strategy being in all cases random order generation. In case of the second model in
which limit orders are generated, the limit price is pseudo-randomly generated, from a
normal distribution around the last market price with a given standard deviation (that
is usually set to 1). The side of an order is generated with an equal probability to
be buy or sell. In the first experiment, the volume of orders and the quoted bid-ask
volumes are set to 1 unit. In the second experiment, the number of shares offered or
asked is a multiple of 100 and below 10000.
• Price formation and the order execution behavior of the market makers
While the order placing behavior of investors is similar, the order execution strategy of
market makers differs within the two models. The market maker applies specific bid-
ask quoting strategies during continuous sessions, and determines prices at equilibrium
in the call auctions.
Market makers set the market price based on the orders they receive and the particular
strategies implemented and plugged in on top of their skeleton. At the beginning of
the experiments, there is an initial market price (P0) given, set to 100.00. In case of
the continuous market model, the market price is formed at the bid or ask quote of the
market maker, depending on whether a sell or a buy order was matched against it. In
case of the call model, the market prices are determined at equilibrium at the end of
each call. The equilibrium point is at the intersection of supply and demand curves so
as to maximize the trading volume.
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4.6.2.4 Simulation runs
Within each market model we have conducted several rounds of experiments. For continuous
market settings rounds were specified in terms of real time length, while for the call market
settings in terms of the number of call auctions, a call lasting for varying time length in the
different experiments. In case of continuous settings, rounds lasted for 5, 10, 15, 30 and 60
minutes in real time, while in call settings 1000 calls have been made, a call lasting for 1, 5
and 10 seconds respectively in real time through the different experiments.
The results turned out to be stable over time, in the sense that the dynamics were similar
regardless of the length of the experiments. In call markets, given the preselected number
of call auctions, 1000 market prices have been determined. The size of the time series
generated in the continuous models varies from around 1500 (in 5-minute experiments) to
around 30000 (in 1-hour experiments). In general 300-500 transactions have been carried
out during a minute.
The number of transactions carried out depends on the computational speed of the com-
puter used. It also depends on the time it takes the investor to place new orders. Further, it
depends on the market structure, on the time it takes the market maker to handle orders, to set
new bid and ask quotes in case of continuous markets, and to determine the equilibrium price
in case of call markets. Given that the behavior of market maker is computationally more
intricate than the investors’ behavior, we delayed the investors’ decision with 0.1 seconds in
the continuous setting, i.e. we allowed them to place new orders only every 0.1 seconds. In
doing so, we tried to avoid to overload the market makers with orders.
4.6.3 The Roll model
4.6.3.1 Model specific settings
The Roll model is a continuous quote-driven ASM. The market maker sets the bid and ask
quotes at equal distance from the fundamental value (FV ) he perceives. Accordingly, the
bid price is set to FV − s/2, and the ask price to FV + s/2, where s is called the spread
value. Investors are represented by a single investor agent, who continuously places market
orders of size 1, with equal probability regarding the trading side. Market prices result from
matching the orders to the quotes of the market maker.
We have conducted experiments with two different settings regarding the fundamental
value:
1. a simple Roll model, with constant fundamental value; and
2. a general Roll model, with changing fundamental value.
In the first, simple Roll model, the fundamental value is fixed and does not change dur-
ing the experiments. In the second, more general variant, the fundamental value changes
randomly following a normal distribution with mean 100.00 and deviation 1.00. The market
maker senses the changes regarding the fundamental value and adapts the bid-ask quotes
accordingly. FV is, in both the simple Roll model and the general Roll model, initialized to
100.00, and the spread varies across experiments, taking a value of 0.50; 1.00 and 2.00.
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4.6.3.2 Evaluation and results
In the analytical model of Roll that we aim to replicate, the bid-ask spread has an impact on
the time series properties of the returns; a negative serial correlation arises. The explanation
in the simplest case is that, if the fundamental price does not change, the bid and ask quotes
will not change either, and as a consequence the measure of change between two consecutive
market prices is either 0, or the spread, or the negative spread (0, s, or −s). As the bid and
ask prices are fixed, there are never two consecutive increases or decreases in the price. It
can be established analytically that the value of the correlation is independent of the spread
and equals −0.50. It can further be shown that the general Roll model with changing fun-
damental value leads to similar properties. That is, even if the fundamental price changes,
the serial correlation of returns is non positive, under the assumption that changes in the
fundamental are serially uncorrelated and independent of the probability of the order side
generated (Campbell et al., 1997).
Functional tests A primary verification that we have conducted regarding the correctness
of the implementation and the adequacy of the framework was functional testing. During
testing we have inspected the generated orders and time series with respect to changes in
prices and the autocorrelation of returns at lag 1.
• First, we have inspected the consecutive changes in prices. It turned out that indeed the
return series based on the difference between the values of the transaction series con-
tain only values of 0, s, and −s. In this sense the implementation is thus analytically
correct.
• Then, based on the theoretical findings with respect to the Roll model, we analyzed
the autocorrelation of returns generated by the experiments we have conducted with
the implemented version of the Roll model. We have found that, indeed, in all the
experiments the autocorrelation at lag 1 is close to −0.5 in case of the simple Roll
model with constant fundamental value (see Table 4.2). More specifically, the value
of autocorrelation is independent of the value of the spread, which we set to 0.50,
1.00 and 2.00 respectively. Further, the autocorrelation is negative, and even quite
close to −0.5 in experiments conducted with changing fundamental values as well
(see Table 4.3).
From functional testing we can conclude, that the findings with respect to price changes
and autocorrelation are in accordance with the analytical predictions. This suggests that the
environment functions correctly if we place the implementation of the Roll model as a form
of bid-ask quoting strategy on top of it. We can thus state that we have built ”the model
right”.
Other time series properties So far, we have seen that the autocorrelation of return series
at lag 1 is negative in Roll models. This finding is due to the impact of the bid-ask spread
on the time series properties. There are other interesting properties of financial times series
published in literature both in relation to the Roll model, as well as other theoretical, empiri-
cal and experimental findings. From all these we analyze the distribution of return series and
we look whether volatility clusters are present.
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Table 4.2: Roll model with constant fundamental value. AC stands for ‘autocorrelation at
lag 1’.
Length Nr. AC AC AC Skewness Kurtosis Roll
s Experiments Transac- Price Return Squared Return Return Measure
(minutes) tions Return Series Series
5 2165 -0.03 -0.51 0.00 0.00 1.95 0.51
10 4458 -0.03 -0.53 0.03 0.00 1.94 0.52
0.5 15 6735 -0.01 -0.51 0.01 0.00 1.98 0.51
30 13887 0.00 -0.50 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.50
60 26669 -0.01 -0.50 0.00 0.00 1.99 0.50
5 2386 0.02 -0.50 0.03 0.00 2.04 0.99
10 4649 0.02 -0.50 0.02 0.00 2.03 1.00
1.0 15 7389 0.01 -0.49 0.00 0.00 2.03 0.99
30 13836 0.00 -0.49 -0.02 0.00 1.99 1.00
60 28602 0.00 -0.51 0.01 0.00 2.00 1.01
5 2179 -0.02 -0.53 0.05 0.00 1.96 2.08
10 4331 -0.01 -0.51 0.01 0.00 1.98 2.03
2.0 15 6762 0.01 -0.50 0.00 0.00 2.02 1.98
30 13689 0.01 -0.49 0.00 0.00 2.02 1.98
60 27373 0.01 -0.50 0.01 0.00 2.01 1.99
Table 4.3: Roll model with changing fundamental value and spread s = 1.
Length Nr. AC AC AC Skewness Kurtosis Roll
s Experiments Transac- Price Return Squared Return Return Measure
(minutes) tions Return Series Series
5 2320 0.02 -0.48 0.26 -0.04 2.86 2.22
10 5136 0.00 -0.49 0.23 0.01 2.90 2.22
1.0 15 6573 -0.01 -0.52 0.28 0.00 3.04 2.28
30 14193 0.01 -0.50 0.23 0.00 2.95 2.22
60 26410 0.01 -0.50 0.24 0.01 2.95 2.22
• Distribution
It is interesting to observe that the kurtosis of the returns is close to 3 in the experi-
ments in which the fundamental value is changing. The skewness is close to 0 in all
experiments (see Table 4.3). These values suggest that returns are almost normally
distributed, which is also demonstrated by Figure 4.19. One of the reasons behind this
phenomenon is probably the fact that the fundamental values, on which the bid and
ask quotes are based, are generated randomly from a normal distribution.
• Volatility clusters
It can be observed that the autocorrelation of the squared returns is close to 0.2 in
the experiments where the fundamental value changes. Similar results are found by
Alexander (2001, pg67) for empirical data. The explanation given for this phenom-
enon is that autocorrelation of squared returns could be the implication of volatility
clusters. By analyzing the return series generated by our model, it seems indeed that
returns of the same absolute size are generally not isolated, but occur in clusters of
small size.
Volatility clusters observed in the general model are possibly there by construction.
The fundamental value is generated from a normal distribution, fundamental values
are thus, in general close to the mean, and the price changes are relatively small.
Every now and then the fundamental value might be chosen further away from the
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Figure 4.19: Example: normal probability plot of returns in the general Roll model.
mean, causing a higher return in absolute measure. If this is the case, most probably
the next fundamental value will be again close to the mean, causing again a big relative
change in prices, and thus autocorrelation of returns.
The accuracy of the Roll measure Roll has also developed the so-called Roll measure to
estimate the spread when quoted data are not available (s = 2 ∗ 2√−Cov [∆Pt−1,∆Pt]).
Regarding the Roll measure we found that in the simple model, the estimated spread indeed
equals the quoted spread, that is 0.5, 1, and 2 respectively. However, in the general model,
this is not the case, the estimated spread being more than twice higher than the real spread,
which is 1. The reason behind this phenomenon is that the estimated spread is deduced
from the transactions. Transaction prices are quoted prices, quoted prices are determined
in function of fundamental value. Transactions thus, depend in this case on a changing
fundamental value. As the fundamental value changes every time, bid and ask quotes change
continuously, and, thus, there is always a difference between the execution price of two
consecutive transactions. The Roll estimate of the spread is thus, not an accurate measure
of the transactions costs in this setting. This result is in accordance with empirical findings
from the literature.
4.6.3.3 Discussion
In this subsection we have validated and verified the ABSTRACTE environment with the
Roll model on top of it. Concluding, we can say that the joint test of the environment and
the market maker’s Roll model-based strategy proves their accuracy. We have additionally
analyzed time series properties, and tested the accuracy of the Roll measure, and our findings
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turned out to be in accordance with empirical findings from the literature.
About the efficiency of this market we can say that it is efficient by construction. Fun-
damental values are known, and they are immediately incorporated into the market prices
as they change, because the market maker determines the price of bids and offers based on
them. Although the assumptions of the model are not realistic, it illustrates that random
walk and stylized facts do not exclude each other, i.e. volatility clusters might occur even
ina random environment.
4.6.4 The call market model
4.6.4.1 Model specific settings
The second market structure represented is a call-market. In this case, an investor agent
again represents the investors, and continuously generates random limit orders around the
last market price. Market prices are set by the market maker, who collects during each
call the orders sent by the investors and determines prices at the intersection of supply and
demand curves so as to maximize trading volume.
4.6.4.2 Evaluation and results
Functional test In order to test whether the environment with the single price call auction
on top of it functions correctly, we have conducted again functional tests. During these tests
we have looked at sample data from randomly selected call sessions, and checked whether
market prices are set at equilibrium, and trading volume is maximized. The analysis suggests
that the equilibrium algorithm of the market maker within the ABSTRACTE environment
works correctly as expected.
Time series properties In contrast to the Roll model in which some ”regular” properties
could have been observed, in call auctions with prices set at equilibrium from randomly
generated orders, price series exhibit the ”random walk” property (Table 4.4). In this model,
there is a strong serial autocorrelation of prices, that follows from the fact that investors
generate random orders around the last market price.
Further, the change in volume is negatively autocorrelated indicating that increases (de-
creases) in transaction volume are most often followed by decreases (increases) in it. This
phenomenon, as well as the values of the rest of the statistical data suggests that prices de-
termined in this way follow a random walk (Figure 4.20). This is to be expected, as orders
are randomly generated, too.
Table 4.4: Experimental results in the call market model.
Length Orders Average AC AC AC Skewness Kurtosis AC AC
call Executed/ Volume/ Price Return Squared Return Return Volume Change in
(seconds) Call Transaction Return Series Series Volume
1 22 6851 0.998 0.00 0.01 0.10 3.38 -0.02 -0.52
5 120 38670 0.997 0.03 -0.01 -0.15 3.12 0.03 -0.47
10 240 75451 0.998 0.03 0.06 0.02 2.89 -0.02 -0.51
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Figure 4.20: Example: Price dynamics over call sessions, a session lasting 1 second.
The results seem to be independent of the length of calls, except for the transaction vol-
ume of course, given that during longer transactions more orders are received and matched.
Given the computationally complex task of the market maker compared to the behavior of
investors, we have analyzed whether there is a delay between placing and processing orders,
and it turned out that this problem does not exist: orders are always processed immediately
by the market maker.
The market models presented above are aimed to illustrate the flexibility stemming from
the modularity of the ABSTRACTE trading environment, showing the possibility to repre-
sent multiple market structures with the help of it. Many other strategies can be represented
in ABSTRACTE.
Comparing the results obtained by experimenting within different market settings one
can conclude, that as expected, market organizations influence to a high degree market dy-
namics. The question is what these dynamics are, and how they differ once we introduce
more precise market settings that represent real markets more realistically and in more de-
tail.
We would like to emphasize that in this chapter we aimed to present the trading environ-
ment that we have designed and developed, and illustrate what it can offer as compared to
ASMs in the literature. As a consequence, for the purpose of this chapter we do not focus
here on more intricate experiments. However, our long term aim with the trading environ-
ment, as pointed out by the way it is designed, is to conduct experiments in more realistic,
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and thus, more intricate, market settings.
In the next chapter we analyze market dynamics within a more complex market model,
namely an extended version of the Glosten and Milgrom information model. To round off
this chapter we discuss the added value of the ABSTRACTE environment.
4.7 The added value of the ABSTRACTE environment
In this chapter we have described the ABSTRACTE trading environment, the design of
which is based on the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 2 and on the analysis of
ASMs in Chapter 3. The question we aim to answer in this section is, what the added value
is of the environment presented here. Some of the properties of the ABSTRACTE are also
characteristics of other ASMs. In ABSTRACTE we aim to keep the good aspects of existing
ASMs (like the agent-based approach) and we try to repair the shortcomings that we sense.
The main properties that we discuss can be deduced from the description of the environment
given previously in this chapter and from the case studies presented above. Moreover, they
are further emphasized by the case study presented in the next chapter.
• Agent-based approach
The main approach applied to design and implement the ABSTRACTE environment
is the agent-based computational (ACE) approach. We have chosen for the ACE ap-
proach because in this way emergent properties of market dynamics from individual
interactions can be studied. Agent-based systems are accurate tools to study com-
plex dynamic systems, like stock markets. Within agent-based computational eco-
nomics (ACE), artificial stock markets (ASM) are studied extensively to assess how
global regularities arise from individual interactions of market participants (Tesfat-
sion, 2001). Usually, individuals are represented by (software) agents interacting in an
artificial environment. By using agents for studying market dynamics, heterogeneous,
boundedly rational, and adaptive behavior of market participants can be represented
and its impact on market dynamics can be assessed.
• Special attention paid to various trader-roles
Unlike most ASMs which mainly focus only on investors, or even just provide an
order generation mechanism, we differentiate market participants’ behavior based on
their role in the market. Within ABSTRACTE specific behavior of various market
participants is provided and skeletons are designed for three types of participants:
investors, brokers, and market makers. Market makers can further exhibit either price
quoting (dealer) or auctioneer behavior, depending on the market where they interact.
• Emphasis on continuous trading sessions
Within ABSTRACTE we primarily aim to focus on studying market dynamics in con-
tinuous trading sessions. The most common ASMs in the early literature represented
single-price call auctions. In single-price call auctions orders are aggregated at dis-
crete points in time and market price is set at equilibrium (see Chapter 3). In these,
at each trading round (i.e. call) the investors are asked to submit their orders, and the
market price is determined by aggregating supply and demand (e.g. (Marsili, 2001;
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Challet et al., 2005; Brock and Hommes, 1997; LeBaron, 2002; Raberto et al., 2001)).
Although ASMs that study single-price call auctions are encountered regularly in liter-
ature, in real financial markets continuous trading sessions and quote-driven execution
mechanisms are more common (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000; Harris, 2003). This
has prompted some groups to look beyond the call market structure, and study mar-
kets with continuous trading sessions. Examples of such models have been described
in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000; Chan and Shelton, 2001; Smith et al., 2002; Shatner et al.,
2000). We also follow this trend. Remark however, that, as shown in the previous
section, ABSTRACTE supports experiments with call auctions as well.
• Continuous-time simulation
The majority of the market models that implement continuous trading sessions apply
discrete-time simulation to model trading and price formation. In (Loistl and Vetter,
2000) and (Raberto et al., 2001) continuous sessions are modeled by centrally select-
ing the trader whose decision is carried out during the next trading session. Another
approach is proposed in (Shatner et al., 2000), where traders ”sleep” after actions, and
”wake up” at predefined times, or as a result of certain events.
At a high level of abstraction, the discrete-time models of financial markets are turn-
based games, in which the market participants take turns to execute their actions. The
specific characteristics of the simulation models determine how the players take turns
and how they arrive at their decisions. Players remain passive in the market until it
is their turn (i.e. they are selected) to take decisions and perform actions. This means
that while a trader is selected, the environment is frozen. In reality, however, the
environment can change while participants make decisions.
In ABSTRACTE continuous trading sessions are implemented using continuous-time
simulation. Continuity is modeled by concurrent execution of agent actions (in Java
threads) which interact by asynchronous message passing. This implies that the trad-
ing environment is continuous and dynamic, and as a consequence, a number of traders
can simultaneously be active, carrying out various tasks.
• Autonomous, active traders
In the majority of the ASMs traders whose decision will be taken into account are
centrally selected, often at random. In contrast to most of the ASMs in the literature,
in the ABSTRACTE framework traders are not centrally selected, but are individual,
autonomous elements. They decide when to place an order. Autonomy results from
the agent-based implementation that we have chosen.
• Concurrent, asynchronous behavior of agents
Autonomous representation and continuous time simulation of traders implies asyn-
chronous execution of tasks, i.e. traders may be carrying out different tasks at the same
moment. Figure 4.21 gives insight into the workings of the ABSTRACTE in a certain
time interval. It illustrates the behavior of different traders who are acting asynchro-
nously just as on the real markets. Various brokers conduct different (sometimes even
parallel) tasks at the same simulation moment. At time T1 for example Broker A
has no jobs, he is just waiting for new messages or analyzing the market, Broker B
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is busy with deciding which order to execute, while Broker C tries to negotiate. In
the meantime Broker D receives a new order from an investor, besides selecting an
order for execution.
As the figure illustrates tasks might start at varying points in time for the various
agents and might be under execution for shorter or longer periods. The duration of
negotiations for example depends on whether there are counterparties at that time on
the negotiation floor or not, and on the grace period of a specific agent waiting for
answers.
• Modularity
One of the most important features of ABSTRACTE that makes it so specific, is its
modularity. The environment is modular with respect to
– the execution system applied; and
– the traders’ strategies.
Modularity means that various market structures and arbitrary many types of strategies
can be implemented on top of the proposed environment. ABSTRACTE allows for
this in an easy and flexible way. This kind of representation enables the user to model
many market structures and gives the freedom to implement any kind of available or
presumed trading strategy. In the future modularity can be extended to other elements,
like news formation, for instance.
We do not claim that the ABSTRACTE environment is fully generic. Indeed, we are
trying to incorporate more and more structures and strategies. Although, incorporating
a new aspect, and even a new strategy might require modification and adaptation of the
environment, those adaptations will improve the model, and make it more valuable.
• ABSTRACTE is a distributed system
Although we didn’t make use of this aspect in this thesis, another specific feature of
ABSTRACTE is the fact that it is a distributed system. This means that markets and
investors can be started and run as stand alone applications. This property enables the
user to run experiments with investors who trade on multiple markets.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced and described the ABSTRACTE flexible agent-based
trading environment that is able to capture varying features of stock markets in order to
study market dynamics, incorporating features that are rarely represented in other ASMs.
Additionally, we have shown through simple examples how various market organizations
and strategies can be configured and studied within the environment. In order to be able to
provide an acceptably accurate explanation and analysis of the workings of a financial mar-
ket, several features should be represented. This is why we have chosen for an agent-based
micro-simulation approach based on market microstructure literature. In order to allow for
the representation of diffuse assumptions regarding the workings of financial markets we did
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Figure 4.21: A view into asynchronous trading behavior
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not choose for a certain market mechanism, but for a framework on top of which experiments
with arbitrary many types of trading strategies in various trading environments can be con-
ducted and compared. During the design of the framework, we have striven to address the
perceived shortcomings of ASMs in the literature, discussed in Chapter 3. Consequently, the
framework allows for continuous trading, asynchronous and autonomous decision-making
and considers the different roles traders have to fulfill in the market. In addition to capturing
rarely considered features of stock markets, the introduced ABSTRACTE trading environ-
ment allows for testing of previous findings in the literature; for studying how different
market structures with the joint influence of various types of agents affect market charac-
teristics; and for analyzing whether a certain behavior can be more successful than others
in certain environments. Further, it allows for studying which features of the market prices
are due to learning, adaptation and which are coming from the structure of the market itself.
All these studies serve to test the quality of markets having different structures and might
indicate changes that need to be made in order to improve market quality.
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The Continuous-Time Extended
Glosten and Milgrom Model
In this chapter we aim to evaluate the ABSTRACTE environment with a new model on top
of it. For this reason we replicate and extend the experiments of an ASM in which contin-
uous trading sessions are represented. In contrast to the ASM studied the implementation
of which is based on a turn-based mechanism, we focus on continuous-time simulation.
The extension amounts to addressing the question to what degree the models developed in
turn-based simulations are extensible to continuous, asynchronous simulations. Since most
financial markets are continuous with asynchronously interacting traders, while its agent-
based models are often turn-based, this is an important question to address in order to assess
the limitations of the current modeling practice.
The research presented in this chapter is based on the learning market maker from Das
(2005). This model extends the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) information-based model,
which was proposed to show the influence of informational asymmetry on the bid-ask spread
in financial markets. We consider an information-based model, since they provide insights
into the adjustment process of prices that we are interested in (O’Hara, 2002).
In this chapter we combine the learning market maker, which Das describes in a turn-
based model, with investors that interact asynchronously and autonomously. We imple-
ment the model on top of the ABSTRACTE environment described in Chapter 4 that applies
continuous-time simulation instead of discrete-time simulation. We study the characteristics
of the market prices that arise in continuous, asynchronous simulation, and compare it to
the characteristics of the prices in the turn-based implementation. Further, we elaborate on
the additional considerations that are needed in order to extend the turn-based model into
a continuous, asynchronous model. Part of this chapter has been published in (Boer et al.,
2007).
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5.1 The extended Glosten and Milgrom model
The organization of the artificial market that we use in order to study market dynamics
is based on an extended version of the information-based Glosten and Milgrom model pro-
posed in Das (2005) (hereafter EGM). The Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model was proposed
to show the influence of informational asymmetry on the bid-ask spread. In the Glosten and
Milgrom model, the market maker tries to discover the fundamental value of a stock by
means of Bayesian learning. He determines the bid and ask quotes based on his expectation
of the real value, the order flow, taking into account his prior knowledge regarding the ratio
of informed and uninformed traders. In Das (2003) and Das (2005) a nonparametric density
estimation technique is proposed for maintaining a probability distribution over a range of
expected true values. The market-maker uses these probability estimates to set bid and ask
prices. Discrete time simulation is applied in this extended model, as well as a probabilistic
representation of the order flow. In this section, we describe the characteristics of the EGM
market. We first discuss the organizational aspects, and then we elaborate on the behav-
ioral aspects of this market model based on the framework for a taxonomy of stock markets
proposed in Chapter 2, and on the framework for a taxonomy of artificial stock markets in
Chapter 3.
5.1.1 Organizational aspects
In both the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model and the extended EGM version
described by Das (2003, 2005) trading sessions are continuous and the execution system
is quote-driven. There is one stock traded. One market maker and multiple investors are
represented.
The stock does not pay dividends. It is assumed that the stock has an underlying funda-
mental value, which is generated exogenously to the market.
The underlying fundamental value of the stock at time t is V t (rounded to cents). V t
follows a jump process, being constant most of the time, and changing occasionally.
Trading is organized in trading rounds (turns) as a sequence of bilateral trading oppor-
tunities. Each trading opportunity involves a single potential investor who is selected at
random from an unchanging pool of potential traders. The selected trader can buy at the of-
fer, sell at the bid, or choose not to trade (Lyons, 2001). The market maker is responsible for
the liquidity of the stock and the execution of orders at the current bid or ask price. He sets
bid and ask prices as a function of the order flow and the market information he possesses.
All orders are assumed to be market orders of one unit.
The market maker does not know the fundamental value, but, in order to ensure an effi-
cient market, he tries to capture it by maintaining a probability density estimate (PDE) over
a range of expected true values. The probability estimates are initialized according to the
normal distribution. The initial bid and ask prices are calculated from this initial PDE and
a priori expectations of the market maker. After initialization trading rounds start. A round
consists of the following steps:
1. The probability is evaluated for a jump in the fundamental value, and the jump is
carried out if it is the case.
2. An investor(type) is selected randomly from the pool to place an order.
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3. A Buy, Sell, or No order is sent by the selected trader to the market maker.
4. The market maker processes the order and carries out the transaction if it is the case.
5. The market maker updates his probability density estimate of possible fundamental
values.
6. The market maker updates the bid and ask prices (PB and PA).
We elaborate now on these steps. First we discuss how the fundamental value is modified.
We focus on the investors’ behavior in relation to the second and third steps. The market
maker’s behavior is discussed in relation to the rest of the actions.
5.1.2 The fundamental value
In the EGM model a jump in the fundamental value occurs with some probability (0.001 in
the experiments) at every trading period, that is at every discrete point in time. The jump
process is modeled as a random process following V t+1 = V t + ω˜(0, σ), where ω˜(0, σ)
represents a sample from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2.
5.1.3 The investors’ behavior
Investors are differentiated based on the information they receive regarding the fundamental
value. There are two types of investors:
• informed traders and
• uninformed traders.
The informed traders are further classified as
• perfectly informed or
• noisily informed.
Perfectly informed traders observe the correct fundamental value (V t), while noisily in-
formed investors observe a distorted fundamental value W t = V t + ψ˜(0, σW ). Here,
ψ˜(0, σW ) represents a sample from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2W .
Finally, uninformed traders do not know what the underlying fundamental value is, and they
trade randomly.
Informed traders decide whether to trade or not, based on their observation of the fun-
damental value. An informed trader will buy if the fundamental value that he observes is
higher than the market maker’s ask price, i.e. if V t > P tA in the case of perfectly informed
traders, and W t > P tA in the case of noisily informed traders. He will sell if the fundamental
value that he observes is below the bid price, i.e. if V t < P tB or W
t < P tB . He will place
no order if the observed fundamental value is within the bid-ask spread, i.e. P tB ≤ V t ≤ P tA
or P tB ≤ W t ≤ P tA). Uninformed traders place buy and sell orders with equal probability
(η ≤ 0.5). They can also decide not to place orders with probability 1− 2η.
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5.1.4 The behavior of the market-maker
After an investor has been selected, and has placed an order, it is the market maker’s task to
carry out the rest of the actions (steps 4 to 6) within a trading round. On his turn, the market
maker needs to carry out the following tasks:
1. receive and execute orders;
2. update the probability density estimate (PDE) based on the received orders;
3. adjust the bid and ask quotes according to the changes in the PDE.
5.1.4.1 The information set of the market maker
The market maker executes sell orders at the current bid price (PB) and buy orders at the
current ask price (PA). The private information regarding the fundamental value is revealed
implicitly by the type of the orders submitted by the (informed) traders. Information re-
garding the fundamental value of the stock diffuses from the informed traders to the market
maker in this way. A series of sell orders might indicate that the fundamental value is lower
than the current bid price, and a series of buy orders might indicate that the fundamental
value is higher than the current ask price. However, the market maker will have to take into
account the noise incorporated by the orders of the noisily informed traders, and the noise
implied by the orders submitted by the uninformed traders.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the process of information diffusion in the model. The market
maker aims to set bid and ask prices to capture the underlying fundamental value of the
stock. The fundamental value is known only by the (perfectly) informed investors, and is
not known by the market maker. The main task of the market maker is to learn this value.
As mentioned above, he tries to do this by maintaining a set of possible true values with
probability estimates attached to each of them (see Section 5.1.4.2).
The range of possible values, the corresponding probabilities, and the learning process of
the market maker is based on a set of current and a priori known information. Current infor-
mation refers to the actual order placed, and a notification when a change in the fundamental
value occurs. The a priori information set of the market-maker contains:
• the fraction of informed traders (α) and uninformed traders (1− α) in the market;
• the probability for an uninformed trader to trade (η);
• the initial fundamental value V0;
• the distribution function of the jump process (ω˜(0, σ));
• the distribution function of the noise process (ψ˜(0, σW )).
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Figure 5.1: Information diffusion in the EGM model.
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5.1.4.2 The probability density estimate
The range of possible values maintained by the market maker to estimate the fundamental
value, as proposed by Das (2005) varies from
Vmin = V0 − 4σ
to
Vmax = V0 + 4σ − 1.
The values are given in cents, in intervals of one cent. The market maker keeps a probability
density estimate (PDE) over the whole range of possible values determined in this way.
Whenever a jump in the fundamental value occurs, the range of possible values is re-
centered. That is, after each jump the market maker sets V0 to the current expected value,
and the range of possible values is reset at 4σ distance from the new V0.
Initialization. At the beginning of the simulation, and after a jump in the fundamental
value, the probabilities are initialized to follow a normal distribution within the given range
of possible values. Accordingly:
Pr(V = Vi) =
∫ Vi+1
Vi
N (0, 4σ)dx; where i ∈ {V0 − 4σ, ..., V0 + 4σ − 1} (5.1)
Here, N is the normal density function in x with mean zero and standard deviation 4σ. The
array is kept in a normalized state at all times, so the entire probability mass for V lies within
it. The probabilities are updated whenever a new order arrives.
Updating the PDE. When an order arrives, the market maker updates the probabilities for
Vi by scaling the distribution, based on the type of the order. The new probabilities at time
t+1, Pr(V = V t+1i ) will be set to the current probabilities given that the corresponding
order arrived Pr(V = V ti |Order). The values are updated using Bayes’ Rule according to
the following generalized equation:
Pr(V = Vi|Order) = Pr(Order|V = Vi) ∗ Pr(V = Vi)Pr(Order) , (5.2)
where the Order can be:
• Buy,
• Sell, or
• No order.
The prior value probabilities Pr(V = Vi) refer to the current probability estimates.
Pr(Order) represents the prior probability of a certain type of order, while Pr(Order|V =
Vi) is the conditional probability of a certain type of order. The prior probability of an order
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is the cumulated conditional probability of that action weighted by the probability estimate
of the given values.
Pr(Order) =
Vmax∑
Vi=Vmin
(Pr(Order|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)), (5.3)
The conditional probability of placing a certain order depends on the fraction and type of the
investors involved. In general:
Pr(Order|V = Vi) =(1− α) Pr(Order from uninformed investors|V = Vi)+
+ αPr(Order from informed investors|V = Vi)
(5.4)
The model assumes that in case of uninformed traders the probabilities are known and these
are independent of the current market situation. Accordingly,
Pr(Buy from uninformed investors|V = Vi)
}
= ηPr(Sell from uninformed investors|V = Vi) (5.5)
Consequently,
Pr(No Order from uninformed investors|V = Vi) = 1− 2η
Let us now elaborate on how the conditional probabilities of the various order types can be
computed for the informed investors.
The conditional probability of orders with perfectly informed traders In a market with
perfectly informed traders, the probability for a sell order or a buy order depends on the
fraction of various traders and the probability they will trade. Accordingly, the market maker
bases his estimates on the expectation that (rational) informed traders will always buy if the
perceived fundamental value is above the ask price, they will always sell if the perceived
value is below the bid price, and they will not trade otherwise. Then,
Pr(Sell|V = Vi) =
{
(1− α)η + α, if Vi < PB
(1− α)η, if Vi ≥ PB ;
(5.6)
Pr(Buy|V = Vi) =
{
(1− α)η, ifVi ≤ PA
(1− α)η + α, if Vi > PA
(5.7)
In addition to receiving buy or sell orders, it is also possible that the market maker does
not get any orders at a certain turn. The prior probability for no order PNo order is equal
to 1 − (PSell + PBuy). The fact that there are no (informed) traders who want to trade,
given the current bid and ask prices and the current fundamental value, suggests that the bid
and ask prices are currently set around the fundamental value. By adjusting the estimated
probabilities, the market maker can make the bid-ask spread smaller, in order to ensure
market liquidity and to encourage trading.
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If the market contains perfectly informed traders, the following updates are being made
in order to determine the new probability estimates of not receiving any order:
Pr(No order|V = Vi) =

(1− α)(1− 2η), if Vi < PB
(1− α)(1− 2η) + α, if PB ≤ Vi ≤ PA)
(1− α)(1− 2η), if Vi > PA
(5.8)
These equations capture the property that the probability that uninformed traders place
no orders does not depend on the true value of the stock. Informed traders on the other hand,
do not place orders if the true value is within the bid-ask range.
The conditional probability of orders with noisily informed traders. If the market
maker has to deal with noisily informed traders instead of perfectly informed ones, the noise
is incorporated into the updates. Accordingly, the probabilities for sell, buy, and no orders
are determined by the following equations:
Pr(Sell|V = Vi) = (1− α)η + αPr(Vi + ψ˜(0, σW ) < PB) (5.9)
Pr(Buy|V = Vi) = (1− α)η + αPr(Vi + ψ˜(0, σW ) > PA) (5.10)
Pr(No order|V = Vi) = (1− α)(1− 2η)+
+ αPr(PB ≤ Vi + ψ˜(0, σW ) ≤ PA)
(5.11)
The second term in (5.9) reflects the probability that a noisily informed trader sells if
the observed fundamental value, including the noise is below the current bid price PB . This
means that the trader will submit a sell order also if the noise in the noisily informed trader’s
observation is smaller than the difference between the bid price and the fundamental value.
Although a perfectly informed trader would not sell in this case, the additional noise can
cause a noisily informed trader to make different decisions. Similarly, a noisily informed
trader will place a buy order if the observed fundamental value, including the noise is greater
than the current ask price PA. Finally, a noisily informed trader, will not place orders, if the
perceived fundamental value, including the noise falls in the interval between the bid and
ask values.
The various conditional probabilities for each possible order and investor type are sum-
marized in Table 5.1. According to (5.2), after all current probabilities have been updated
by being multiplied with the corresponding conditional probabilities, the new probability
estimates are scaled with the factor in (5.3).
Illustration of the conditional probabilities and PDE updates Figure 5.2 illustrates pos-
sible updates of the probability density estimate (upper part) after the receival of an order,
and the conditional probabilities (lower part) used to update the estimates. In the sample
50% of the traders are perfectly (a) and, respectively, noisily (b) informed (α = 0.5) and the
probability for uninformed traders to place buy orders and respectively sell orders is set to
0.3 (η = 0.3). Further, the standard deviation of the noise that alters the fundamental value
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Table 5.1: Summary of the probabilities that various investors place a certain type of order
as a function of the current market situation.
Order Condition Uninformed Perfectly Noisily
type values investors informed informed
Sell
Vi < PB (1− α)η α αPr(Vi + ψ˜(0, σW ) < PB)PB ≤ Vi 0
Buy
Vi ≤ PA (1− α)η 0 αPr(Vi + ψ˜(0, σW ) > PA)PA < Vi α
No order
Vi < PB
(1− α)(1− 2η)
0
αPr(PB ≤ Vi + ψ˜(0, σW ) ≤ PA)PB ≤ Vi ≤ PA α
PA < Vi 0
is 5 cents (σW = 0.05). The cross signs on the x-axis represent the bid and ask values before
the receival of an order. Diamonds represent new bid and ask values, that are set based on the
new probability updates. The learning process to update the bid and ask values is described
in Section 5.1.4.3.
Figure 5.2 (a) depicts the PDE updates and the corresponding conditional probabilities,
in case of receiving a buy order from a pool with perfectly informed investors. The figure
reflects that a buy order is perceived by the market maker as an indication that the stock is
undervalued, and, as a consequence the new probabilities for the values above the current
ask will be increased, and the new probabilities for the possible values below the current ask
will be decreased. Given that the conditional probabilities are the same for the values on the
same side of the ask, probability values are multiplied with the same factor on the same side
of the ask. The PDE’s are then discounted with the a priori probability of placing a buy order
(see (5.3)).
The updates with noisily informed traders result in a similar density function as for the
scenario with perfectly informed traders. The new density function is however, smoother,
given the uncertainty caused by the noise added to the fundamental value (Figure 5.2 (b)).
Please note that receiving a sell order would lead to density functions that are symmetric
to the ones resulted after receiving a buy order. The case of no orders leads to different
results. If the selected investor decides not to place any order (Figure 5.3) the market maker
believes that he managed to capture the bid and ask values. Consequently, he increases the
probabilities for the values in between the bid and ask, and lowers the probabilities for the
rest of the values.
Recall, that, after the arrival of an order the market maker adjusts his current probabilities
for the whole range of possible fundamental values (between Vmin and Vmax) in an attempt
to track the actual fundamental value. Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of the market maker’s
probability density estimate when receiving three consecutive buy orders in market runs
with different rates of perfectly informed (a, b, c) and noisily informed (d, e, f) traders.
Each plot represents one trade event and one update round including the normalization of the
probabilities. ”NDF” refers to the normal density function, which is valid at the initialization
step or at the moment a jump in the fundamental value occurred, because in that case the
market maker’s probability estimate has just been initialized or re-centered.
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Figure 5.2: Sample probability density update after receiving a buy order when 50% of the
traders are perfectly (a), or noisily (b) informed.
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Figure 5.3: Sample probability density update after perceiving no order when 50% of the
traders are perfectly (a), or noisily (b) informed.
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Figure 5.4: The path of evolution of the probability density estimate of the market maker,
when receiving three consecutive buy orders, with different fractions of perfectly informed
(a,c,e), and noisily informed (b,d,f) traders
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Table 5.2: Numerical sample of the conditional probabilities in case of perfectly informed
traders.
Parameters Buy Sell No Order
α η Vi ≤ PA PA < Vi Vi < PB PB ≤ Vi Vi < PB ,PA < Vi PB ≤ Vi ≤ PA
(1− α)η (1− α)η (1− α)η (1− α)η (1− α)(1− 2η) (1− α)(1− 2η)
+α +α +α
1 0.3 0 1 1 0 0 1
0.75 0.3 0.075 0.825 0.825 0.075 0.1 0.85
0.5 0.3 0.15 0.65 0.65 0.15 0.2 0.7
0.25 0.3 0.225 0.475 0.475 0.225 0.3 0.55
As Figure 5.4 illustrates, as a result of receiving a series of buy orders, most of the mass
has been shifted to the right a couple of times, resulting in upwards shifts of the probabilities
over a smaller range. The peaks in upward shifts are at the current ask value. This is a
natural consequence of the fact that, a buy order indicates that the stock is undervalued.
Thus, the probability that the current value is higher than the current ask value is increased.
Accordingly, all values (in the range of possible values) above the current ask are multiplied
with a factor greater than one, and the ones below the ask are multiplied with a factor less
than one.
Note again, that, with noisily informed traders (Figure 5.4(b)(d) and (f)), the updating
algorithm results in a much smoother probability distribution than with perfectly informed
traders. This happens because the noise is taken into account when updating the probability
values (see the last column of Table 5.1).
It can be also observed, that the higher the rate of informed traders the higher the peaks,
because the probability that the orders are placed by informed traders is higher (see Ta-
ble 5.2). Further, the higher the rate of informed traders the more to the right are the shifts
in the density estimates. This results from the fact that with a higher percentage of informed
traders the Bayesian learning method applied results in more extreme bid and ask values, i.e.
values that are further away from the mean (see the details of calculating the bid and ask in
Section 5.1.4.3).
A series of sell orders leads to symmetric results. They shift the mass of probabilities
to the left with peaks around the bid value. Further, receiving no orders results in higher
probabilities in between the bid and ask values. Mixed signals of buy, sell and no orders
cause thus, shifts, and peaks in the density estimate (see for example Figure 5.5), depending
on the sequence of the orders received. After updating the probability density estimates the
market maker is ready to incorporate the new information into the new bid and ask values.
5.1.4.3 Adjusting the bid and ask quotes
The market maker tries to set the bid and ask prices such that these reflect the fundamental
value of the stock. As he does not know this value, the new bid and ask prices will be based
on the expected value given the adjusted probability density estimate after arrival of an order.
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Figure 5.5: Sample probability density update after receiving a series of buy, sell and no
order, when 50% of the traders are perfectly informed.
The bid price is set to the expectation of the true value given the probability that a sell
order will arrive. Similarly the ask price is set to the expectation of the true value given the
probability that a buy order arrives. In other words,
PB = E[V |Sell], (5.12)
PA = E[V |Buy]. (5.13)
By definition, in order to estimate the expectation of the underlying value, it is necessary
to compute the conditional probability that the true price equals a certain value (V = x, x ≥
0) given that a particular type of order is received. For market sell orders the expectation
then becomes:
E[V |Sell] =
∫ ∞
0
V Pr(V = x|Sell)dx (5.14)
For market buy orders the expectation can be written as:
E[V |Buy] =
∫ ∞
0
V Pr(V = x|Buy)dx (5.15)
Given the [Vmin, Vmax] range of possible values, (5.14) and (5.15) can be refined to:
PB =
Vmax∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi(Pr(V = Vi|Sell)) (5.16)
PA =
Vmax∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi(Pr(V = Vi|Buy)) (5.17)
When trying to solve these equations, they turn out to be more complicated than observed
at first sight. The definition is circular, since the bid price depends on the bid price, and the
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ask price on the ask price. This is because, as elaborated in (5.6) - (5.11) the conditional
probabilities of sell orders are bid price dependent, and the conditional probabilities of buy
orders are ask price dependent (see also Table 5.1). In case of perfectly informed traders,
for instance, different expressions have to be substituted for values below and above bid in
case of sell orders, and for values below and above ask in case of buy orders. Consequently,
(5.16) and (5.17) should be refined as:
PB =
1
PSell
(
PB−1∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi Pr(Sell|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)
+
Vmax∑
Vi=PB
Vi Pr(Sell|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)), (5.18)
PA =
1
PBuy
(
PA∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi Pr(Buy|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)
+
Vmax∑
Vi=PA
Vi Pr(Buy|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)), (5.19)
where PSell is the a priori probability of a sell order, and PBuy is the a priori probability of a
buy order. These values are determined by the equations (5.6) and (5.7). Now, (5.6) - (5.11)
can be easily substituted into the right hand side to get the final expressions.
So, we get fixed point equations: bid is calculated as a function of bid (PB), and ask is
calculated as a function of ask (PA). Furthermore, the bid price is primarily driven by sell
orders, while the ask price is primarily driven by buy orders; and at a first sight, none of the
quotes depends directly on the probability that no orders arrive. In fact, both sell and buy
orders, as well as no order placements, will influence both the bid and ask values, as the
effect of these situations is incorporated in the update of PDE (see (5.2)).
In order to solve the fixed point equations we follow the approach taken in (Das, 2005)
taking into account that PB ≤ E[V ] ≤ PA. The bid price is computed by repeatedly
computing the right hand side of (5.18), thus cycling from E[V] downwards until the absolute
difference between the left and right hand sides of the equation stops decreasing. Similarly,
the bid price is computed by cycling from E[V] upwards until the difference between the left
and right hand sides of the equation stops decreasing. The fixed point real-valued solution
is then chosen as the one closest to the integral value at which the distance between the two
sides of the equation is minimized.
So far, we have described the EGM model based on (Das, 2003, 2005). Next, we dis-
cuss how this model can be replicated on top of the ABSTRACTE environment. There are
two important differences between the implementation properties of the EGM model as de-
scribed by Das, and the properties of ABSTRACTE. First of all, the former applies discrete
time simulation, while the latter is based on continuous time simulation. Further, in the
original EGM model individual investors are not focused on, to be more precise, they are
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centrally selected to decide when to trade. In contrast, as emphasized in Chapter 4, within
ABSTRACTE it is possible to represent, individual, autonomously acting investors.
In the remainder of this chapter we analyze whether and how experiments within the
EGM model can be replicated on top of ABSTRACTE in a continuous time setting. We con-
sider two main cases, which differ primarily with respect to the autonomy of the investors.
First, we try to replicate EGM and focus on centrally selected traders. Then we elaborate on
autonomously interacting traders.
5.2 The case of centrally selected investors
In order to validate and verify the EGM market as implemented within ABSTRACTE we
have first carried out experiments with orders arriving as assumed in (Das, 2003, 2005). That
is, orders arrive one by one, and the type of the trader who places the order is stochastically
determined based on the given fraction of informed and uninformed traders (α). This feature
is implemented by modeling one single representative trader. Every time this trader considers
placing an order he first of all decides whether he will act as an informed or an uninformed
trader.
The time line of events in the replicated EGM market model (further referred to as
CEGM) that corresponds to this description, is as follows:
1. The market maker initializes the bid and ask prices (PB and PA). These are made
public to all participants.
2. The representative trader determines stochastically whether the next order will repre-
sent a decision of an informed trader or the decision of an uninformed trader.
3. Depending on the selected type of trader a Buy, Sell, or No order is generated and
sent to the market maker.
4. The market maker processes the order, carries out the transaction if needed, and up-
dates the PDE, PB and PA.
5. If there is a transaction the market maker confirms the transaction to the trader in-
volved.
6. The market maker publishes the new PB and PA.
7. Steps 2 to 6 are repeated.
Please note, that this time line of events does not involve the jump process for the funda-
mental value. In contrast to the original EGM model, the news source within ABSTRACTE
is independent of the market. In the original EGM at every trading round, first the probability
of a jump in the fundamental value is evaluated and investors are selected to trade afterwards.
In our implementation the jump can occur at any time, independently of the actual step that
is carried out by the market participant in action. When a change in the fundamental value
occurs, the new value is made public, and thus, informed investors can take into account the
new value instead of the old one in their decisions. The effects of having an independent
news source will be discussed later in this chapter.
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5.2.1 Experimental settings
The experimental settings correspond to the ones from Das (2005), unless we specify other-
wise. The numerical values given in this section are used in most of the experiments. The
choice for the specific values is motivated in Section 5.4. There, we also discuss outcomes
with other (more extreme) settings, and we elaborate on the sensitivity of the results on the
values chosen.
Fundamental value related settings.
• The initial value (V0) is 7500 cents.
• The standard deviation (σ) of the jump process is 50 cents.
• In the discrete time simulation of the EGM model changes occur with some probability
at every discrete time step (trading round). Because the probability of a jump is very
low (1 in 1000) the underlying fundamental value of the risky asset is constant for
most of the time and changes occur occasionally at various moments. In order to
model the jump process in the continuous setting, we draw the time of the next jump
randomly from a uniform distribution in a given interval. Given the stochastic feature
of the two types of jump processes, both frequent and rare jumps can occur in both
of the simulations. Accordingly, the slight difference in the frequency of jumps does
not affect the outcomes. What is more important is the property that the size and
direction of the jumps is based on the same probability function. In our experiments
the fundamental value jumps at periods drown randomly from a uniform distribution
every 30 to 60 seconds in real time.
• The noise process has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 5 cents.
Investor related settings.
• The fraction of perfectly informed traders (α) varies across the experiments, taking the
values of 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25. (In (Das, 2005) mainly experiments with 0.5 are focused
on).
• The probability (η) that uninformed traders place a buy order (and, respectively, sell
order) is set to 0.3. Consequently, the probability that uninformed traders do not trade
is 0.4.
• All investors place market orders for one quantity of the risky stock. The investors do
not withdraw their order once it is submitted.
Market maker related settings.
• The market maker knows the fraction of uninformed traders and the probability with
which they trade.
• The market maker also knows whether informed traders are perfectly informed or
noisily informed, and the noise distribution.
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In the original EGM, experiments are reported taking 50000 trading rounds. Given the
continuous time feature of the environment that we use, in our case we need to let the simu-
lations run for a certain time. We have chosen to run the experiments for 10 minutes in real
time. The number of trading rounds, updates in the bid and ask quotes, and the number of
transactions conducted within this time depends on the performance of the computer and on
the settings of specific models. In the experiments that we present here this time period leads
to an average of 40000 adjustments made in the quotes. What in fact is more important with
respect to the stability of the results is the fact that the price discovery process of the market
maker is similar between two jumps of the fundamental value.
5.2.2 Experimental results
Figure 5.6 shows how the market maker sets his bid-ask spread trying to follow a given
profile of fundamental value. The fraction of informed traders is set to 0.75 in (a) and (d),
0.5 in (b) and (e), and 0.25 in (c) and (f). The figures on the left hand side show the result
of a typical experiment for perfectly informed traders, while the experiments on the right
hand side are conducted with the presence of noisily informed traders. At first sight there
is no remarkable difference between the various outcomes. It seems that the market maker
is able to learn the underlying fundamental value of the asset fairly quickly from the trades
of the informed traders. Sometimes however, the market makers seems to slightly over- or
underestimate the fundamental value estimated by receiving orders from noisily informed
traders.
In order to be able to compare the outcomes we need to take a closer look to the re-
sults. Figure 5.7 illustrates segments from the experiments with 3 consecutive jumps, and
Figure 5.8 is a snapshot taken immediately before and after a jump.
From these figures we can conclude that, when the fraction of perfectly informed traders
is high (0.75) the market maker is able to learn the underlying fundamental value quickly.
This is to be expected, since the market maker learns primarily from the trades of the in-
formed traders. In scenarios with a higher level of noise (higher rate of uninformed traders,
or informed investors receive noisy value) the market maker needs in general more time to
learn the fundamental value. Note the increased uncertainty after news arrives in the market,
i.e after a jump in the fundamental value. The bid-ask spread is initially large, but the spread
is reduced gradually as time passes. The learning progresses fairly regularly, and the prices
evolve without much fluctuation. This indicates stable learning on the part of the market
maker.
The market maker becomes thus, more insecure after the arrival of news in a market
with a higher level of noise. He still manages, however, to learn the fundamental value
most of the time. Sometimes however, the market maker can make small mistakes. In
case of experiments with 50% and 25% noisily informed traders, for instance, the market
maker slightly overestimates or underestimates the fundamental value. By taking a closer
look at the detailed numbers behind the figure we discovered that the explanation for this
phenomenon can be found in the probability density updates. Bid and ask values become
two consecutive values after a while, and their cumulated probability becomes a value above
0.9. The rest of the possible values is estimated to have a probability below 0.1, most of them
below 1.E-8. Independently of the side of the arrived orders, when these values close to 0 are
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Figure 5.6: The learning behavior of the market maker in case of central selection.
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Figure 5.7: The learning behavior of the market maker in case of central selection, closer
view at a simulation run.
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Figure 5.8: The learning behavior of the market maker in case of central selection, immedi-
ately before and after a jump.
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multiplied, they do not change much, but stay in the neighborhood of 0. As a consequence
bid and ask remain the same. A possible solution to this problem would be to re-center the
interval of possible values and set up a new normal PDE in cases like this. In Das (2005)
experiments with larger spread values are run. Larger spreads could also solve the problem
in some of the cases, the results depend however, on the size of the noise.
When studying carefully the segments on Figure 5.8, a slight delay can be observed in
the reaction of the market maker to the change in the fundamental value. This feature is
the consequence of the continuous time implementation and the fact that the news source
that generates the fundamental value is a component running independently. On its turn, the
timing of the adjustment in the bid ask spread depends on the time of receiving an order,
and on the timing of the orders placed by the selected investor who might have decided to
place a new order just before being informed about the new true value. Consequences and
(side)effects of the continuous time implementation are elaborated on in Section 5.4.
5.3 The case of autonomous traders
In the experiments presented in Section 5.2 central selection of the type of investors is im-
plemented by modeling one single representative investor who decides at each trade on the
type of trader that he simulates. In this section we focus on experiments with autonomous,
individual investors. A comparison of central, turn-based selection of investors, and au-
tonomous representation of individual investors is illustrated by Figure 5.9. In turn-based
selection there is always only one investor who is selected, and is required to make a de-
cision. The decision of the selected investor is always known by the market maker, even
if it leads to no orders. Central selection entails that traders cannot place orders whenever
they want to, but only when they are selected to do so. Autonomous investors decide them-
selves when to trade, and their decision is taken into account at all times. The autonomy of
investors entails simultaneous or asynchronous behavior. That is, the investors might react
simultaneously to some information (e.g both Investor 1 and Investor 2 react at the same time
to B6 and A6 on the figure), but they might also be carrying out different tasks, at the same
moment (e.g. between the first and the second change in the bid and ask values). One of the
agents, for example, might just listen to news, while another one is analyzing the market,
and a third one is waiting for his order to be executed, and all this as a consequence of their
autonomy, being not coordinated by some central system.
Given the autonomous feature of investors it is not possible to provide a unique time line
of events within the new, autonomous, continuous time (ACTEGM) model. We can provide
only an independent description of the behavior of the various market participants. The
behavior of the investors and the behavior of the market maker corresponds to the description
given in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.9: Turn-based selection of investors vs. autonomous behavior of investors.
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The time line of an investor’s behavior.
1. Listen to news and/or confirmation of placed orders.
2. Perceive and interpret the available information.
3. If there are no pending orders sent already, place an order depending on the individual
belief and decision-making mechanism.
The time line of the market maker’s behavior. The behavior of the market maker is the
same as in the CEGM market, with centrally selected investors.
1. The market maker initializes the bid and ask prices (PB and PA). These are made
public to all participants.
2. The market maker waits for messages, processes the message, carries out the transac-
tion if an order is involved, updates the PDE, PB and PA.
3. If there is a transaction the market maker confirms the transaction to the trader in-
volved.
4. The market maker publishes the new PB and PA.
5. The market maker processes the next message.
In this section we analyze the performance of the market maker in tracking the funda-
mental value in the asynchronous, continuous time simulation with autonomous, individual
investors. We examine whether the market maker is able to react timely to changes in the
fundamental value and whether the fundamental value is correctly reflected in the market
prices. Das (2005) has shown this to be the case in the discrete-time model. Our results in
the turn-based Section 5.2 model with central selection also confirm this conclusion.
5.3.1 Experimental settings
The experimental settings are similar to the settings used to conduct experiments with cen-
trally selected investors, described in Section 5.2. In this way we can compare the results and
analyze the effects of autonomous traders. The individual, autonomous, representation of the
investors entails however, the specification of additional attributes. The attributes include the
number of traders for each type of trader, and timing aspects, such as the time horizon of the
investors, and the no order condition of the market maker.
The number of investors. Given the individual, autonomous representation of the in-
vestors in our implementation, the number of each type of investor needs to be specified
to each fraction applied. While a small number of investors might be not representative, a
lot of traders could overload the market maker with orders, if they place orders faster than
the market maker can handle them. In order to avoid this situation, in the first place we con-
duct experiments with the minimum number of investors necessary: three informed – one
uninformed for α = 0.75, one informed – one uninformed for α = 0.5, and one informed –
three uninformed for α = 0.25. Later on, in Section 5.4, we also study the implications of
considering more interacting investors.
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The ”no order” condition In turn-based models, in each period, there is either zero or one
order to be processed placed by a single (selected) investor. The market maker knows in this
way at each moment whether a decision has been made. He thus, is implicitly informed also
about the fact that someone decides not to place an order. In order to keep this property, in
the autonomous, continuous case we let the investors send explicit ”No order” messages to
the market maker when they decide not to trade. Informing the market maker that someone
does not wish to place an order is not realistic, however. In reality, investors do not commu-
nicate such decisions, they communicate only when they decide to place a buy or sell order.
Therefore, later on in this chapter, in Section 5.4, we also discuss the consequences of not
notifying the market maker about the ”no order” decisions.
Timing aspects. In the discrete implementation, investors decide whether to trade or not
only when they are selected by the central simulation manager. The situation is similar in
a continuous setting with a central selection mechanism. In a continuous setting with in-
dividual, autonomous investors, investors decide to trade or not whenever they think it is
worthwhile to do so. In such a setting quite some events can take place in the market while
an investor is waiting for the execution of his order. The fundamental value can change for
example, or market conditions can change as a result of executing orders of other traders. If
an investor has no orders placed, because it was not worthwhile for him to do so, he could
analyze the possibility to trade again immediately, or he could wait for a while first and
reconsider after waiting the possibility to trade again after some time period as market con-
ditions (like bid and ask values) might have changed. For how long an investor waits before
examining the market conditions again depends on his time horizon. In our experiments, in-
vestors analyze market conditions either when news arrives or, when their order is executed,
or when their individual time horizon ”expires”. If not specified otherwise, we set the time
horizon of investors to 0, meaning that they consider placing an order whenever they get the
chance.
5.3.2 Experimental results
Figure 5.10 illustrates that, the market maker is able to learn the fundamental value most of
the times in a setting with autonomous investors as well. However, fluctuations (uncertainty)
after a jump occur more often and are longer visible in general, than in the case of centrally
selected investors. In the segments provided in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 this property is
more visible.
An interesting feature that we observe is that the market maker seems to be more uncer-
tain when working with 75% informed traders as opposed to 50% or 25% informed traders.
In the market with 50% informed traders, the uncertainty can be exclusively ascribed to the
presence of the uninformed trader. In Figure 5.12 (a) and (d) a kind of overreaction can be
observed. After the fundamental value jumps, the market maker’s bid and ask prices begin
to fluctuate with a decreasing amplitude, before approximating the desired value. This phe-
nomenon can be attributed to the larger amount of informed traders in the market with 75%
perfectly informed traders. Here, three informed and one uninformed investors are interact-
ing, as opposed to one informed and one uninformed trader in the experiments with 50%
informed traders. All informed traders respond immediately to the change in the fundamen-
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Figure 5.10: The learning behavior of the market maker in case of autonomous investors.
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Figure 5.11: A segment from the learning behavior of the market maker in case of au-
tonomous investors.
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Figure 5.12: The learning behavior of the market maker immediately before and after a jump
in the fundamental value in case of autonomous investors.
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tal value by placing the same kind of order, thus causing the peaks in the resulting bid and
ask prices.
Note that the repeated peaks are not visible in Figure 5.8(a) and (d), viz. the model with
central selection. Although, in case of central selection, the market maker is also uncertain
about the correct bid-ask prices after a jump in the fundamental value, the market maker
quickly learns the new fundamental value, especially when the fraction of informed traders
in the market is high. There are no other large oscillations.
The diverging results in the price discovery process of the market maker in the two models
presented can be attributed to the autonomous, individual representation of investors. In the
next section we elaborate on some of the consequences discussed so far and we analyze what
kind of other consequences autonomous representation and continuous time simulation can
cause.
5.4 Discussion
In this section we aim to analyze how the various implementations and extensions of the
EGM model perform, and what the effect on the market dynamics is of making the model
and the settings more realistic. In relation to this we elaborate on the differences between the
dynamics of the turn-based, continuous time model with central coordination of investors,
and the dynamics of the continuous time model with autonomous traders. We focus espe-
cially on the following questions.
• In which case do the various models give the most appropriate results?
• Which model and setting is closer to reality?
• What happens when trying to make them more realistic?
5.4.1 How realistic are the models?
The EGM model seems to be appropriate to learn the fundamental value of a stock known
and diffused by informed traders. The question is however, how the results can be related
to the dynamics of real stock markets. It must be admitted that the model contains several
unrealistic elements.
1. In the turn-based models (EGM and CEGM) investors are controlled, in the sense that
they are not allowed to trade whenever they want to, but only when they are centrally
selected to do so.
2. In the ACTEGM model the number of investors is relatively low.
3. In all models the market maker knows whenever investors make a decision, thus also
when investors decide not to trade.
4. In all models all investors plan only one time horizon ahead.
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5. In all models the market maker knows information that is not available in reality.
We refer here to the time of change in the fundamental value, the rate of informed and
uninformed traders, and the frequency with which uninformed traders place an order.
6. In all models there is a well-defined fundamental value.
In this chapter we aim to focus mainly on the first three items and on the consequences
of allowing a more realistic representation of these aspects. We will also indicate briefly how
some of the other ”unrealistic” elements could be eliminated.
5.4.2 The effects of individual, autonomous representation
In the ACTEGM model we tried to eliminate the first unrealistic element. In the experiments
presented in Section 5.3 we have avoided central selection, and represented individual, au-
tonomous investors. In this way the EGM model became closer to the behavior of human
traders. It has also caused however, diverging results that are mainly manifested in the fluc-
tuating bid and ask values. In Section 5.3.2 we already gave a brief indication of the reasons
behind this phenomenon. In this section we elaborate on this and give an indication on how
the problems can be repaired.
(Simultaneous) reactions of informed traders to changes in the fundamental value. In
the continuous model, in which investors are represented as individuals and exhibit au-
tonomous, asynchronous behavior, every trader has the opportunity to submit an order when-
ever the trader determines it is worthwhile to do so. This feature implies that if more investors
interact on the market, it can happen that some of them decide to place orders at the same
time. For example, when all informed traders observe the same jump in the fundamental
value, and it is worthwhile to submit an order, they will all do so. Given that the market
maker is able to process only one order at a time, this homogeneous, (close to) simultaneous
decision will result in a queue of orders. If there are more informed traders in the market,
there is also a larger queue.
Consider, for example, the experiments with 75% perfectly informed traders in Fig-
ure 5.12(a). Here, the number of informed investors is three as opposed to one single in-
formed investor in the experiments with 50% (b) or with 25% (c) informed traders. The
difference thus, between these experiments, is not only the fraction of the uninformed in-
vestors. The number of informed players in the market is also different. The question is
now, whether the observed fluctuations are caused only by the random trader, or whether the
number of informed investors (in absolute terms, and hence not in terms of the fraction) also
plays a role. In order to answer this question, we take a closer look at the 75% case. Further,
in Section 5.4.3 we analyze situations with populations of multiple informed traders.
Figure 5.13 shows a part of the simulation run with four traders three of which are per-
fectly informed. In the upper panel the bid and ask prices, and the fundamental vale are
displayed immediately before and after a jump in the fundamental value. On the second
panel from above, the orders are displayed at the time these are processed by the market
maker. This panel is aimed to illustrate how orders trigger the changes in the bid and ask
values shown in the upper panel. The third panel illustrates the (same) orders at the moment
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Figure 5.13: Market prices, orders processed, orders sent, and the pending message queue
over time, in a market with four traders, of which three are perfectly informed.
they have been placed by the investors. In the lower panel the number of pending messages
are shown at the time when the market maker processes a message.
Overshoots and herd-like behavior. In this figure the reason for fluctuations becomes
more pronounced. Since all informed traders submit an order of the same type, each indi-
vidual order pushes the market maker’s bid and ask prices in the same direction, causing a
strong movement in one direction. As soon as these orders are processed, the bid and ask
prices are typically over- or underestimating the fundamental value. Given that the informed
traders know the actual fundamental value and see the results of this overreaction, they will
again submit an order, driving the prices back in the direction of the fundamental value and
even further away in the other direction. This process may be repeated several times until
the market maker sets his bid and ask prices around the fundamental value.
The speed of information diffusion. In Figure 5.13 the speed of information diffusion
can be followed as well. As can be observed, the change in the fundamental value is not
immediately reflected in the prices. This market is thus inefficient for a moment. The delay
in the price adjustment process of the market maker is caused by the presence of unprocessed
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orders at the time of the jump. As there are already some orders that wait for execution when
the fundamental value changes, it might take the market maker some time to realize that the
fundamental value has changed. The delay in information diffusion is also caused by the fact
that there is some time spent between the moment an investor places an order (thus also an
order from an informed investor through the orders of which information diffuses), and the
moment the market maker executes the order.
At time 379100 the market maker begins to process a series of buy orders sent by in-
vestors before this time, when the stock was overvaluated. The market maker manages to
capture the fundamental value through the first adjustment, however, he continues to increase
the quotes as he thinks that follow up orders are reactions to new quotes. Those have been
sent however before the adjustment.
Timing aspects. Another consequence of the autonomous representation of the investors
is the delayed reaction of the market maker to the change in the fundamental value. Although
the fundamental value changes at time 378900 the market maker reacts to this change only at
379100, because he gets the message about the change only then. At this point the message
queue drops to four elements, so the change in the fundamental value is now investigated.
The market maker, as well as the investors, is notified however, about the change imme-
diately. This can be seen from the correct reaction of investors and the increased message
queue. Informed investors send buy orders as soon as they sense that the stock is mispriced.
The message queue increases to 5 elements (just) before time 379000, the 5ht element be-
ing the sign that there is a change in the fundamental value. The market maker processes
sequentially first however the messages that are waiting in the queue. These ones became
outdated though at the moment of jump.
The following additional timing issues can cause the model to not behave as expected.
• From an investor’s point of view the fundamental value might change between the time
he placed an order and before the time this order is processed by the market maker.
• The market maker might be notified later than the investors about the change in the
fundamental value.
• Both the investors and the market maker might show a delayed reaction to changes if
at that time they are carrying out another task.
Most of these timing issues might be considered as realistic. For instance, in reality it
might happen as well that someone receives important news after placing an order. If so,
he might cancel the order he placed in case that this order does not conform anymore to the
news and is not executed yet. In the model this behavior could be modeled by introducing
cancel type of messages and giving them higher priority then request messages. The market
maker’s delayed reaction to news about a change in the fundamental value could also be
solved by giving higher importance to the news message than the request messages.
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Figure 5.14: Performance with increasing number of investors if 3 out of 6 (a) and 6 of 8 (b)
traders are perfectly informed.
5.4.3 The effects of increasing the number of investors
The autonomous, individual representation of investors thus causes herd-like behavior in
case more than one informed trader interacts on the market, who immediately react to a
change in the fundamental value. Herd-like behavior in turn results in overshoots in the
price discovery process of the market maker. In the original Das (2005) model and in the
CEGM turn-based model, this effect is not present, because only one trader can submit an
order at a time, and thus, when the next trader enters the market, he observes the new bid
and ask prices, in which the new information is already (partly) processed.
In the experiments with autonomous traders presented so far, the number of traders is
kept relatively small, while in the models in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Das (2005)
the number of traders is not relevant (only the fractions of various types of traders matter).
This has to do with the typical feature that in the original models investors are either not rep-
resented individually (so, just the order flow is generated) or one single investor is centrally
selected to trade at each trading period.
In this section we analyze what happens when we increase the size of the trading crowd.
Figure 5.14 illustrates experiments in which the size of the population has been doubled
in case of 75% perfectly informed traders, and tripled in case of 50% perfectly informed
investors. As we have expected, in simulations with an increased number of informed traders
the market maker performs worse, and the order queues cause larger peaks in the bid and ask
prices, than in simulations with less investors. While the market maker was able to quickly
learn the fundamental value when trading against 1 informed and 1 uninformed trader, it
takes him more time to correctly adjust the bid and ask prices when trading with 3 informed
and 3 uninformed traders, or he does not succeed in adjusting at all.
When a queue of pending orders arises, the market maker will aim to handle the orders
one by one. Market orders that need to wait for other orders to be executed before they are
handled will not be cleared at the price they have been placed for. The market maker, how-
173
188
Chapter 5 - The Continuous-Time Extended Glosten and Milgrom Model
ever, processes all the orders as if they would have been placed one after each other, taking
into account the effects of the transactions resulting from the earlier arrived orders. This
implies that the amplitude of fluctuations increases with an increasing number of informed
investors. The question is how to deal with this herd-like behavior of traders.
5.4.4 Adjusting the model to the herd like behavior
How can we avoid to misinform the market maker while maintaining the autonomy of the
investors, and the continuous time evolution of the market? The solution that we propose is
to let the investors send limit orders instead of market orders. The market maker then would
execute only the orders that correspond to the current bid or ask, and ignore and reject the
other ones. In this way the investors will not mislead the market maker, and moreover, the
investors’ orders will not be executed at an inconvenient price. Note, that this approach does
not require modifications to the learning algorithm of the market maker.
In order to apply this approach the limit prices need to be determined. The limit price
could be set to the actual bid or ask values for instance. However, this setting would cause
many unnecessary communication between the investors and the market maker as it would
lead to many useless messages. In order to avoid overloading in the communication process,
the investors could also set the price at the fundamental value that they know, since this is the
ultimate price at which they would trade, excluding the transaction costs. This means that an
investor will sell at the current bid as long as it is higher than the current fundamental value
(plus the transaction costs) and an investor will buy at the current ask, as long as it is lower
that the current fundamental value (minus the transaction costs). As transaction costs are
ignored for the purpose of this thesis, we set the limit prices to the fundamental value plus
one cent for sell orders, and the fundamental value minus one cent for buy orders. Trading at
the fundamental value of course immediately reveals the true value of the stock to the market
maker. Given, however, the nature of the learning algorithm that is based on the order side
and not on information in the limit prices we do not have to be concerned about this problem.
Accordingly, we choose to set the price quotes at the fundamental value plus-minus one cent.
In Figure 5.15 the results of applying this setting are illustrated for the case of 75%
informed investors. On the left hand side simulations with perfectly informed traders, on
the right hand side simulations with noisily informed traders are presented. Panels (a) and
(d) show the results during the whole simulation run. Panels (b) to (d) represent segments
from the simulation. As it can be noticed, the limit orders have successfully eliminated the
fluctuations observed in Figure 5.10 (a) and (d).
Alternative approaches Another way to deal with the queues caused by the autonomous
behavior and homogeneous setting of informed traders is to introduce more variation in
the order placement behavior of the traders. Introducing different reaction times for the
investors, for example, would reduce the size of the queue that arises when a change in the
fundamental value of the risky asset occurs. Different reaction times are realistic parameters,
they could be the result of different news-sources, location or time needed to analyze the
news.
Although at first sight the queue of messages makes the model perform worse than in
the case of turn-based models, it reveals in fact valuable information from which the mar-
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Figure 5.15: The learning behavior of the market maker in case of 75% autonomous investors
who send limit orders.
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ket maker could learn. In order to improve the learning algorithm, thus, the market making
algorithm could be adjusted to handle trading crowds, by eventually learning from this spe-
cific situation (see for example (Koornneef, 2006) for a solution). The queue might indicate
for instance, the number of informed traders, or a change in the fundamental value. The
market maker could try to avoid overreaction by, for example, modifying his expectations
more smoothly, when he observes a queue of orders on the same trading side. He could also
temporarily modify the parameter indicating the fraction of informed traders when using
the learning algorithms, assuming that the queue consists mainly of the orders of informed
traders who react to mispriced stocks. Further, the market maker could learn the fraction
of informed traders, information that is given in advance in the current model. This would
make the model more realistic, as in reality the market maker does not know this fraction. In
our future research we intend to investigate these extensions to the learning behavior of the
market maker.
5.4.5 Effects of the no order condition
Once again, in the experiments presented up to now we let the investors send explicit ”No
order” messages to the market maker, when they decided not to trade. We have chosen for
this solution, in order to keep the model as close to the replicated EGM as possible. This
way of trading is not realistic however, as in reality investors do not inform the market maker
that they do not want to trade. In order to make our model more realistic, in the experiments
described in this section we have modified the investors’ behavior, so that they do not notify
the market maker about their ”no order” decision. Next, we analyze the consequences of this
modification.
Defining the market maker’s no order condition. In the turn-based EGM model it does
not make a difference whether investors send an explicit no order message or not, because the
market maker will interpret a turn with no outcome as a no order. In the discrete situation, the
”no order condition” occurs when a buy or sell order is not placed in a trading round. During
continuous simulation, however, there are no trading rounds, and orders are not placed at
fixed times. If an investor decides to not to place any orders, because for him it is not
worthwhile to do so, he could reconsider the possibility to trade again after a while, as
market conditions (like bid and ask values) might change after a while. In the experiments
presented here, we set the time horizon of the investors to 20 milliseconds. The investors
analyze thus, every 20 milliseconds the market conditions again (unless they receive news in
the meantime), in case they decide not to place an order.
This setting raises the following question: how long should a silent (no order) period
last before the market maker decides that investors do not want to place orders because the
fundamental value is captured?
For experimental purposes the time horizon of investors is constant and homogeneous.
Moreover, the chosen value might not be optimal. The time horizon of investors is highly
heterogeneous in reality and might vary from stock to stock, further it might change over
time. In order to obtain an optimal performance of the model the time horizon (even if it is
the same for all investors) and the no order condition should be properly determined. In order
to determine properly for how long investors should wait for a change in the environment to
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Figure 5.16: Market prices in a market with 50% of perfectly informed traders, no order
condition of 50 (a) and 5 (b) milliseconds.
reconsider their decision, and to determine the no-order condition for the market maker the
performance of the application should be analyzed. One of the values that could be looked
at is how often bid and ask values change in the central selection case. Another aspect
is how long it takes to get an answer to an order, and the frequency with which investors
place no orders in the ACTEGM model with no order messages. Further, it should be taken
into account, that all these values depend on the number of traders and the computational
performance of the computer used to run the experiments. In the thesis we do not aim to
analyze this problem, although we will illustrate the consequences of choosing different
values.
Sensitivity to the no order condition. Figure 5.4.5 illustrates experiments with a rela-
tively high and a relatively low value for the no order condition. In the first case the market
maker counts every 50 millisecond period of silence as a no order condition, while in the
second case this value is set to 5 milliseconds. These settings involve that the market maker
will apply more often the ”no order” condition in the latter case, than in the first case (see
the lower panels). As it can be observed the speed of adjustment depends on this value. The
smaller the value of the no order condition, the faster the convergence of the bid and ask
values to the fundamental value. It should be mentioned further, that the speed of adjustment
depends in addition on the number of traders, on the time horizon value of the traders, and
on the performance of the computer used to run the experiments
5.4.6 Other unrealistic aspects
Although the ACTEGM model contains more realistic elements than the EGM and CEGM
model, there still are many aspects that do not cover real behavior or market structure. As we
mentioned in Section 5.4.1 in reality the fundamental value is not crisp, the market maker
knows neither the rate of informed and uninformed traders, neither the level of noise in
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the information set of the investors. We already suggested that the unrealistic assumptions
regarding the knowledge of some of these elements could be avoided in the autonomous case
by trying to learn these values from the queue of orders.
Finally, we should remark that the continuous time implementation, the independent rep-
resentation of the news source, and the individual, autonomous representation of investors
imply various timing issues leading to results that diverge from the results generated by the
original EGM model. These are, at one hand realistic and interesting, on the other hand
they might cause more complex behavior, and thus they should be taken into account when
analyzing market dynamics.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have replicated the extended EGM model described in (Das, 2003, 2005)
in the continuous time ABSTRACTE environment. The original model is implemented by
applying discrete time simulation. In contrast the ABSTRACTE environment is based on
continuous time simulation. The difference in the flow of time entails that time related
aspects should be carefully chosen, and should be taken into account when analyzing exper-
imental results within ABSTRACTE. We have presented two specific cases with respect to
the investors’ behavior. In CEGM centrally selected investors are mimicked. This selection
does not require an individual representation of traders, and is in accordance with the de-
scription given by Das. The difference between the original model and our model is, that the
fundamental value is represented independently.
The central selection of traders is not realistic however, and therefore, in the second case,
in the ACTEGM model we have relaxed this assumption, and have focused on autonomous,
individual representation of traders. In Section 5.3, we have pointed out that continuous
implementation of markets and an individual, autonomous representation of traders carrying
out tasks asynchronously requires specification of additional parameters. For example, atten-
tion should be paid to the number of different types of investors in addition to their fraction,
and to the no order condition. Individual, autonomous behavior of the traders can influence
market dynamics in an interesting way. In general it can cause the model perform worse
through the herd-like behavior. These effects can be eliminated however, by slightly chang-
ing the market structure, i.e. letting the investors place limit orders instead of market orders.
Further, herd like behavior might also reveal valuable information about the fundamental
value.
The results of our experiments point out that continuous simulation of continuous mar-
kets, and individual asynchronous representation of traders’ behavior influence the dynamics
of the model. Given that most financial markets apply continuous trading sessions, these fea-
tures should thus be taken into account during modeling.
It might seem that the asynchronous, continuous-time framework just makes the dynam-
ics, and the interpretation of the results, more intricate. It has, however, several advantages
compared to the original model. While in the original framework, no attention is paid to the
way orders are generated, in the model presented in this thesis there is special attention paid
to the behavior of individual investors. Investors in the continuous setting are more realisti-
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cally represented, being able to make decisions autonomously. Further, the agents may have
more information available in the continuous-time framework, for example, by interpreting
order queues. We expect that this additional information would enable the market maker to
learn several quantities that would be unknown to him on actual markets (such as the fraction
of informed traders and the distribution of the jump process).
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Conclusions and future research
The research goal that we have stated in this thesis was to help the study and understanding of
market dynamics. As various, often evolving, market organizations exist, we did not choose
for one specific market to study, but we strived to allow for the representation of multiple
markets. In a similar way, we have focused on traders’ variable behavior. In this chapter we
aim to give an overview and evaluate to what degree we managed to achieve the research
objective and answer the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. We will also give hints
for future research.
6.1 Evaluation objective
In the introduction of the thesis we have stated the following research objective:
Contribute to the study and understanding of market dynamics by providing a com-
putational agent-based continuous-time simulation approach that supports a flexible
representation of stock market organizations and traders’ variable behavior.
In relation to our research objective we have formulated a number of research questions.
The first amongst these focused on the structure and functioning of real markets:
Research Question 1.
Which are the relevant common and variable aspects of stock markets that should be
taken into account when studying them?
Chapter 2 has been devoted to this question. In order to be able to answer it we have
studied the market microstructure literature. As a result, we have proposed a conceptual
framework that contains various aspects, dimensions along which the various market orga-
nizations and individual traders can be differentiated.
When trying to answer Research Question 1 we have differentiated two type of aspects:
• organizational aspects, i.e. static aspects that are well-defined, and
• behavioral aspects, i.e. dynamic aspects containing elements that are hardly observ-
able
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.
We distinguished the following organizational aspects:
1. traded instruments
2. orders and quotes
3. market participants
4. trading sessions
5. execution systems
6. market rules
The hardly observable, dynamic aspects are mainly price formation related. In the price
formation mechanism often a market participant is involved. Therefore, we have categorized
this aspect as being behavioral.
We have formulated the behavioral aspects in terms of the role of the market participant
concerned. We have analyzed the generic behavior of three groups of market participants:
investors, brokers and market makers. Further, we have tried to identify hardly observable,
and varying aspects that differentiate individual traders from each other within each group.
As a result, we proposed the following aspects for the three trader types.
Aspects that differentiate investors are: investment objectives, investment constraints,
attitude to risk, investment strategy, portfolio maintenance, monitoring, and time issues.
It is however, difficult to give a generic representation in such a detail, as these aspects
are correlated, and actions related to them are not executed sequentially. All these aspects
influence however the order investors place at the end of their decision process. So, they can
be included in one way or another in the investors’ order placing strategy; and investors can
be simply looked upon as traders who generate orders.
The main aspect that differentiates investors is, thus:
• the order generation mechanism.
Aspects that differentiate brokers are:
• order selection mechanisms;
• order execution mechanisms;
• negotiation strategies;
• strategies to determine transaction prices.
Aspects that differentiate market makers are:
• order execution mechanisms;
• determination and timing of quotes;
• handling the limit order book.
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The way we described trader roles turned out to be advantageous in two ways at least.
Firstly, it can be easily translated to the perception-decision-action architecture of agents.
Secondly, the generic, specific and hardly observable components, can be captured in a
straightforward way by designing the agents as consisting of skeletons and empty place-
holders for the various existing or presumed behavioral strategy patterns.
Chapter 2 ends with an overview of approaches used to study market dynamics. The
primary aim of this overview is to analyze how the various approaches deal with the hardly
observable aspects (i.e. how they model them and what they assume about them), and what
these approaches assume or conclude about the market dynamics. The analysis points out
that assumptions regarding price formation vary along a large scale, from matching two or-
ders and simple linear equations to complex, nonlinear equilibrium models, and intricate
behavior of market makers. Further, the assumptions regarding traders’ behavior varies from
homogeneous rational traders with fixed trading strategies to heterogeneous, boundedly ra-
tional traders with evolving strategies, and arbitrary many other possibilities and combina-
tions of strategies.
After being able to describe the structure and workings of real markets, we turned our
focus to artificial stock markets. Accordingly, Chapter 3 dealt with:
Research Question 2.
To what degree do ASMs from literature reflect the workings of real markets and how do
they deal with the common and variable aspects of real stock markets?
In order to answer this question we analyzed a number of ASMs from the literature, and
compared their structure, and traders’ representation to the workings of real markets. We did
this on basis of the framework of organizational and behavioral aspects proposed in Chap-
ter 2. The analysis resulted in a conceptual framework for a taxonomy of ASMs that extends
the conceptual framework for describing stock markets with design and implementation as-
pects. This taxonomy can be used as a map, a sort of checklist based on which additional
ASMs can be analyzed.
One of the conclusions of this synthesis, and the answer to the research question, is that
although many ASMs focus on call-auctions, the importance to study continuous trading
sessions is more and more recognized. When implementing continuous trading sessions,
however, mainly discrete-time simulation is applied, not continuous-time simulation. When
analyzing the type of traders in various ASMs with respect to their role in the market, we can
conclude that investor traders are most often focused on. The role of market makers is seen
as important only in a few cases, and brokers’ behavior is ignored. Further, traders are gen-
erally implemented as a crowd, and their behavior is often centrally controlled. Individual,
autonomous traders are rarely modeled.
Based on the analysis of the workings of real markets and on the synthesis on ASMs we
proposed the ABSTRACTE trading environment in Chapter 4. The contents of this chapter
forms the answer to:
Research Question 3.
How can we design and develop a modular, flexible agent-based environment using which
one can study both the common and the varying, hardly observable features of stock markets,
as well as their aspects that have been rarely or not represented in existing ASMs?
As suggested by our answer to Research Question 3 the environment is agent-based,
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and is designed with the purpose to deal with the varying and hardly observable aspects of
real markets, with the relevant factors that can be found in existing ASMs, as well as the
aspects ignored by the ASMs studied. Accordingly, the main properties that we have striven
to achieve, and which finally drove the design process of the trading environment were:
• continuous trading sessions;
• continuous-time simulation;
• individual trader representation;
• autonomous, asynchronous (not controlled, always simultaneous or sequential) behav-
ior of traders;
• modularity as regards trading strategies and price formation mechanisms.
The approach we took was to build the environment based on the static, well-defined
organizational aspects and the generic behavioral aspects discovered in Chapter 2. In the
implementation these are the only hard-coded parts. For the varying, hardly observable
aspects we used only empty placeholders that can be filled in with arbitrary many solutions
in a flexible way.
We provide a number of variants to fill in the empty placeholders on top of the skeletons,
and in the second part of Chapter 4 we illustrate how the environment can support multiple
market organizations and behavioral implementations. By using, simple and analytical case
studies we have been able to gain confidence about the correct functioning of the environ-
ment with the implemented ASMs on top of it.
While in Chapter 4 only simple ASMs are studied to illustrate the modularity of the AB-
STRACTE environment, in Chapter 5 a more detailed study of the dynamics of a specific
market is presented and discussed. The case study concerns the continuous-time, asynchro-
nous implementation of the extended Glosten and Milgrom model from Das (2005) with
autonomous, individually represented investors. This representation helps us to give a fist
answer to the last research question, namely:
Research Question 4.
What is the added value of the proposed environment as compared to existing ASMs, and
how can it improve the understanding of market dynamics?
The results of the experiments show that there are some important differences in the na-
ture of available information between turn-based models and continuous-time, autonomous,
asynchronous agent-based models like ABSTRACTE. On the one hand, much information is
available to the agents in turn-based models, since each agent can observe the consequences
of the previous decisions (e.g. prices that have been formed as a result of other agents’ trading
decisions). In continuous, asynchronous models, there is uncertainty regarding this informa-
tion, because the agents take decisions based on available information at some point in time,
but the market state may change between the placement of an order and its execution. On
the other hand, additional information might be revealed in the continuous, asynchronous
models, which is not available in turn-based models. For example, a sudden increase in the
number of entries in the order book might entail information that can be acted upon, while it
is not available in turn-based models.
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In the end, the answer to the last research question, Research Question 4, can be derived
from both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. What makes the ABSTRACTE environment specific,
is the fact that it is based on continuous-time simulation and on an individual representation
of various market participants, without putting constraints on the representation of hardly
observable and varying aspects, namely the price formation mechanism and trader’s specific
behavior. The most important value of the ABSTRACTE environment lies in its modularity,
i.e. in the fact that experiments with various market structures and with arbitrary many
trading strategies can be run on top of it. Since, only a few strategy implementations are
provided at the time being, to fill in the empty placeholders, replication of some specific
ASMs or market structure might require adaptation of the environment. We expect however,
that this will not take too much effort, and the grade of adaptation required will be reduced
over time.
Given the above answers to the research questions, and the argumentations behind them,
we can state that we have managed to achieve the stated research objective, namely to aid the
understanding of market dynamics. The approaches and frameworks proposed in this thesis
will help the study of market dynamics in multiple ways. The conceptual framework can be
used to compare properties of real and artificial stock markets, and can serve as a guideline
to design new ASMs. The ABSTRACTE trading environment is a test bed of ASMs, and a
tool to implement new ASMs. In this way the environment can help us to study, understand
and compare market dynamics within new and existing ASMs. Results might suggest how
certain market organizations should be changed or improved to improve market quality.
6.2 Future research
Research in the field of market dynamics can be conducted in many directions, due to the
fact that market dynamics are still difficult to understand, and that many varying market
organizations, and hardly observable aspects of price formation and traders’ behavior exist.
Based on the contents of this thesis we suggest future research in three main directions: the
conceptual framework, the trading environment, and the specific ASM studied in this thesis.
The conceptual framework proposed can be used as a guideline to design new ASMs.
Further, it is a framework that helps to structure existing literature, i.e. to classify, compare
various ASMs and to analyze how given ASMs conform to reality. In the thesis, we have
compared only a limited number of ASMs, this list can be extended at any time. Further, the
framework could be extended or modified if necessary, to include other important aspects
that differentiate stock markets.
The ABSTRACTE trading environment itself can be further developed in many direc-
tions. For example, multiple stocks could be considered, and investors could be modeled as
portfolio managers in multiple stocks. In relation to this more market makers could operate
on the same market. Then, the news generation process could be separated, and should be
made modular to support other forms of news generation, and fundamental value evolution.
Further, the behavior of brokers could be focused on, for instance market dynamics could
be studied and compared with brokers in double auction vs. dynamics of markets without
double auction. The environment can additionally be used to compare dynamics of various
market structures, like call vs. continuous trading sessions, and to study the relation to the
empirical and experimental literature. Another challenging application of the environment is
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to run it in a distributed way. It would be interesting to conduct research with more types of
markets running simultaneously trading in similar stocks, and observe the behavior of traders
who exploit differences in pricing. Finally, the set of provided strategies to fill in the empty
placeholders could be extended with learning strategies applying computational intelligence
approaches, for instance.
In relation to the specific ASM studied within the ABSTRACTE, i.e. the continuous-
time implementation of the extended Glosten and Milgrom model, we propose additional
experiments, extensions, modifications, and analysis to better understand the dynamics of
the model, and the relation between the aspects that drive the dynamics. A more detailed
statistical analysis could be conducted for example, to further test the efficiency of the mar-
ket. The performance of various investors, and the performance of the market maker could
be analyzed for this reason. Then, the behavior of the market maker could be improved, as
suggested, to learn from the order queue. In this way, some unrealistic assumptions of the
model could be dropped, like the knowledge related to the rate of informed and uninformed
traders. These adaptations would make the model more realistic, and would lead to a higher
degree of efficiency. Experiments with a higher number of individual traders would make
the results more valuable as well. There are several other interesting situations to experiment
with in both the discrete-time and the continuous-time framework. It would be interesting,
for example, to vary the jump process and investigate the market maker’s learning behavior
under different circumstances. Large jumps could be introduced for this purpose, or histori-
cal time series could be used to model the jump process. Another challenging task is to adapt
the learning algorithm of the market maker in order to account for both perfectly informed
and noisily informed traders.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Over de dynamiek van financie¨le markten wordt een uitgebreide discussie gevoerd door
onderzoekers en financie¨le experts, die proberen te begrijpen en te verklaren hoe finan-
cile markten opereren. De ingewikkelde dynamiek van markten en allerlei moeilijk waar
te nemen aspekten ervan, zoals de besluiten die ten grondslag liggen aan de prijsformatie
mechanismes, of ook de motivatie van investeerders voor hun akties op de markt leiden
tot uiteenlopende verklaringen. De verscheidenheid van aannames binnen de verschillende
benaderingen heeft geleid tot controversile, elkaar tegensprekende beschrijvingen van de
dynamiek van markten, hetgeen aangeeft dat de werking van markten tot op heden slecht
begrepen wordt.
In hun poging om een beter begrip te verkrijgen van de dynamiek van markten, worden
in studies op het terrein van de op agent technologie gebaseerde computationele economie
markten gerepresenteerd vanuit een bottom up benadering. In het algemeen kunnen deze op
agent technologie gebaseerde modellen van aandelenmarkten gekarakteriseerd worden als
modellen waarin agenten om beurten geselekteerd worden door een centrale instantie, waar-
bij ze een enkelvoudige handeling verrichten. Dat wil zeggen, er wordt om beurten handel
gedreven op diskrete tijdstippen, een vooraf vastgelegd repertoire van handelsalternatieven
wordt gemodelleerd, en de handelaars zijn niet autonoom maar nemen alleen dan een besluit
om al of niet te handelen als ze daartoe geselekteerd worden.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is een bijdrage te leveren aan het inzicht in de dynamiek
van markten door middel van een uitbreiding van de op agent technologie gebaseerde inval-
shoek. Om ons doel te bereiken stellen we een omgeving voor, die modulair is, gebaseerd op
continue tijd en gebruik maakt van agenten, waarbij de deelnemers aan de markt individueel
en autonoom gemodelleerd worden. Om zo’n omgeving te kunnen ontwikkelen maken we
allereerst een analyse en een vergelijking van aandelenmarkten uit de praktijk en artificile
aandelenmarkten (”artificial stock market”s of ASM’s). Deze analyse is het uitgangspunt
voor twee conceptuele raamwerken: een om aandelenmarkten uit de realiteit te beschrijven
en de andere voor artificile.
Voor het conceptuele raamwerk waarmee we aandelenmarkten uit de praktijk beschri-
jven nemen we de literatuur over de microstruktuur van markten als uitgangspunt. Binnen
dit raamwerk worden de organisatie van markten en de deelnemers daaraan onderscheiden
langs twee assen, te weten organisatorisch en in termen van gedrag. Organisatorische aspek-
ten refereren aan statische, welgedefinieerde elementen, zoals de verhandelde instrumenten,
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het type orders, het type uitvoeringssysteem en de sessies waarin handel gedreven wordt.
Gedragsmatige aspekten zijn dynamisch en bevatten elementen die nauwelijks waar te ne-
men vallen. We concentreren ons op het gedrag van drie groepen participanten in de markt:
investeerders, effectenmakelaars en ’market makers’, zoals de hoekman op de Amsterdamse
Effectenbeurs. We beschrijven het generiek gedrag van elk type deelnemer. Daarnaast
proberen we de nauwelijks waarneembare en varie¨rende elementen te bepalen waardoor indi-
viduele deelnemers binnen dezelfde groep zich van elkaar onderscheiden. Om te analyseren
in hoeverre de ASM’s uit de literatuur de mechanismes van markten uit de praktijk mod-
elleren, en hoe ze omgaan met de gemeenschappelijke alsook varirende aspekten van aan-
delenmarkten uit de praktijk, bestuderen we een aantal ASM’s uit de literatuur, vergelijken
we de struktuur ervan en hoe handelaren gerepresenteerd worden, met de gang van zaken
in de werkelijke wereld. Deze analyse levert een taxonomie van ASM’s op waarbij we het
conceptuele raamwerk van de aandelenmarkten uit de praktijk uitbreiden met ontwerp- en
implementatieaspekten. Deze taxonomie kan gebruikt worden als een routebeschrijving, een
soort check list waarop een vergelijking van additionele ASM’s gebaseerd kan worden.
We nemen de analyse van de mechanismes van markten in de praktijk en de synthese
over ASM’s als uitgangspunt voor onze bijdrage: de ABSTRACTE omgeving (Agent-Based
Simulation of Trading Roles in an Asynchronous Continuous Trading Environment). Deze
omgeving maakt gebruik van agenten, en is ontworpen met het doel onderzoek te verrichten
naar de varie¨rende en moeilijk waar te nemen aspekten van markten in de praktijk, alsmede
de relevante factoren die we kunnen vinden in bestaande ASM’s, alsook de aspekten die
daar achterwege gelaten zijn. Derhalve zijn de belangrijkste eigenschappen die we willen
implementeren, en die de drijvende kracht vormen achter het ontwerpproces van deze mark-
tomgeving de volgende: de mogelijkheid om continu handel te drijven, simulatie in continue
tijd, individuele representatie van de deelnemers, autonoom en asynchroon (niet van buiten
af bestuurd, niet alles tegelijkertijd of strikt sequentie¨l) gedrag van de deelnemers, en mod-
ulariteit wat betreft handelsstrategien en het prijsvormingsmechanisme.
Ons idee is om de omgeving te bouwen, gebaseerd op de statische, welgedefinierde
organisatorische aspekten, met daarnaast alleen de generieke aspekten van het gedrag. In
de implementatie zijn dit de uitgeprogrammeerde onderdelen. Voor elk van de varirende,
nauwelijks waarneembare aspekten gebruiken we een lege mal, die op een flexibele manier
gevuld kan worden met een willekeurig aantal oplossingen.
In dit proefschrift beschrijven we een aantal varianten waarmee deze lege mallen inge-
vuld kunnen worden, en we laten zien op welke manier de omgeving gebruikt kan worden
om een aantal marktorganisaties en voorbeelden van gedrag te beschrijven. We gaan uit van
eenvoudige en analytische case studies en dit stelt ons in staat om vertrouwen te verkrij-
gen wat betreft het korrekt funktioneren van de omgeving met de gemplementeerde ASM’s
daaraan toegevoegd.
In dit proefschrift presenteren we daarnaast een gedetailleerde studie van de mecha-
nismes in een specifieke markt. Deze case study behandelt de asynchrone implementatie
in continue tijd van het uitgebreide Glosten en Milgrom model met autonome, individueel
gemodelleerde investeerders. De resultaten tonen aan dat er een aantal belangrijke ver-
schillen aan te geven zijn in de aard van de beschikbare informatie tussen op beurten
gebaseerde modellen versus autonome, asynchrone, op agenten gebaseerde modellen met
continue tijd zoals ABSTRACTE. Enerzijds is er veel informatie beschikbaar voor de agen-
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ten in modellen die op beurten gebaseerd zijn, omdat iedere agent de gevolgen kan waarne-
men van eerdere beslissingen (bij voorbeeld prijzen die het resultaat zijn van de beslissingen
van andere agenten). In continue, asynchrone modellen bestaat onzekerheid omtrent deze
informatie, omdat de agenten hun beslissingen baseren op de informatie die beschikbaar is
op een bepaald ogenblik in de tijd, terwijl de toestand van de markt kan veranderen tussen
het ogenblik waarop de order geplaatst werd en waarop die uitgevoerd wordt. Anderzijds, in
continue, asynchrone modellen kan informatie beschikbaar komen, die niet beschikbaar is in
modellen die op beurten gebaseerd zijn. Zo kan bij voorbeeld een plotselinge toename van
orders informatie in zich bergen waarop gehandeld kan worden, terwijl die niet beschikbaar
is in modellen die op beurten gebaseerd zijn.
De specifieke aspekten van de ABSTRACTE omgeving zijn dat de simulatie gebaseerd
is op continue tijd en dat de diverse deelnemers aan de markt individueel gemodelleerd
worden, terwijl er geen beperkingen zijn op hoe de varirende en nauwelijks waarneembare
aspekten gerepresenteerd worden, te weten het mechanisme dat de prijs bepaalt, en het spec-
ifieke gedrag van de deelnemers. De belangrijkste waarde van de ABSTRACTE omgeving
is gelegen in haar modulariteit, waarmee bedoeld wordt dat de omgeving als basis gebruikt
kan worden voor experimenten met allerlei marktstrukturen en een willekeurig aantal han-
delsstrategien.
De benaderingen en raamwerken die in dit proefschrift voorgesteld worden kunnen op
vele manieren bijdragen aan de studie van de dynamiek van markten. Het conceptuele
raamwerk kan ingezet worden om eigenschappen van zowel aandelenmarkten uit de praktijk
als kunstmatige te vergelijken, en kan ook dienen als richtlijn bij het ontwerpen van nieuwe
ASM’s. Met de ABSTRACTE omgeving kunnen ASM’s zowel bestudeerd als nieuw ont-
worpen worden. In deze zin is de omgeving van nut om de dynamiek van markten te bestud-
eren, te begrijpen en te vergelijken, zowel middels nieuwe als bestaande ASM’s. De hieruit
voortkomende inzichten kunnen aanbevelingen opleveren over hoe bepaalde marktorgan-
isaties veranderd of verbeterd zouden kunnen worden teneinde hun kwaliteit te verhogen.
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A Modular, Continuous-Time Approach
The dynamics of financial markets is subject of much debate among researchers and
financial experts trying to understand and explain how financial markets work and traders
behave. Diversified explanations result from the complexity of markets, and the hardly
observable aspects of price formation mechanisms and of participants’ motivation behind
trading decisions. In an attempt to provide a better understanding of market dynamics,
studies in the realm of agent-based computational economics represent markets from
bottom-up. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of market
dynamics by extending the agent-based computational approach. In order to achieve our
goal we propose a modular, continuous-time, agent-based trading environment, with
individual, autonomous representation of market participants. In order to be able to
develop such an environment we first analyze and compare real and artificial stock
markets (ASMs). Based on this analysis we propose a conceptual framework to describe
real markets. By enriching the framework with design and implementation issues we get a
multi-dimensional taxonomy of artificial stock markets. ABSTRACTE, the proposed
modular environment is an operational form of these frameworks. ABSTRACTE is aimed to
embed the common aspects of real markets that exhibit big variations and are rarely
represented in artificial stock markets. This environment provides the user with a flexible
mechanism to implement many of the varying and hardly observable aspects of stock
markets and traders’ behavior. In this way it can contribute to the understanding of
market dynamics as it can be used both as a test bed to replicate and evaluate existing
market models, and to compare dynamics of multiple ASMs, as well as a tool to conduct
experiments with new models and traders.
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The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder-
zoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The
founding participants of ERIM are RSM Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of
Economics. ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on
the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm relations, and its
business processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an
advanced doctoral programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research
programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating new business
knowledge.
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